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The founders of the United States built the U.S. Constitution upon a foundation of 
fundamental rights to include freedom of religious expression (Sidhu, 2012).  They 
enshrined this right in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. 
I). Many immigrants came to the United States for just that reason, to practice religion 
freely – without fear of persecution or hindrance.  Over the years, the issue of religion 
freedom has remained a strongly protected right and a hotly contested topic.  Cases 
involving prayer in schools, religious items at public buildings, and public funding for 
religion related programs have all made the headlines in recent years.  Such attention 
indicates the significance of this right to the average American.   
When an individual comes into the criminal justice system, things change.  
“Prisoners are often not afforded the same rights as civilians, and those diminished rights 
have been held to include restrictions on their religious freedoms” (Kao, 2005, p. 1).  
Courts attempt to balance an offender’s rights against the rights of society to be free from 
whatever behavior placed the offender in the criminal justice system.  Often, this 
balancing act causes courts to modify the rights of the offender in a diminishing sense.  
The rights of the average American to peaceably assemble, speak freely, and freely 
exercise religion do not apply without reservation to the incarcerated individual. 
Religion can make a big difference in an offender’s life (Johnson, 2012).  Since 
abandoning the “Hands-Off” Doctrine, the courts’ philosophy is that offenders do not 
give up all constitutional rights (Seymour, 2006).  This change in philosophy has had a 
large effect on how prisons manage their offenders.  Several state systems have changed 
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their policies because of, or in anticipation of, a lawsuit (e.g., Basra v. Cate, 2011; Couch 
v. Jabe, 2012).  Prison systems in the U.S. have policies covering the spectrum from 
conservative to liberal religious accommodation policies.  Clemmer (1958) defined 
accommodation as “that process which ends conflict by mutual agreement or by superior 
power and skill” (p. 86).  In the case of religion in prison, the conflict is the offender’s 
right to freely practice his or her religion and the prison administration’s duty to safely 
manage the offenders in their custody. 
Society believes prisons should diminish an offender’s rights because they can no 
longer trust the offender to act in the manner proscribed by society (Nelson, 2009) – 
therefore, he or she is in prison for deterrence or punishment, depending on the 
correctional theory to which one ascribes.  The public does not want to spend tax dollars 
on offenders when they can spend them on things such as better schools or roads (Hallett 
& Johnson, 2014).  Prison administrators closely examine each religious accommodation 
request, trying to consider offenders’ motives to determine if there is some underlying 
agenda that will cause a potential breach of security. 
While many offenders are sincere in their religious beliefs, some attend services 
as a means to break up the monotony of prison life (Clear, Hardyman, Stout, Lucken, & 
Dammer, 2000; Clemmer, 1958; Dye, Aday, Farney, & Raley, 2014). Some offenders, 
however, have used religious claims for nefarious purposes, which have resulted in harm 
to staff and other offenders.  Several years ago, a Texas death row offender pulled the 
arm of a volunteer chaplain, who was passing a Bible to him through the food slot, into 
the cell and methodically began to slice the skin from the volunteer’s arm with a razor 
(“Texas Death Row Inmate,” 2000).  In another incident, an offender’s attorney mother 
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sent a hacksaw blade to him hidden in a Bible (Colloff, 2002).  Gang members have used 
religious assembly as a ruse to carry out activities and communication (Davis, 2000; 
United States Commission on Civil Rights [USCCR], 2008).  Incidents such as these may 
cause prison officials to question whether an offender’s desire to practice his or her 
religion is sincere or is merely a means to attempt to violate the security mission of the 
prison (USCCR, 2008).  They also cause the courts to have a tendency to defer to the 
expertise and decisions of prison officials in determining if a religious activity would 
violate a legitimate governmental purpose (Gaubatz, 2005).  
Conversely, “Prisoners may have minimal control over their daily routines, but 
the Supreme Court has clarified that status as a prisoner does not entail forfeiture of all 
constitutional rights” (Seymour, 2006, p. 538).  The deprivation of liberty is the 
offender’s punishment, without stripping of all other rights (DiIulio, 1987).  Despite the 
situations when offenders have used religion for manipulative or dangerous purposes, 
many offenders are sincere in their beliefs and the exercise of their religion is meaningful 
to their rehabilitation (Johnson, 2012).  There are many converts in prison, a time of rock 
bottom for numerous individuals.  A religious belief may give them hope for a new life 
(Seymour, 2006). 
“Balancing religion is particularly complicated in the prison environment” 
(Solove, 1996, p. 462).  The judiciary branch constantly struggles between the 
fundamental right of religion expression and the right of society for protection from 
harmful acts.  The issue of religious freedom seems to bring out the passion in people.  
Throughout the last 50 years, legislation and litigation have been quite active in the area 
of religious freedom in prisons.  The pendulum in case law has swung from tests of strict 
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scrutiny to rational basis review and back again.  Historical evidence indicates many 
stakeholders are not always going to agree on how prison administrators should manage 
religious accommodations in prisons.  A review of the literature on this topic shows this 
to be the case.  Even though the majority of law reviews had the same basic concepts – 
the protection of individual rights to practice religion, many did not agree on how to 
make it happen. 
The majority of the examined journal articles showed concern for the rights of the 
prisoners rather than concern for the upholding of prison regulations.  One author wrote, 
“The Court has tended to side with the government against individuals’ claims that a 
particular law burdens the free exercise of religion” (Seymour, 2006, p. 536).  Another 
wrote, “The government cannot completely deny a prisoner’s constitutional right to 
exercise religion, and it cannot impinge upon a prisoner’s right to religious exercise 
without a rational penological justification” (Chiu, 2004, p. 999).  Contrary to the beliefs 
of scholars, it was difficult to find any entity, either court or prison system, which did not 
believe prisoners have certain rights to practice their religious beliefs.  The scholars, 
courts, and prison systems, however, were vastly different in their opinions as to how the 
exercise of these religious beliefs can be safely managed in a prison setting.  The courts 
appeared to believe, for the most part, that prison systems only have to show their 
governmental interest in an infringing regulation is necessary and of greater weight than 
the rights of the offender (Seymour, 2006). 
Scholars suggest different options for managing religion.  They agree religion has 
a place of primary importance in the rehabilitation of prisoners.  As Gaubatz wrote, there 
is “strong evidence that spiritual development and religious practice promote 
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rehabilitation and reduce recidivism in inmates” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 511).  Administrators 
weigh that importance, however, against the other factors in place at the time of religious 
exercise.  Some suggest, “correctional facility officials should defer to religious leaders in 
determining whether an inmate is a bona-fide member of a recognized religious group” 
(Davis, 2000, p. 776).  Others have suggested “correctional facility officials should 
assume all inmates claiming individualized religious beliefs are sincere in those beliefs, 
and provide such inmates with a uniform set of religious privileges” (Davis, 2000, p. 
785).  Other suggestions were more specific, such as one author’s opinion on how the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice should change its grooming policies to 
accommodate religious beliefs (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 549), something that later occurred as a 
result of judicial decision (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015).  The Harvard Law Review suggested 
following the examples of Texas and Arizona by recording the religious preferences of 
offenders exactly as reported to avoid infringement on religious freedom (“Developments 
of the Law,” 2002).  Other prison systems use categories of traditional religions and 
“other.” 
This study will address the rights of the prisoner to practice his or her religion, 
and case law leading up to and since the inception of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  Chapter II examines the history of the law 
regarding religion in prisons as well as the current governing law.  Chapter III reviews 
the research of other scholars on religious accommodations in prison and the role religion 
plays in the lives of offenders.  Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the current 
research.  Chapter V is a summary of the U.S. state and federal prison systems’ policies 
on religious accommodation.  Chapter VI explores the U.S. Courts of Appeals cases on 
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the areas of religious accommodations in prison for property, assembly, diet, grooming, 
pat and strip searches, and general exercise of religious freedom cases.  Chapter VII 




The Law and Religion in Prisons 
The Road to RLUIPA 
Any discussion of religion in prisons must begin with why society even needs to 
be concerned with the rights of prisoners to exercise their religious beliefs.  While there is 
a school of thought that believes “out of sight, out of mind” for incarcerated individuals, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution” (Turner v. Safley, 1987, p. 84).  A 
prisoner does not lose all rights merely by virtue of his or her incarceration.  Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to rule in favor of prison systems in matters weighing 
religious freedom against institutional security, but only if any infringement was 
reasonable and consistent.  That has not always been the case. 
There are many who would argue the encouragement of religious involvement of 
any type serves penological and rehabilitative interests.  “It is neither in the interest of 
inmates nor in the interest of society as a whole to force prisoners to go without the 
humanizing benefits that religion can provide” (Welty, 1998, p. 604).  Most religious 
dogmas espouse some inclusion of personal responsibility and code of ethics.  The 
involvement in religious programming also provides offenders with another outlet of 
personal expression, one of the few opportunities in a correctional setting.  “Religion can 
play a dual role in rehabilitating the inmate while simultaneously enabling the prison 




For many years, the courts took a deferential stand towards the judgment of prison 
administrators (Kao, 2005).  “The Court repeatedly refused to ‘substitute [its] judgment 
on…difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration’” (Seymour, 1984, p. 
539 quoting Block v. Rutherford, 1984, p. 599).  There may be arguments both for and 
against deference towards prison administrators.  In most cases, judges do not have the 
same knowledge about prison practices as do prison administrators (Solove, 1996).  On 
the other hand, “Deference dilutes a court’s critical powers; the more deferential a court 
becomes, the less it investigates the regulation and the more it accepts the opinions of 
those who designed the regulation” (Solove, 1996, p. 481). 
Regardless, prior to the latter half of the 19th century, the courts’ deference to 
prison administrators existed.  Initially, this deference manifested itself in a “Hands-Off” 
Doctrine (Kao, 2005).  The courts based this philosophy on five beliefs.  First, the courts 
considered the prison systems a part of the executive branch of government (Collins, 
2004).  Due to the separation of powers, the judicial branch was reluctant to meddle in 
executive branch affairs (Frey, 1997). 
Second, the courts believed prison administrators had the best knowledge and 
expertise to manage their institutions (Solove, 1996).  The courts did not believe judges 
had the knowledge and expertise to scrutinize decisions made by prison administrators.  
The courts believed their intervention could cause harm to the prison systems by 
undermining security and discipline (Collins, 2004).   
Third, in 1871, Ruffin v. Commonwealth ruled that offenders were “slaves of the 
state” (p. 796).  Offenders lost their rights once they were convicted and became 
incarcerated (Collins, 2004).  The infringement on offenders’ rights spread to the 
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fundamental right of religious freedom (Kao, 2005).  With the “slave of the state” 
viewpoint, any prison official could deny an offender’s religious accommodations for any 
or no reason (Rom, 2009).  Fourth, prisons were not a matter of great importance to 
society.  This judicial period was before the days of internet and highlighting prisons as a 
media focal point.  Once incarcerated, offenders and their daily lives became mostly 
invisible to the general public (Del Carmen, Ritter & Witt, 2008).  Finally, due to the 
concept of federalism, federal courts stayed out of the affairs of state prison systems 
(Collins, 2004). 
With Sherbert v. Verner in 1963, the Court made a step away from the “Hands-
Off” Doctrine and ruled “the Free Exercise Clause necessitated a strict scrutiny review of 
neutral, generally applicable laws that impose burdens on religious exercise” (Chiu, 2004, 
p. 1003).  Thus, essentially any law burdening religious exercise was subject to strict 
scrutiny.  The Sherbert Court also defined substantial burden, stating it “is present when 
an individual is required to ‘choose between following the precepts of her religion…or 
the other’” (Sherbert v. Verner, 1963, as cited in Gaubatz, 2005, p. 506 – 507).  Any law 
or regulation that was a substantial burden to religious exercise was unconstitutional 
unless it furthered a compelling governmental interest, and was the least restrictive means 
to achieve that interest (Sherbert v. Verner, 1963). 
The U.S. Supreme Court further reduced the “Hands-Off” approach in Cooper v. 
Pate (1964), when the Court determined the offender’s complaint regarding the denial to 
purchase religious publications and prison administrator’s retaliation due to the 
offender’s religious beliefs was a 42 U.S.C. §1983 cause of action.  The importance of 
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this case was to signal to the federal courts that §1983 was a remedy when correctional 
officials violated prisoners’ constitutional rights. 
Although this case was important in giving offenders a voice at the highest court 
and showing a shift from the “Hands-Off” Doctrine (Blischak, 1988), the ruling in 
Cooper did not set forth any standards of evaluating the constitutionality of regulations 
infringing on offenders’ constitutional rights (Kao, 2005).  Nonetheless, Kao noted this 
movement towards eliminating the “Hands-Off” Doctrine was important because “it 
intended to break down the walls formed to separate prisoners from their constitutional 
rights” (2005, p. 30).  Despite the Court’s decision in Cooper, the judicial branch 
continued with the philosophy that prison administrators were best suited to determine 
whether a religious accommodation would infringe upon a compelling governmental 
interest (Gaubatz, 2005). 
Cruz v. Beto (1972) continued with this trend when the Court ruled that prison 
administrators could not deny an offender a reasonable opportunity to exercise his 
religious freedom if they afforded other offenders that same right.  Prison officials had 
argued that the offender, a Buddhist, was causing conflict with other offenders by his 
religious expression (DiIulio, 1987).  “In the 15 years following Cruz v. Beto, prisoners 
enjoyed the highest level of protection for their First Amendment religious exercise rights 
in the nation’s history” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 507).  In 1972, the Court went further in its 
decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) ruling, “only those interests of the highest order 
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of 
religion” (p. 215).   
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During the 1970’s, the U.S. Supreme Court fluctuated on the issue of prison 
rights.  In Procunier v. Martinez (1974), the Court first put in place a standard for 
evaluating the constitutionality of a prison regulation.  This case highlighted “concerned 
prisoners’ challenges to the constitutionality of rules that restricted their personal 
correspondence and gave prison officials the right to screen both incoming and outgoing 
mail” (Blischak, 1988, p. 461).  The “prison policy must support an important 
governmental interest” and “it must not burden prisoners beyond what is necessary to 
promote that interest” (Procunier v. Martinez, 1974, as cited in Kao, 2005, p. 7).  The 
Court also wrote, “When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional 
rights” (Procunier v. Martinez, 1974, p. 405 – 406). 
After this brief bout of dabbling in the protection of prisoners’ rights, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed its course with Pell v. Procunier (1974) and Bell v. Wolfish 
(1979).  In both of these cases, the standard of deference to the expertise of prison 
administrators was again applied (Seymour, 2006).  In Pell (1974), the Court ruled 
internal security was the most important objective of the prison system and courts should 
uphold regulations if another alternate means to achieve the prisoner’s religious 
expression and communication existed.  “The Supreme Court upheld prison regulations 
forbidding media interviews with individual inmates” (Blischak, 1988, p. 462).  The 
Court balanced the rights of the offender against the compelling governmental interests 
and also found the prison accommodated the offenders’ religious exercise by alternative 
means (Kao, 2005). In Bell (1979), the Court ruled the prison’s regulations did not 
12 
 
amount to punishment of pre-trial detainees, but instead met the purpose of maintaining 
the goals of safety and security.  
Between Pell and Bell, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union (1977) 
established the rational basis standard for review of prison regulations.  In this case, the 
prison administrators met the standard because they showed a reasonable relationship 
between the regulation and the rational goal of the prison.  The offenders wanted to 
solicit other prisoners to join the union.  Prison administrators had a prohibition against 
offenders sending mail to other offenders encouraging them to join.  The Court ruled the 
offenders had other reasonable means with which to communicate and thus, the 
regulation was constitutional (Kao, 2005).  Unlike strict scrutiny, this case indicated the 
government prevailed if administrators showed a rational relationship between the 
regulation and the legitimate mission of the prison.  The rational basis standard swung 
back to the deference of prison officials with a less stringent standard than strict scrutiny.   
The Court further solidified the rational basis standard in Turner v. Safley (1987).  
While the Court noted, “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates 
from the protections of the Constitution” (Turner v. Safley, 1987, p. 84), they also 
determined prison officials did not have to spend large amounts of time and resources 
attempting every possible alternative to meet an offender’s religious accommodations 
(Nelson, 2009; Seymour, 2006).  The Court developed a new test for the constitutionality 
of prison regulations that impinged on offenders’ free exercise of their religious freedom.  
Based on four prongs, Table 1 presents a summary of the Turner test.  Plaintiffs are not 
required to meet all four factors, but the court should consider the factors relevant in 
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cases where the courts must decide the constitutionality of a prison regulation that 
infringes on an offender’s rights (Kao, 2005). 
Table 1 
Turner Prongs:  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (Rational basis) 
# Prong 
1 The prison regulation must be justified by a legitimate government interest 
2 The prison system must offer an alternative means to exercise the right 
3 
There must be consideration of the effect any 
accommodation of the right would have on the prison 
system's effective management of its offenders and the 
impact on available resources 
4 
There must be consideration of any alternative that 
provides full accommodation of the right with a minimum 
cost to prison operations/efficiency, and the rule cannot be 
an exaggerated response 
 
 
One author saw Turner as a step back for prisoners’ rights, “The modern day 
application of the Turner test is a restoration of the hands-off doctrine” (Kao, 2005, p. 
32).  The author believed the Court’s test would lead to discretionary, and implicitly 
inconsistent, rulings by the lower courts.  A further criticism was “the entire burden is on 
the plaintiff to present evidence to negate all assumptions of the prison regulations’ 
validity.  The correctional administrators merely have to provide a legitimate penological 
interest such as security or budget concerns” (Kao, 2005, p. 41).  Another author 
emphasized the importance of the decision, writing, “Surely Turner remains the most 
influential of all prisoners’ rights cases” (Robertson, 2006, p. 123). These factors remain 
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as “good” case law and, if Congress were to repeal the current governing law (RLUIPA), 
these factors would again be the primary test of a state prison’s religious accommodation 
regulation’s acceptability (Kao, 2005). 
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) first used the Turner test to determine if a rule 
governing an offender’s exercise of religion was constitutional.  The Court ruled prison 
administrators could infringe upon a prisoner’s right to free exercise if the infringement 
related to a legitimate penological interest.  It was a landmark case as it applied the 
reasonable basis test to religious regulations in prison and completely abandoned the 
strict scrutiny test (Kao, 2005).  Shabazz “…addressed the constitutionality of prison 
regulations that prevented Muslim inmates from absenting themselves from a work crew 
to attend a Friday daytime prayer” (Robertson, 2008, p. 273).  In this case, the Court 
reasoned prison administrators needed the use of rational basis to be proactive and 
innovative with security needs (Seymour, 2006).  Kao (2005) saw Shabazz as a 
continuation of the courts’ tendency to defer to the expertise of prison administrators.  
Blischak showed concern regarding the trend, writing, “The clear message in Shabazz, 
therefore, was that the Constitution permits prison officials to substantially restrict or 
absolutely deprive prisoners’ religious practices with only minimal justification” 
(Blischak, 1988, p. 478).  The argument of security frequently prevailed over Free 
Exercise arguments (Becci & Dubler, 2017). 
The Court modified the use of reasonable basis in Employment Division v. Smith 
(1990).  In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court looked at laws that prohibited a religious 
practice.  The case was applicable to all religious freedom cases, not just those in prisons.  
In Smith, the Court held religious exercise burdened by a “neutral and generally 
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applicable law” (Employment v. Smith, 1990, as cited in Gaubatz, 2005, p. 509) was 
sufficiently constitutional under rational basis scrutiny, but strict scrutiny was required 
for any law that impeded a specific religious practice.  For Smith, the use of peyote was 
illegal for everyone, not just members of Native American religions, and thus, the 
regulation was not unconstitutional (Seymour, 2006). 
Seeing it as a weakening of a fundamental constitutional right, the U.S. Congress 
took exception with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith and passed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.  “Congress believed that the Smith decision 
would cause every religion in America to suffer” (Frey, 1997, p. 764).  Congress wanted 
any infringement on the fundamental constitutional rights of an individual to be required 
to withstand strict scrutiny.  “Accordingly, RFRA mandated that cases involving 
prisoners’ religious free exercise be reviewed with the same strict scrutiny as regular free 
exercise cases, promising prisoners a significant increase in the protection of their free 
exercise rights” (Solove, 1996, p. 471).  This Act essentially invalidated Smith and 
mandated courts to use strict scrutiny when evaluating any Free Exercise Clause cases 
(Solove, 1996).  As noted by Turner, this made it much more difficult for prison systems 
to prevail in court challenges, as a compelling interest was much harder to prove than a 
rational basis for a regulation (Turner, R., 2009).  Prison administrators seemingly 
anticipated difficulty.  Prior to RFRA’s passage, “all fifty state prison directors signed a 





Figure 1. RFRA. Strict Scrutiny 
 
The RFRA was unsuccessful and only lasted four years.  The courts defied 
Congress in their rulings.  “Lower courts…gutted the protections afforded to prisoners’ 
religious exercise under the …RFRA…in the four years it applied to the states (before 
being held unconstitutional), ruling against prisoners in over 90% of the cases” (Gaubatz, 
2005, p. 504).  For an offender to prevail under RFRA, he or she had to show the prison 
regulation impeded the practice of a “central tenet” of the offender’s religious belief.  The 
standard was so onerous; many offenders could not meet it (Solove, 1996).   
One problem with RFRA as noted by Frey (1997) was the lack of guidance 
regarding what constituted a substantial burden.  Courts were thrust into the position of 
determining what constituted a religion; the impossible task of assessing the depth of an 
offender’s religious sincerity; and calculating how much a regulation burdened an 
offender’s free exercise of religion (Marshall, 2014).  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed this issue in Mack v. O’Leary (1996), a case where an offender 
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brought suit alleging his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the prison’s 
failure to accommodate his beliefs during Ramadan (Frey, 1997).  The court ruled the 
prison’s accommodation of the offender was reasonable, but more importantly, set forth a 
definition of substantial burden.  The Seventh Circuit defined a substantial burden on 
religious exercise was one “that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously 
motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central 
tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to 
those beliefs” (Mack v. O’Leary, 1996, p. 1179, as cited in Frey, 1997, p. 768). 
Under Turner and RFRA, the offender had to show his or her religious belief was 
sincere.  As noted by Davis (2000), insincere religious beliefs have no protection under 
Turner.  The measurement of sincerity was subjective as noted by Solove who wrote, 
“Courts can use sincerity as a proxy for injecting their own prejudices and ignorance into 
the balance” (Solove, 1996, p. 488).  How can courts measure an offender’s sincerity?  It 
was difficult because of course the judge could not pry open an offender’s brain to make 
a determination.  Nonetheless, several federal court cases addressed the issue of sincerity 
of religious beliefs.  The result was a morass of opinions without clarity on what 
constituted “sincerity.”  
In DeHart v. Horn (2000), “the court held that only beliefs that are both ‘sincerely 
held’ and ‘religious in nature’ are allowed constitutional protection” (Kao, 2005, p. 20).  
In this case, Turner was expanded so that offenders did not have to provide evidence that 
their religious exercise was mandatory or usual.  The sincerity and nature of the exercise 
was enough to reach the threshold required for the Turner analysis (Kao, 2005).  The 
Second Circuit Court addressed the issue of religious sincerity in 1999 (Jackson v. 
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Mann), when the court ruled, “an inmate need not be a member of a religious group to be 
considered sincere in his or her religious beliefs” (Davis, 2000, p. 774).  With different 
judicial interpretations, proving sincerity remained a difficult task for an offender (Glyn, 
2009). 
The ultimate rebuttal came from City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), when the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional.  The Court ruled Congress had 
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment authority “by defining rights instead of enforcing 
them” (City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997, as cited in Solove, 1996, p. 510).  The Court held 
RFRA was only unconstitutional in its application to the states, not to the federal (e.g., 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons) government (Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente 
União do Vegetal, 2006). 
To continue the tug of war between the two branches of government, Congress 
then passed RLUIPA in 2000 (Larson, 2007).  RLUIPA is the current governing law and 
applies to all state-incarcerated individuals who are exercising their religious freedom 
(Chiu, 2004).  “RLUIPA was designed to overturn City of Boerne and mandated that 
courts use strict scrutiny rather than the Turner test when evaluating inmates’ religious 
claims” (Seymour, 2006, p. 542).  In response to the court rulings that had undermined 
the Congressional intent for RFRA, Congress was diligent in its building of RLUIPA to 
ensure it would protect the rights of prisoners to exercise religious freedom.  Congress 
did this by designing RLUIPA with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court rulings 
regarding religious exercise protected under the Free Exercise Clause (Gaubatz, 2005).  
To avoid the pitfalls of RFRA regarding Congressional powers, “rather than relying on 
the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions, Congress invoked 
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its Spending and Commerce Clause powers” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 535).  The states were 
required to follow RLUIPA as a condition of receiving federal funds (Gaubatz, 2005; 
Schnizler, 2006). 
RLUIPA differs from RFRA in that it does not require a practice or exercise to be 
required or central to a religion (Gaubatz, 2005; Glyn, 2005).  As noted in Thomas v. 
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1981), there is not always 
agreement within a religion about its practices (Gaubatz, 2005; Nelson, 2009).  
“Intrafaith differences…are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and 
the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences” (Thomas v. 
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 1981, p. 707).  As Solove wrote, 
religions rarely have mandatory practices and frequently allow exceptions to practices for 
various reasons such as health, age, and other similar factors (1996).  This was important 
because the majority of the RFRA-era cases which held no substantial burden was 
proved, did so because the courts found the practice at issue was not mandated (Gaubatz, 
2005).  “Unlike the ‘central tenet’ test employed by many courts under RFRA, RLUIPA 
encourages an effort that values religious experience, requiring that the judiciary engage 
in a balancing test that considers the perspective of the religious adherent” (Gower, 2004, 
p. 20).  Congress created a bridge between the application of RFRA for federal prisons, 
and RLUIPA for state prisons.  In RLUIPA, the legislatures clarified that even for RFRA, 
a religious practice does not have to be a central tenet to the religion (Marshall, 2014). 
RLUIPA differs from Turner in that it is not as deferential to prison 
administrations.  The law prohibits the imposition of substantial burdens unless they are 
“the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest” (Chiu, 2004, 
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p. 1000).  Walston (2001) took the pro-deference stance and believed RLUIPA did not 
appropriately give it credence.  “RLUIPA burdens state penal authorities, which have 
traditionally been subject to exclusive State regulation as long as a deferential 
reasonableness standard is met, with the arduous burden of justifying prison regulations 
under strict scrutiny” (Walston, 2001, p. 504). 
The U.S. Supreme Court examined the issue of deference in the oral arguments of 
Holt v. Hobbs (2015).  The justices asked attorneys for both sides about the level of 
deference that should be given to prison administrators.  In her concurring opinion, 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor clarified her stance on deference: 
I do not understand the Court's opinion to preclude deferring to prison 
officials' reasoning when that deference is due – that is, when prison 
officials offer a plausible explanation for their chosen policy that is 
supported by whatever evidence is reasonably available to them. But the 
deference that must be "extend[ed to] the experience and expertise of 
prison administrators does not extend so far that prison officials may 
declare a compelling governmental interest by fiat." Yellowbear v. 
Lampert, 741 F. 3d 48, 59 (CA10 2014). Indeed, prison policies 
"'grounded on mere speculation'" are exactly the ones that motivated 
Congress to enact RLUIPA. 106 Cong. Rec. 16699 (2000) (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 103-111, 10 (1993) (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015, p. 867). 
In summary, the perception is that RLUIPA places a stronger burden on prison 
systems to avoid impinging on offenders’ religious exercise (Chiu, 2004). Yet another 
perception is RLUIPA is an additional way in which prison administrators seek to 
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“meddle” in what should be a private right (Becci & Dubler, 2017, p. 241).  A visual 
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There are several laws used by offenders to base their claims for religious 
freedoms in prison.  The First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments have all been 
used.  “The Law relating to inmates’ religious rights derives from four basic sources:  (i) 
the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions, (ii) federal and state legislation, (iii) federal 
and state case law, and (iv) administrative regulations, policies and procedures” (Turner, 
R., 2009, p. 26).  Of these, the First Amendment is primary.  The First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I).  It is on 
the foundation of this law that the courts base all other measures regarding religious 
rights in the United States. 
The First Amendment’s free exercise clause allows a person to hold whatever 
religious beliefs he or she wants, and to exercise that belief by attending religious 
services, praying in public or in private, proselytizing or wearing religious 
clothing such as yarmulkes or headscarves.  Also included in the free exercise 
clause is the right not to believe in any religion, and the right not to participate in 
religious activities. (The United States Constitution: What It Says, 2005, p. 39) 
Courts applied the First Amendment only to federal cases until 1940 when 
Cantwell v. Connecticut made it applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Cookson, 2003). 
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Building on the First Amendment, but applying specifically to prisoners 
and the First Amendment right of religious freedom, RLUIPA states: 
(a) General rule.  No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as 
defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 
U.S.C. 1997), even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the 
burden on that person –  
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
(b) Scope of application.  This section applies in any case in which – 
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that 
received Federal financial assistance; or 
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with 
Indian tribes (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 2000). 




Figure 3. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000). Note:  Relies on 
Spending and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution (Strict Scrutiny) 
 
If a prisoner fails to demonstrate by appropriate evidence that there is a 
substantial burden on his or her religious exercise, RLUIPA does not apply” (Gaubatz, 
2005, p. 514 – 515).  The exercise must be religious and not merely a lifestyle choice.  
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For the government, the State must prove the compelling interest in the goal achieved by 
the regulation, as well as show there is not some less restrictive path that can achieve the 
same result (Gaubatz, 2005).  “In contrast to the deferential Turner standard, RLUIPA 
prohibits government officials from imposing substantial burdens on the religious 
exercise of institutionalized person unless the burdens are the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling interest” (Chiu, 2004, p. 1001). 
It is worth noting one court’s opinion that, “RLUIPA guarantees prisoners greater 
freedom to engage in religious conduct than does the First Amendment” (Meyer v. Teslik, 
2006, p. 988).  Another author made the comment, “in principle, inmate religious claims 
against states are given more solicitous consideration than are nonprisoner religious 
claims against states” (“Developments of the Law,” 2002, p. 1985).  The U.S. Supreme 
Court examined RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) after Ohio offenders claimed 
their free religious exercise was restricted.  The Court found that RLUIPA was not a 




Religion in Prison 
Deprivation theory partially explains the prevalence of religion in prison 
(Dammer, 2002).  Prison separates offenders from their community.  The anesthetizing 
effects of drugs and alcohol keeping the pain of their lives at bay are gone.  For many, 
their lives are at rock bottom (Maruna, Wilson, & Curran, 2006).  Offenders turn to 
religion for several reasons.  They may believe it will help them with their parole chances 
(Clear, et al., 2000; Dammer, 2002; Maruna et al., 2006).  They may believe it will help 
them live a better life upon release and escape their criminal past (Seymour, 2006).  They 
may use religion as a way to assuage their guilt over their crimes and the effects of their 
incarceration on their families (Clear, et al., 2000). Their belief in a higher power may 
become their only coping strategy for the time they are incarcerated (Dammer, 2002; 
Hamm, 2007; Dye, et al., 2014).  Others affiliate with a religion as a means of security or 
protection (Clear, et al., 2000; Dammer, 2002; Hamm, 2007; Pass, 1999).  One study 
found 49 percent of surveyed offenders attended religious services at least once a year 
(O’Connor & Perreyclear, 2002).  Some offenders however, consider pious offenders as 
weak (Clear, et al., 2000), and irritating with their proselytizing (Clemmer, 1958). 
Although many are cynical about offenders’ sincerity in religion and make 
derisive comments about “jailhouse conversions” (Clear, et al., 2000; Clemmer, 1958; 
Hallett, 2017; Hamm, 2007; Johnson, 2006; Maruna et al., 2006), there are many famous 
examples of offenders who have significantly changed their lives because of religion in 
prison.  Texas executed Karla Faye Tucker in 1998 in Texas despite many appeals for 
clemency based on her widely documented religious conversion (Price, 2006).  Watergate 
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figure Charles Colson not only experienced a religious conversion in prison, but also 
formed the Prison Fellowship Program upon his release to help other offenders achieve 
the same spiritual awakening (Dammer, 2002).  Famed civil rights activist Malcolm X 
also experienced a life-altering religious transformation (Gerwig-Moore, 2012). 
The majority of offenders in federal prisons identify as affiliated with a Christian-
based faith (USCCR, 2008).  Nonetheless, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2008) 
reported that non-Christian religions were present in prison populations at a higher 
percentage than were present in the general public.  This may be due to the co-mingling 
of offenders, often for the first time, with others from different cultures and value 
systems.  It may also be due to the contemplation of philosophical questions at a time 
when an offender is sober for the first time in many years.  Despite the overrepresentation 
of non-Christian faiths, the Commission (2008) also found that prison administrative 
remedies such as grievances only contained a small percentage concerned with religious 
matters.  Of the small number of grievances however, the majority were from offenders 
identifying with non-Christian religious faiths. 
During the review of the literature, scholars universally agreed religion in prison 
life was generally beneficial.  They only differed in their opinions regarding how prison 
officials should accommodate these religious beliefs (Kao, 2005; Lupu & Tuttle, 2011).  
Some officials believe prison is a place for offenders to learn how to conform to rules and 
regulations (Frey, 1997; McMullin, 2005).  Some administrators believe prisons should 
not make exceptions to rules and regulations because offenders will only use religious 
claims to manipulate for extra items and privileges not afforded other offenders (Frey, 
1997; Hamm, 2007; Nelson, 2009).  Accommodations can be expensive in terms of 
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resources as well as security risks (Davis, 2000), and were the main reasons for denials 
(USCCR, 2008).  Other administrators believe involvement in religious activities reduces 
the likelihood of institutional misconduct (Glyn, 2009; O’Connor & Perreyclear, 2002; 
Rarric, 2002).  Most of the literature focused on the positive aspects of religious 
involvement in prison and bemoaned the fact that a few spectacularly bad incidents had 
created hardship for those who were sincere in their beliefs (Gaubatz, 2005; Glyn, 2009). 
Gender and Religion in Prison 
There are many fundamental differences between men and women in prison 
(Jiang & Winfree, 2006).  There are also fundamental differences between men and 
women in the ways they practice religion (Stark, 2002).  Female offenders are more 
likely than male offenders to participate in religious activities (Levitt & Loper, 2009).  
Women are generally allowed to have gender-specific property in prison such as makeup, 
feminine care products, and their own underclothing.  Male offenders, who comprise the 
vast majority of the prison population, have different property allowances (Arkles, 2012).   
Regarding religious accommodations however, the differences between male and 
female are very small.  The main difference is grooming.  As will be discussed, women 
are allowed much more freedom with their hair length than male offenders (Nelson, 
2009, citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 2005).  Prison administrators argue this policy 
difference is because female offenders generally have less institutional misconduct and 
thus, are less likely to be a security risk (Trulson, DeLisi, & Marquardt, 2011).  Several 
prison systems require male offenders to shave, while female offenders generally do not 
have facial hair to the same extent as male offenders.  Religious property, assembly, and 
diet vary little between male and female offenders.  More resources for specialized diets 
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and meeting space are typically available to male offenders simply because they are the 
vast majority of the prison population.  As one prison administrator frequently lamented, 
“People always forget about the women” (J. Cockrell, personal communication, July 24, 
2013). 
Property 
Many religions have items that are symbolic of central religious beliefs or used in 
religious ceremonies.  Prison cells and dormitory cubicles are small spaces with little 
room for storage (Schnizler, 2006).  Additionally, prison officials scrutinize every piece 
of property an offender maintains in his or her possession, to ensure the item will not be a 
risk to security (Rarric, 2002).  Finally, prison officials must consider equal protection of 
offenders (Kao, 2005; Seymour, 2006; Vallely, 2007).  An offender should not have to 
belong to a specific religion to be able to have a valued item of property if allowed for 
other offenders (Glyn, 2009; Johnson, 2006).  Navigation of these issues can be tricky for 
prison officials and the courts.  In a 2012 survey of prison chaplains, 82 percent of 
respondents estimated that inmate requests for religious books or texts were usually 
approved, but only 51 percent estimated religious items or clothing requests were usually 
approved (Pew Research Center, 2012). 
The use of items to practice religious beliefs has ancient roots.  People use 
clothing, statutes, symbols, jewelry, and other types of items to symbolize a part of their 
religion’s beliefs or to represent their affiliation with the religion (Davis, 2000).  Others 
use items such as the Bible or a prayer rug to practice their religion (Gaubatz, 2005).  
Some items are common such as a rosary or yarmulke (Gaubatz, 2005).  Others are not as 
common, such as runestones or tarot cards (Glyn, 2009; Johnson, 2006).  Examples of 
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different religious property are listed in Table 2.  Some correctional officers have 
difficulty understanding the significance of property used by an offender for an 
unfamiliar religious practice (Glyn, 2009). 
Table 2 
Examples of Religious Practices Requiring Property 
Religion Property 
Christianity Bible 
Sunni Islam Prayer Oil, Kufi1, and Prayer Rug 
Native American Buffalo bones, eagle feathers, and 
peyote 
Nation of Gods and Earth Literature 
Orthodox Jewish Yarmulke (kippah) and Tallit Katan 
(rectangular piece of cloth with four 
corners and fringe) 
Catholic Rosary and Religious Medals 
Sikh Kacchera (loose undergarment) and 
Turban 
Odinist Runestones 
Santeria Orshaiba beads 
Wicca Tarot cards and bells 
 
The offender’s perspective:  Property and religious beliefs. According to 
RLUIPA, an offender’s religious belief does not have to be a central tenet of his or her 
religion to require accommodation.  If prison officials can show the offender’s religious 
belief is not sincere however (e.g., changing religious affiliations three times in a six 
month span), the prison may deny the religious accommodation.  For some offenders, the 
                                                 
1 “…a knit skullcap…” (Ali v. Stephens, 2016, p. 780). 
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hurdle is educating officials who are unfamiliar with the religion (Gaubatz, 2005; Miller, 
2011).  For example, to a correctional administrator affiliated with a Christian religion, 
the use of satanic items may be abhorrent to them personally (Harrison, 2012).  The 
offender may have to overcome the hurdle of prejudice against his or her religious beliefs 
when seeking an accommodation (Johnson, 2006; Schnizler, 2006).   
Dilulio even noted that “inmate religious stratification and inadequate staff 
sensitivity to certain religious traditions may have contributed to the 1971 Attica prison 
riot (NY State Comm. Attica 1977)” (2009, p. 118). Prisons generally deny the use of 
some items regardless of the offender’s sincerity (Glyn, 2009).  For example, they deny 
the use of peyote or wine because of the prison’s interest in keeping oft-abused or illegal 
substances out of the hands of offenders (Liu, 2004).  For offenders who have a sincerely 
held belief, this may be burdensome.  If a prison disallows an item, failure to use the item 
may bring shame or ostracism to the offender from other members of his or her religion 
(Krueger, 2005).    
Prison officials’ perspective:  Difficulties in allowing religious 
accommodation in property. Aside from the previously mentioned space issue, prison 
officials have several reasons to deny a religious accommodation for a special property 
item.  The primary reason is for security.  In prison, the ingenuity of offenders constantly 
amazes.  Inmates can turn the most innocuous item into a weapon, such as using a rosary 
as a device to strangle.  They have used religious items to identify themselves as security 
threat group members.   
Prisons must be consistent in their application of accommodations.  If officials 
allowed an accommodation for one group, they would have difficulty denying the same 
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accommodation to another without a compelling reason (Kao, 2005).  Additionally, if an 
item is valued, an offender should not have to declare a religious affiliation to obtain 
access to that item (Davis, 2000; Johnson, 2006).   Searches are another issue for prison 
officials.  The more property an offender has, the more difficult it is to search (Rarric, 
2002).  The process also becomes more staff intensive (Krueger, 2005).  A Sikh may 
request to wear a turban in accordance with his religion.  The courts must weigh the right 
of the offender to practice his religion against the compelling governmental interest in 
searching the offender on a regular basis.  Unwrapping and searching a turban as well as 
an offender’s hair is much more time consuming and staff intensive (Johnson, 2006).  In 
periods of staff shortages, a cursory search could result in the smuggling of contraband 
(Rarric, 2002).  
Finally, prison officials may deny an item such as separatist literature or even in 
some cases Islamic texts, because of the religious group’s beliefs (Hamm, 2007; Krueger, 
2005).  Concerns about the potential for racist incitement or the growth of terroristic 
recruitment in prisons have caused administrators to ban some documents (Glyn, 2009; 
Robertson, 2008).  
Assembly and Ceremonies 
Most religions have a community aspect to them (Gaubatz, 2005; Miller, 2011).  
While some components are solitary, generally people come together as a group at some 
point (Gerwig-Moore, 2012), as illustrated in Table 3.  “Exercise of religion, like every 
other aspect of life and work in America, requires physical space: Whenever two or more 
believers congregate, they must have a place to do so” (Banvard, 2003, p. 281).  
Participating in rituals and meetings together reinforces the individual’s faith and creates 
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solidarity with other believers (Miller, 2011).  The multitude of churches available in 
most communities indicates the importance of assembly (Gerwig-Moore, 2012). 
For those in prison, religious assembly can take on an even greater importance.  
As noted by Sykes (1958), “…if the rigors of confinement cannot be completely removed, 
they can at least be mitigated by the patterns of social interaction established among the 
inmates themselves [emphasis in original].”  In his study conducted in the early 1930’s 
however, Clemmer (1958) disagreed that religion was important to most inmates, noting 
that a cross-section indicated 51 percent of the offender population “...declared that they 
had no religious preference” (p. 51).  In a 2012 survey of prison chaplains, 71 percent of 
respondents estimated that inmate requests for meeting with leaders of the inmates’ 
identified faith were usually approved (Pew Research Center, 2012). 
Table 3 
Examples of Religious Practices Requiring Assemblies and Ceremonies 
Religion Assemblies and Ceremonies 
Islam Jumu’ah Ramadan and Eid Al-Fitr 
Baptist Bible Study 
Native American Sweat Lodge 
Catholic Catholic mass (with wine) 
Orthodox Jewish 
Access to Orthodox Jewish 
Synagogue; no work on Sabbath 
(wine as part of Sabbath and 
Passover) 
Christian Separatist Church 
Society Services with whites only 




The offender’s perspective:  Assembly and religious ceremonies. Religious 
assembly and ceremonies are important to “free world” communities (Gerwig-Moore, 
2012).  The same holds true for offender communities (Miller, 2011).  Studies found 
offenders who participated in religious services had lower rates of recidivism (Gaubatz, 
2005; Hamm, 2007; Young, Gartner, O’Connor, Larson, & Wright, 1995).  Their 
association with other like-minded individuals resulted in better institutional behavior and 
often, greater community support from other church members upon release (O’Connor & 
Perreyclear, 2002).  The time spent with other offenders in a positive atmosphere created 
social bonds that inhibit inappropriate behavior (O’Connor & Perreyclear, 2002).  To 
those with sincerely held religious beliefs, prison officials may interrupt a ceremony or 
assembly by imposing security measures or restrictions (Vallely, 2007).  Some offenders 
view these procedures and regulations as attempts to harass offenders for their belief in 
religion that are different or the antithesis of the beliefs of mainstream religions (Irwin, 
1980).    
Prison officials’ perspective:  Difficulties in allowing religious 
accommodation for assemblies and ceremonies. There are several reasons why 
religious accommodations for assemblies and ceremonies are difficult for correctional 
officials, to include security risks, management of prison schedules, and use of limited 
resources (“Developments of the Law,” 2002).  Officials must balance these concerns 
against the rights of offenders to practice their religious beliefs. Any time a group of 
offenders gathers, the security risks escalate.  Cressey, in his foreward to Clemmer’s The 
Prison Community, noted that one way to run a successful prison “is to keep inmate 
society as unorganized as possible, to prevent individuals from joining forces” (Clemmer, 
36 
 
1958, p. ix).  It may be argued that religious assembly certainly has the potential to bond 
individuals together as a cohesive group.  As a matter of logic, correctional staff can quell 
a disturbance by one or two offenders much easier than a disturbance by 10 or 20 
offenders.   
Officers note religious services are notorious venues for the passing of contraband 
and messages as well as sexual assignations (Dammer, 2002; Hicks, 2008).  
Administrators do not allow some groups to have services together because their purpose 
in meeting was uncovered as a means to plan security threat group activities (Davis, 
2000; Johnson, 2006) or recruit for terroristic purposes (Hamm, 2007; Robertson, 2008; 
Seymour, 2006; Irwin, 1980).   
Since the events of 9/11, U.S. security-related administrators have paid much 
more attention to religious affiliations and assembly in prisons.  The former director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Robert Mueller, testified before the U.S. Congress, 
“’Prisons continue to be fertile grounds for extremists who exploit both a prisoner’s 
conversion to Islam while still in prison, as well as their socio-economic status and 
placement in the community upon their release’” (Current and Projected National 
Security Threats to the United States:  Hearing Before the Select Commission on 
Intelligence, 109th Congress, as cited in USCCR, 2008, p. 32).  BOP officials perceived 
the threat of prisoner radicalization as much more serious as did their state prison 
counterparts (USCCR, 2008). One study identified radical Islam and right-wing Christian 
extremist groups (e.g., Aryan Nations) as leaders in prisoner radicalization, but pointed 
out that radicalization attempts are frequently unsuccessful (Cilluffo, Saathoff, Lane, 
Taynor, Cardash, Bogis, Magarik, Lohr, &Whitehead, 2006).   
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The BOP combated radicalization attempts by supervision of religious assemblies 
(Cilluffo, et al., 2006), but state prison officials reported that radicalization attempts were 
not a primary consideration in their security procedures (USCCR, 2008).A report by the 
Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prison 
Radicalization Task Force (Cilluffo, et al., 2006), strongly urged, that despite lack of 
funding and overcrowding, prisons should make the mitigation of prisoner radicalization 
a top priority. Services may require the presence of a staff member or volunteer (Hicks, 
2008).  If these monitors are not available, prison administrators may cancel the service 
because of lack of available monitoring (Nelson, 2009).  
Other equal protection issues have arisen.  Muslim offenders sued because prison 
officials shackled them on the way to religious services (Vallely, 2007).  In such cases, 
the requirements of security usually undermine the offenders’ religious rights (Nelson, 
2009). For other religious groups, prison administrators find their accommodations would 
inhibit the management of prison schedules.   
One seminal case, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) found the prison did not 
violate the First Amendment rights of offenders scheduled to work on Saturday during a 
religious ceremony.  The Court found the legitimate penological interest in the 
accomplishment of the prison’s work outweighed the First Amendment rights of the 
prisoners to attend the religious ceremony.   
Additionally, some prison administrators argue the accommodation of every 
group’s religious practice would unduly burden the prison’s resources (Davis, 2000; Kao, 
2005).  The largest religious groups traditionally receive the most resources (Johnson, 
2006; Vallely, 2007).  If the shared meeting space is completely booked for larger 
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religious groups, smaller groups may not have a place to gather.  If staffing is low, the 
prison may cancel a service simply because there are not enough officers to cover each 
area.   
Prisons are also not required to hire chaplains or religious advisors for every 
group (Johnson, 2006).  Courts have held that hiring only for the largest religious groups 
is not a First Amendment violation for smaller groups who do not receive such assistance 
(Johnson, 2006).  Despite this ruling, the plethora of religions represented in the states’ 
policies examined in this study show a vast change in prison officials’ religious 
acceptance over the years.  In Sykes’ The Society of Captives (1958), the prison schedule 
indicated only two religious services:  Roman Catholic and Protestant (p. 139).  Modern 
prisons accommodate other groups, to include non-traditional religions (USCCR, 2008).    
Diet 
Food is prevalent in almost every aspect of life.  In addition to the nourishment of 
bodies and survival, the ritual of food is important to the way people interact as well as an 
important facet of culture or religion (Clemmer, 1958; Liu, 2004; Miller, 2011).  
Examples of religious dietary practices are listed in Table 4.  Individuals use meals as a 
means of fellowship, drawing each other closer as a group as well as identity (Chow, 
2003).  Food also represents relationships between difference species of the world.  For 
religious groups, some animals may have spiritual significance and are taboo to eat (Liu, 
2004).  For others, the preparation of meals is of great importance.  If not prepared 
properly, the food is not fit for consumption from a spiritual perspective (Liu, 2004; 
Chow, 2003).   
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Diet is one of the main points of contention in the religious accommodation of 
offenders (Liu, 2004).  It is also one of the areas most easily accommodated (Liu, 2004).  
The courts have not found however, that prison officials are required to accommodate 
every offender’s religious diet request.  Deference to administrators and considerations of 
resource availability impede the legal challenges of smaller, less mainstream religious 
groups (Liu, 2004; Vallely, 2007).  In a 2012 survey of chaplains, only 53 percent 
estimated that inmate requests for a special religious diet were usually approved (Pew 
Research Center, 2012). 
Table 4 
Examples of Religious Dietary Practices  
Religion Dietary Requirements 
Catholic No meat during some religious days 
Rastafarians Vegetarian 
Islam Halal meat, pork-free, dates during Ramadan 
Ultra-Orthodox / Hasidic 
Jewish Kosher; pork-free 
Hindu Vegetarian preferred but not mandatory; no beef 
Seventh Day Adventist Vegetarian 
Wicca Lacto-ovo vegetarian 
Buddhism Vegetarian 
 
The offender’s perspective:  Diet and religious beliefs. Similar to following 
other religious beliefs, offenders wish to adhere to the practices of their faith when they 
eat (Chow, 2003).  There is a major difference with diet however.  An offender does not 
have to have certain property (except perhaps for medication), assembly, ceremonies, or 
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grooming practices to sustain life.  An offender does, however, have to eat to live.  If the 
prison does not allow a religious diet, the offender has to eat food that violates his or her 
beliefs (Davis, 2000; Liu, 2004).  Religious diets are important because they are the one 
area where prison regulations may force an offender to choose between violating their 
religious beliefs and survival (Chiu, 2004).  If the offender does not follow the laws of his 
or her religion, penalties or ostracism may ensue from other faith adherents (Krueger, 
2005).    
Prison officials’ perspective:  Difficulties in allowing religious 
accommodations in diet. Dietary restrictions are one area where prison officials have 
difficulty claiming security risks.  The main argument against dietary religious 
accommodations is resource availability (Davis, 2000; Liu, 2004).  Providing different 
types of meals to different groups is expensive (Armijo, 2005).  It requires the purchase 
of additional food items and kitchen equipment.  The preparation is also staff intensive 
(Krueger, 2005).   Many prison systems provide pork-free and vegetarian diets in 
addition to regular prison meals.  Others concentrate religious populations, such as those 
of the Jewish faith, at one prison facility so that only one special (e.g., kosher) kitchen is 
required (e.g., Texas Department of Criminal Justice).  This can prove problematic if an 
offender has other special needs such as security, medical, or educational requiring 
housing at a different unit than the one that has the religious accommodation.  Often in 
those cases, the offender’s other needs will take priority over his religious 
accommodation requirements.   
Diet can also cause a problem for prison officials, causing dissension over 
differential treatment.  If one religious group is given a special meal, non-affiliated 
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offenders may believe they are denied a privilege due to their religious (or lack of) beliefs 
(Armijo, 2005).  In almost every aspect of prison, officials maintain equilibrium in 
confined spaces by equitable treatment (Davis, 2000).  Any difference, no matter how 
slight, may cause a conflict.    
Grooming 
For purposes of this study, grooming refers primarily to the practice of male 
offenders, specifically regarding hair length and the allowance, or length of, facial hair 
(Sidhu, 2012).  Although female offenders are also included in some states’ offender 
grooming policies, the policies are often different for women, as female offenders are a 
much smaller percentage of the population and less likely to be high security risks or 
dangerous offenders (Nelson, 2009, citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 2005; Trulson, et al., 
2011). 
Hair and grooming has played an important part in religious practices since 
Delilah cut Samson’s hair in the Bible, sapping his God-given strength (Bromberger, 
2008).  Some religions do not allow men to cut their hair or shave their beards.  Some 
religions mandate the hair is not to be combed or cut, typically resulting in dreadlocks.  
The symbolism of hair removal or hair growth may indicate withdrawal from society, 
virility, or entry into sexual activity (Bromberger, 2008).   
The maintenance of similar grooming standards creates a kinship amongst 
followers of a religion, a way of setting themselves apart.  To deviate may bring shame 
and disgrace on the follower because, “everywhere, hairstyles mark the limit between 
submission and disobedience” (Bromberger, 2008, p. 384).  In some religions, 
practitioners perceive the forcible shaving or cutting of hair as punishment (Krouse, 
42 
 
2012).  Although an examination of state policies did not indicate administrators were 
using forcible shaving or hair cutting as punishment, offenders with sincerely held 
religious beliefs might perceive such practices as something that shames them or forces 
them to abandon their religious convictions (Krueger, 2005).  In a 2012 survey of prison 
chaplains, only 28 percent estimated that inmate requests for special hairstyles or 
grooming were usually approved.  Of the respondents, 36 percent estimated the requests 
were usually denied (Pew Research Center, 2012).  Table 5 provides some of the 
grooming practices of different religions. 
Table 5 
Examples of Religious Grooming Practices  
Religion Grooming Practice 
Assemblies of Yahweh Not permitted to cut the hair or beard 
Cherokee Kouplock - a 2" x 2" square lock of hair which is not cut 
Native American Not permitted to cut the hair or allow others to do so 
Nazirite Christian Not permitted to cut hair 
Orthodox Jewish Not permitted to shave any part of their beard 
Rastafarians Hair is not to be combed or cut 
Sikh Males are required to have unshorn hair 
Sunni Islam The Koran requires males to wear a beard 
Ultra-Orthodox / Hasidic Jewish Required to wear beards and sidelocks 
 
The offender’s perspective:  Grooming and religious beliefs. Different 
religions have religious practices regarding grooming (Schneider, 2004).  The majority of 
these pertain to male offenders.  Compliance with penological rules and regulations may 
force offenders with sincerely held religious beliefs to abandon the practices of their 
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religion to comply with penological rules and regulations (Schnizler, 2006).  For those 
prison systems with restrictive policies that do not allow for religious accommodations, 
offenders may be disciplined or denied privileges if they refuse to comply for religious 
reasons.   
Particularly for those prison systems that allow offenders to have a beard for 
medical reasons, but do not allow it for religious accommodations, offenders have 
questioned why a differentiation is necessary to meet legitimate penological interests 
(Sidhu, 2012).  One medical condition that may require a shaving accommodating is 
pseudofolliculitis.  Prison administrators may allow an offender to have a “shaving pass” 
or a very short beard, as a preventative measure for those offenders prone to 
pseudofolliculitis (Schneider, 2004).  Pseudofolliculitis is a condition “when the sharp 
edge of the hair shaft transects the wall of the hair follicle or re-enters the epidermis” 
(Luelmo-Aguilar & Santandreu, 2004, p. 308).  Prison officials have argued that 
accommodations to avoid a medical difficulty are different from a religious 
accommodation because one may cause physical pain while the other does not.   
The U.S. Supreme Court did not agree with this distinction in Holt v. Hobbs 
(2015). If they do have sincerely held religious beliefs, offenders often feel unfairly 
persecuted, especially if they are not members of a mainstream religion (Sidhu, 2012).  
Offenders may believe correctional officers unfairly target them for enforcement of 
regulations more stringently than they do other offenders due to their religious affiliation 
(Rom, 2009).  This has particularly been a concern for Muslim offenders (Glyn, 2009; 
Rom, 2009).    
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Prison officials’ perspective:  Difficulties in allowing religious 
accommodations in grooming. Prisons have typically justified grooming policies by 
citing four purposes:  identification, security, sanitation, and order (Johnson, 2006; Sidhu, 
2012).  Officials claim allowing offenders to alter their hair length or facial hair would 
enable offenders to avoid identification – an important component in prison security 
(Schneider, 2004).  Offenders may use distinct hairstyles to identify themselves for 
security threat group membership, which also creates a safety issue (Sidhu, 2012).  
Additionally, the presence of excess hair, on either the head or face, provides hiding 
places for contraband that may cause a problem for security or require additional 
resources for the extra time it takes to properly search the offender (DiIulio, 1987; 
Schneider, 2004).  In Holt v. Hobbs (2015), the Court did not find the extra resources or 
security requirements for a one-inch beard would be burdensome enough to warrant 
burdening the offender’s religious freedom.  
For sanitation, confinement of many individuals in a limited space develops the 
potential for spread of disease or parasites (Schneider, 2004).  The spread of 
communicable diseases in prison is not uncommon, and prison administrators go to great 
lengths to ensure lice or bed bugs do not overrun their institutions.  Research shows that 
shorter hair is a less welcoming host for such parasites (Bailey & Prociv, 2000).  
Advocates for freedom in grooming argue prison administrators typically allow female 
offenders to have long hair without issue (Sidhu, 2012).  Prison officials may respond by 
noting that female offenders comprise a much smaller percentage of the prison population 
and are easier to maintain parasite-free.   
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Order is another common justification for grooming regulations.  DiIulio (1987) 
quoted one Texas warden on the importance of grooming, “’You have to have rigid 
discipline – that’s the heart of the Texas idea…It begins with the most basic things…the 
dress code and grooming standards…No grooming standards gets you no grooming, or 
damned little’” (p. 140).  Prison administrators perceive uniformed grooming as a way to 
teach offenders self-discipline and self-respect.  They point to the importance of 
grooming in military forces as way of instilling discipline and ask why the same policies 
should be modified for offenders.  If an offenderis taught to comply with rules and 
regulations in prison, he or she will be better able to reintegrate into society upon release 
(DiIulio, 1987).   DiIulio (1987) quoted former Texas prison administrator Dr. George 
Beto:   “…In prison, these men, most of them for the first time in their lives, are made to 
experience external discipline.  They must take a bath each day.  They must shave.  They 
must wear fresh clothes…We hope that they come to learn the benefits of doing such 
things…[and] turn away from their former lives and ways of behaving.” (p. 176)    
Pat and Strip Searches 
The subject of modesty is a central belief for many religions (Ingram, 2000).  
Some of the security practices used by prison systems include pat and strip searches 
(searches).  Most offenders bring challenges to cross-gender searches under Fourth and 
Eighth Amendment violation claims, not First Amendment.  Pat searches were an issue in 
Jordan v. Gardner (1993) and defined as follows by the Washington Corrections Center 
for Women prison training material:   
“[U]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s] crotch area. . . . 
[P]ush inward and upward when searching the crotch area and upper thighs of the 
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inmate.” All seams in the leg and the crotch area are to be “squeezed and 
kneaded.”  Using the back of the hand, the guard also is to search the breast area 
in a sweeping motion, so that the breasts will be “flattened” (Jordan v. Gardner, 
1979, p. 1523, as cited in Weiser, 2003, p. 31). 
Strip searching was an issue in Bell v. Wolfish (1979) and defined as follows by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his 
buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female 
inmates also are visually inspected. The inmate is not touched by security 
personnel at any time during the visual search procedure (Bell v. Wolfish, 
1979, p. 558 n.39). 
Although not as invasive as a physical cavity search, many offenders consider these 
searches as demeaning and humiliating ordeals (MacGregor, 2003).  “In Bell, the 
Supreme Court recognized that unclothed body searches or strip searches might be 
offensive.  Nevertheless, the Court held these searches were neither unreasonable nor 
cruel and unusual when done in a professional manner” (Bell v. Wolfish, 1979, as cited in 
Weiser, 2003, p. 39 n. 47). 
The offender’s perspective:  Searches and religious beliefs. In many societies, 
citizens view the modesty of a female as more important to maintain than the modesty of 
a male (Ingram, 2000).  Courts also treat females differently, noting that many female 
offenders have historically been the victims of male physical and sexual abuse in their 
lifetime (Gerwig-Moore, 2012; Wieser, 2011).  Many prison systems have policies 
prohibiting male officers from strip-searching female offenders (also pat searches except 
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in emergency circumstances); so typically, it is not an issue except for situations of 
employee misconduct (Ingram, 2000).   
Males also may have a religious basis to their modesty.  For some religions, it is 
improper for any female to see a male’s body except for his wife (Jackson, 1998).  Many 
prison systems have male and female correctional staff working at the same units, 
regardless of the gender of the offenders housed there (Ingram, 2000).  The restrictions 
that apply for opposite gender searches of female offenders do not typically apply to male 
offenders (Gallagher, 2011; Ingram, 2000).  It is therefore, much more common for a 
female officer to search a male offender.  Along with the embarrassment of having 
someone of the opposite sex seeing him naked, the offender’s sincere religious beliefs are 
breached (Seymour, 2006).  Table 6 provides some examples of religious beliefs 
regarding nudity and touching.      
Table 6 
Examples of Religious Beliefs Regarding Nudity and Touching 
Religion Practice 
Jehovah’s Witness Women are expected to be modest 
Islam Only spouse is allowed to see individual nude 
Christian Only spouse is allowed to see individual nude 
 
Prison officials’ perspective:  Difficulties in allowing religious 
accommodations in searches. Maintaining security in a prison is a constant struggle.  
Prison administrators must conduct searches to maintain the safety and security of the 
prison and prevent the introduction contraband (Weiser, 2003).  Offenders hide items in 
the most unusual places (Petrie, 2005).  Prison officials have found contraband in 
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offenders’ hair (DiIulio, 1987; Petrie, 2005), their mouths (Boyd, 2006), their ears 
(Smith, 2011), their armpits, underneath their scrotum (Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of County of Burlington et al., 2012), inside their vagina (Brown, 2013; 
Smith, 2011) or anus (Daily Mail, 2012; DiIulio, 1987), and even in the skin folds of an 
obese offender (Turner, A., 2009).  If the offender attempts to smuggle in contraband, a 
proper strip search will often enable correctional staff to find it.   
In most situations, working as a correctional officer is not a glamorous or high 
paying position.  The median salary of a correctional officer in 2010 was $39,020 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).  During their daily duties, the correctional officer may 
endure an attempted stabbing; have feces or urine thrown on him or her; or at the very 
least, receive a plethora of expletives speculating about their parentage.  For that reason, 
prison administrators have done everything they can to widen the pool of potential 
applicants, especially with recruiting females.   
Female officers have been working in female prison units for almost as long as 
formal prisons have existed (Gallagher, 2011).  They have not however, been working at 
male prison units until the last half of the 20th century (Gallagher, 2011).   Female 
officers have proven to be a valuable employee resource.  In 2007, female officers 
comprised 37 percent of U.S. correctional staff (Winters, 2014).  With such dependence 
on female officers to fill positions, many of them work in male facilities (Gallagher, 
2011).  Prison administrators would have a difficult time if forced to prevent female 
officers from performing such essential security functions as searches (Jackson, 1998).  
Prohibiting male officers from searching female offenders is not as much of an impact 
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The study used a congruent method of research, combining legal research 
methods with social science research methods (Nolasco, Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010).  
The method provides “a composite approach [that] can significantly add to the 
scholarship in the discipline [criminal justice]” (Nolasco, et al., 2010, p. 18).  The author 
used the legal database LexisNexis® and Westlaw to determine the state of the law 
regarding religious accommodation policies in prison.  The search included only U.S. 
Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals cases.   
The study used only cases decided after September 22, 2000, the effective date of 
RLUIPA, the current governing law for the religious freedom of offenders.  Only cases 
based on RFRA or RLUIPA were included.  Seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases leading 
to the development of RLUIPA however, were included, even if decided prior to 
September 22, 2000.   
Non-reported or non-published cases were not included2.  Cases about prison 
employees were not included, only those involving offenders.  Cases only included 
incarcerated persons, not those who were briefly detained (e.g., less than 24 hours at a 
border crossing [Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 2007]).  Cases dismissed as moot were not included.  
If the substantive issue had been decided in the district court, and the Court of Appeals 
case only decided an issue regarding a peripheral matter, the case was not included (e.g., 
district court decided issue on grooming, but the Court of Appeals only decided an 
                                                 
2 “Unpublished opinions, unlike published opinions, are given non-binding precedential status:  their 
precedential value is treated differently merely because a judge has decided the case is not worthy of 
publication and therefore not worthy of binding precedential value.” (Weisgerber, 2008, p. 622). 
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attorneys’ fees issue for the case).  If the case was related to discrimination based on 
religion and not infringement of religious freedom, it was not included.3 
The search for property accommodation cases used the terms “prison,” 
“religious,” and “property.”  The results included 12 U.S. Supreme Court cases and 81 
Courts of Appeals cases.  Of those, 35 Court of Appeals cases applied. 
The search for religious assembly cases used the terms “prison,” “religious,” and 
“assembly.”  The search resulted in 11 U.S. Supreme Court cases and 56 Courts of 
Appeals cases.  Of those, 32 Court of Appeals cases applied. 
Religious diet cases included the search terms “prison,” “religious,” and “diet,” 
resulted in seven U.S Supreme Court cases and 72 Courts of Appeals cases.  Of those, 43 
Court of Appeals cases applied. 
For grooming cases, the search strategy included the terms “prison,” “religious,” 
and “grooming” resulted in nine U.S. Supreme Court cases and 55 Courts of Appeals 
cases.  Of those, one Supreme Court cases and 26 Court of Appeals cases applied. 
Strip search cases were the smallest category.  Using the terms “prison,” 
“religious,” and “strip searches,” resulted in seven U.S. Supreme Court cases and 22 
Court of Appeals cases.  Of those, two Court of Appeals cases applied.  Using “pat 
search,” “religious,” and “prison,” found two U.S. Supreme Court cases and seven Court 
of Appeals cases.  Of those, zero Court of Appeals cases applied.  There were 21 general 
exercise cases. 
                                                 
3 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a post-9/11 detainee alleged he was subjected to “serial strip 
and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others” (p. 668).  The detainee also 
alleged he was not allowed to pray.  The first issue was not included because it was based solely on the 
allegation of discrimination against him because he was Muslim; not that it kept him from practicing his 
faith.  The second issue was included because he was kept from his religious practices. 
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To gather information about prison practices, the author examined each state’s 
website to search for prison policies regarding accommodations of offenders’ religious 
exercise.  Additionally, the author searched each state’s administrative codes for related 
topics.  If the author could not find the state prison system’s policies by either method, 
she communicated with the system’s administration, either by telephone or by email.  All 
50 states’ and the federal BOP’s policies are represented. 
The study divided cases and policies into groups according to U.S. Court of 
Appeals Circuit.  The study compared the court rulings of each circuit to the policies of 
the prison systems in that circuit.  Additionally, the study examined the number of cases 
per state against the population rates of prisons within those states to determine if the 
number of offenders incarcerated made a difference. 
The study evolved from a panel discussion on U.S. Supreme Court cases during 
an Academy of Criminal Justice meeting.  Dr. Marvin Zalman of Wayne State University 
and Dr. Michael S. Vaughn of Sam Houston State University spoke about the lack of 
research comparing court decisions and correctional policies.  The study sought to fill the 
research void regarding religious accommodations in prison.  The author expected to find 
a wide variety of court decisions and religious accommodations policies from circuit to 
circuit, with very little specific guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The author gave some thought to the examination of prison policies as categorized 
by Dilulio’s Governing Prisons (1987):  control, responsibility, and consensual models.  
After further review however, the author determined that such an examination would be 
beyond the scope of this project.  Due to the changes in prison systems because of court 
decisions, federal oversight, and new laws, it is unclear that Dilulio’s categorizations 
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would still hold true at the time of this writing.  For example, a researcher could argue 
that California’s system has moved away from a consensual model towards a control 
model due to overcrowding and budgetary issues.  An accurate categorization would 
require review of each prison system and its status as laid out by Dilulio.  At some later 
date however, a study of religious accommodations compared to a prison system’s model 
type would be of great interest.  Particularly with the growing popularity of faith-based 
prison units and housing areas (Hallett & Johnson, 2014), along with therapeutic 
communities, it is expected that participating prison systems that have a consensual 
component to their penological management would provide more religious 
accommodations to the offenders in their custody. 
Major Research Questions 
The study examined several issues related to the correctional policies related to 
religious accommodations in each circuit, as well as the court decisions related to 
challenges within each circuit.  In many areas of correctional law, prison systems have 
latitude on some issues and are restricted in others.   
In Chapter V, the scrutiny of prison systems’ policies expected to show the range 
of religious accommodations in different systems.  The expectation was that different 
regions of the United States would have different practices of accommodation.  The study 
expected policies within the same circuit to be consistent however.   
In Chapter VI, the research reviewed whether the U.S. Supreme Court provided 
specific guidance in any of the five areas to include property, assembly, diet, grooming, 
and searches.  A category was also included for General Exercise of Religious Freedom.  
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A U.S. Supreme Court decision would cause any religious accommodation, or lack 
thereof, to be consistently applied throughout the United States.   
Law is a fluid entity and evolves over time along with societal mores.  The study 
explored whether this had been the case in any of the five areas since the passage of 
RLUIPA.  Chapter VI scrutinized cases within circuits to identify changes in direction as 
well as for the impetus for those changes.  Finally, the study teased out trends among 
cases to determine what assisted an offender to prevail in a legal challenge and what 
factors enabled prison administrators to prevail. 
Once the study examined each branch’s (executive and judicial) contribution to 
penal religious accommodations, it moved on to an analysis of the relationship between 
them.  In Chapter VII, the study observed if there was consensus between the policies, 
court decisions, and between circuits on any of the five issues.  Such consensus would be 
considered an indication of a national consensus of a particular area of penal religious 
accommodation, making it more difficult in the future to revert back to a regional or 
prison system-specific culture of accommodation in that area.  The study also looked at 
any differences between large and small prison systems, measuring based on prison 
population.  This analysis was conducted to determine also if some circuits had more 
accommodation cases than others did.  The study reviewed the intersection of legal 
decisions and policies to ascertain in which direction the issue of religious 




Summary of State Prison Systems’ Policies 
Property 
A complete listing of the U.S. state prison systems’ policies is included in 
Appendix A.  While some states were very specific about the property allowed (e.g., 
Alabama and Illinois), some were very general (e.g., Delaware and Georgia).  Policies 
included information about where property could be kept or even worn (e.g., in cell, 
during services, or at any time).  Some policies were event specific about the color of an 
item.  It was not uncommon to put a monetary limit of the worth of religious property.  
Prohibitions were primarily based on security and space considerations.  The use of 
property as a means of gang affiliation was a primary concern.  Many policies set forth 
procedures regarding the process of procuring religious items. 
Assembly 
A complete listing of the U.S. state prisons systems’ policies is included in 
Appendix A.  Some states were very specific regarding the recognized religions that were 
allowed to assemble.  One state even listed the religions that were not allowed to 
assembly (Michigan).  To the author’s dismay, the Church of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster was not included in any of the policies, although it is a recognized religion. 
Other states were very general, simply noting the policy of the state is to allow 
offenders to freely exercise their religious beliefs as long as institutional order and 
security are maintained.  Along with naming the religious categories of faiths allowed to 
assemble (e.g., Islam, Judaism, Roman Catholic) several states also listed specific special 
events that were allowed (e.g., baptism, communion, Ramadan, and Passover).   
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Space and availability of a faith leader were often required.  Many policies had 
procedures for the approval of new religions and services.  Topics frequently addressed 
included the use of communion wine, tobacco, and sweat lodges.  Communion wine and 
tobacco were typically used only by the officiant, symbolically on behalf of the 
congregation.  Other services included counseling, spiritual study, and family interaction 
(e.g., next of kin notification in case of illness or death). 
Diet 
A complete listing of the U.S. state prisons systems’ policies is included in 
Appendix A.  The majority of states had religious accommodations for meals.  Only one 
state did not (Mississippi).  In addition to specific meals for every day, most states 
allowed food for special ceremonies such as Passover, fasting for Ramadan and Yom 
Kippur, and Potlach.  Some states allowed special food for an assembly to be donated or 
purchased from an approved vendor.  It was noted in some states that any need for 
medical diet took precedence over a request for a religious diet. 
If an offender requested a religious diet, most states had a requirement that the 
offender adhere to that diet.  This included not eating the regular meal or ordering 
prohibited (by the religion) foods from the commissary.  Abuses of the accommodation 
included punishments such as being suspended from the diet for 90 days, or even up to 
one year. 
Other states would allow special diets only for those who could purchase them 
from the commissary.  Some states noted that the available religious diet were only 
provided based on demand (for example, if only one offender requested the meal, it 
would typically not be made available).  Other states would house all requestors in a 
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single facility, to make availability more cost effective through economies of scale (e.g., 
one facility has a kosher kitchen). 
Some states were very general in their policies, simply stating policies such as, 
“Committed persons shall be permitted to abstain from any foods the consumption of 
which violates their religious tenets” (Illinois 20 Admin. Code §I.d.425.70).  Other states 
only allowed special diets because of a lawsuit (e.g., Indiana). 
Grooming 
A complete listing of the U.S. state prisons systems’ policies is included in 
Appendix A.  The vast majority of policies allowed offenders to have beards in 
accordance with Holt v. Hobbs (2015).  Only one state prohibited any facial hair for 
males (Alabama).  States, such as Texas, allowed clipper shave passes (¼” beard) for 
offenders diagnosed medically indicated for pseudofolliculitis (Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice [TDCJ], 2012) and in part, that lead to the decision in Holt v. Hobbs 
(2015).  The Court reasoned that if the medical accommodation could be allowed; there 
should be no reason to deny the religious accommodation of one-inch long facial hair. 
Many states allowed offenders to groom as they wish as long as the prison’s 
requirements for safety, sanitation, identification, or security were met.  Some states 
implemented grooming restrictions based on job assignments, such as food service or 
working around machinery (e.g., California, and BOP), participation in a program 
(Michigan), or the offender’s custody (New Mexico). 
Security requirements included prohibiting styles that could signify security threat 
group (STG) affiliation (e.g., Illinois, and Tennessee).  Many states also required 
offenders to take a new photograph if an offender significantly altered his identity by the 
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use of grooming practices (e.g., Alaska, and Tennessee).  Some, as with Colorado, 
provided for hair to be cut and facial hair shaved upon intake for identification purposes 
and photographs with offenders allowed freedom in grooming afterwards.  Others 
requested a new photograph if any significant change was made (i.e., beards shaved or 
beards grown). 
Several states indicated they changed their policies as a result of lawsuits filed by 
offenders (e.g., Basra v. Cate, 2011).  In California, the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) changed their policy to allow offenders to grow 
beards longer than ½” in response to ongoing litigation (ACLU, 2011). 
When asked about some states’ grooming policies, there were three staff members 
who requested anonymity and noted the prison systems’ policies read much more 
liberally than they were actually enforced.  One administrator said, “We allow offenders 
to wear their hair and their beards however they want – as long as they don’t cause a 
problem with security or sanitation.  Those are some very subjective terms.  If I have 
concerns about an inmate’s hair or beard, I’m going to find a potential security or 
sanitation problem and make him cut his hair or shave.”  For some states, administrators 
considered staff ability to easily be able to search hair and beards for contraband as very 
important (Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Oregon, and Wyoming). 
Pat and Strip Searches 
A complete listing of the U.S. state prison systems’ policies is included in 
Appendix A.  The vast majority of the policies are taken word for word from PREA 
Standard §115.115 (see standard below in Chapter VI, Summary of Pat and Strip 
Searches).  Alabama did not have any policy regarding cross-gender searches, while 
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Arkansas did not have a prohibition against cross-gender pat searches.  Three state 




U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases 
Throughout the United States, the courts have heard many cases regarding the 
religious accommodations of non-traditional groups in prisons.  Prisons are simply not 
able to accommodate all religious requests.  “While any one accommodation may or may 
not have…an impact, accommodating the multiple idiosyncratic requests of every inmate 
claiming individualized religious beliefs would severely tax correctional staff and 
resources” (Davis, 2000, p. 791).  Vallely (2007) writes that RLUIPA causes challenges 
involving non-traditional groups to be more difficult to prevail.  “By its generality in 
language and lack of more stringent rules for prison administrators, RLUIPA 
discriminates against individuals with minority religious views that have not been 
historically accommodated in the penological system.” (Vallely, 2007, p. 234).  
Discrimination may take place because of a group’s racial or political views, or it may be 
simply because the group simply does not have many practicing offenders – the squeaky 
wheel truly does get the grease (Vallely, 2007). 
Gaubatz (2005) however, suggests two ways in which offenders can prevail 
against the states in their legal challenges.  Both include showing how the 
accommodation is managed in other instances.  Gaubatz’s (2005) reasoning is if the 
accommodation is made elsewhere (geographically), it should be allowed for religious 
exercise.  The first example is to show how the accommodation is made for reasons other 
than religion within that prison system (e.g., such as for medical reasons).  The second 
example is to show how other prison systems successfully manage the same 
accommodation (Gaubatz, 2005).  This reasoning has been used in some of the cases 
61 
 
discussed below, and is an intriguing possibility for offenders who wish to challenge 
regulation of their religious exercise. 
It should be noted that some facets of religious litigation favor prison systems 
while others are more favorable to offenders due to the nature of the issue.  For instance, 
“Prisoners requesting special dietary accommodations based on their religious beliefs 
have a greater likelihood of success than prisoners challenging grooming policies, due to 
the lack of safety and security concerns involved in potential dietary accommodations” 
(Vallely, 2007, p. 218). 
Detractors ask why some states, which allow religious accommodations, are able 
to maintain order, while other states, which do not permit accommodations, cite threats to 
security and order.  As ruled by the 8th Circuit in Fowler v. Crawford (2008), 
...as prisons differ, so may the means by which prison officials ensure 
order and stability.  ‘Although prison policies from other jurisdictions 
provide some evidence as to the feasibility of implementing a less 
restrictive means of achieving prison safety and security, it does not 
outweigh the deference owed to the expert judgment of prison officials 
who are infinitely more familiar with their own institutions than outside 
observers’ [citing Hamilton v. Schriro, 1996, p. 1557, n. 15].  The point is 
that prison officials may, quite reasonably, exercise their discretion 
differently based upon different institutional circumstances (Fowler v. 




Gaubatz (2005) noted the deletion of the requirement under RLUIPA that a 
religious exercise be mandated or common to a religion has allowed more offenders to 
prevail in cases regarding property.  Offenders no longer have to show possession of 
items is an essential tenet of their religious belief.  It was under this condition that most 
property claims under RFRA were dismissed (Gaubatz, 2005). 
Since RLUIPA’s passage, through January 2018, the following U.S. Courts of 
Appeals’ cases were decided.  They are categorized as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Summary of Property Cases 
Topic # of Cases 
Clothing 2 
Constitutionality and Tape Recorder 1 
Jewelry 3 
Jewish items 5 
Muslim Prayer Oil 1 
Native American items 6 
Odinist items 2 
Religious texts 14 





Clothing. In discussing Boles v. Neet (2007), the issue was the wearing of Jewish 
orthodox items when transported from prison to the hospital.  “Boles demonstrated that 
the much criticized Turner test can have ‘teeth’ …” (Robertson, 2008, p. 274).  The state 
denied the offender’s request to wear his yarmulke and tallit katan while being 
transported to a hospital.  The offender showed that it substantially burdened his 
sincerely-held religious beliefs and that wearing the items would not have interfered with 
prison security.  The state failed to identify that the regulation had a legitimate 
penological purpose. 
In Ali v. Stephens (2016), a Sunni Muslim offender sued over the right to wear a 
kufi, other than in his housing area or during religious assembly.  The Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice did not challenge the substantial burden of the offender’s religious 
exercise.  However, they did not show how wearing the headcovering would differ from 
the hats that offenders were already allowed to wear at work.  The prison officials also 
did not show any instance where an offender had been found to smuggle contraband 
under or in a kufi.  The appeals court affirmed. 
Constitutionality and tape player. The prison officials argued RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional, but the court found it was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power 
under the Spending Clause and that South Dakota could avoid adhering to its mandates 
by declining federal grants.  In Van Wyne v. Reisch (2009), the court reversed the 
summary judgment and noted the court lacked jurisdiction for some of the offender’s 
claims.  They noted that the Jewish offender did not need a tape recorder in his cell to 
learn the Hebrew but could use the tape recorder available during group assembly to learn 
the language and practice it later in his cell. 
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Jewelry. McFaul v. Valenzuela (2012) involved a Celtic druid offender who was 
denied a medallion that cost more than the policy allowed.  The court found that the 
policy prohibiting nonconforming property did not violate free exercise.  The policy for 
uniformity in property was a legitimate concern for security reasons.  Also, the offender 
did not show that he had a lack of alternatives; that the policy was not equally applied; or 
that the burdens of his free exercise were substantial. 
In Davila v. Gladden (2015), an offender, also a Santerian priest, brought suit that 
a necklace and shells had been denied to him, violating RFRA and the First Amendment.  
The court found that the offender’s beliefs were substantially burdened.  However, the 
federal BOP officials did not show that the denial was in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest or that the policy was the least restrictive alternative.  Summary 
judgment for the First Amendment claim was affirmed though, as RFRA does not 
authorize suits for monetary damages from officers in their official capacity. 
The court found that the Wiccan offender’s religious beliefs were substantially 
burdened in Knowles v. Pfister (2016).  He requested an injunction allowing him to wear 
a religious medallion with a five-pointed star (a pentacle).  The state contended that the 
star could be used as a gang symbol.  The court granted the preliminary injunction stating 
the offender’s “freedom of religion has been gratuitously infringed by the prison” 
(Knowles v. Pfister, 2016, p. 519). 
Jewish items. In Walker v. Maschner (2001), the African Hebrew Israelite 
offender claimed he was not allowed to attend Jewish services or possess Jewish religious 
items.  The offender admitted he had not exhausted his administrative remedies.  
Therefore, the court ruled that his Free Exercise claim did not prevail.  The same issue 
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arose in Gallagher v. Shelton (2009).  The offender sued over denial of his request for a 
Menorah and candles to celebrate Hanukkah.  Again, the offender did not first exhaust his 
administrative remedies and the court found for the state of Kansas officials.  
In the next case, Benning v. GA (2004), the court found that Congress did not 
overstep its powers by predicating receipt of federal funds on adherence to RLUIPA.  
The offender claimed that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment and the Tenth Amendment.  The Jewish offender brought suit that he was 
not allowed to constantly wear a yarmulke, eat only kosher foods, and observe holy days 
and rituals.  The offender’s claims against individuals were dismissed. 
In Washington state, contract chaplains denied property (Torah, Jewish calendar, 
and visit by rabbi) to the offender as they did not consider him to be Jewish.  The court 
ruled that the offender’s religious status was religious, not penological (Florer v. 
Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 2010/2011).  The congregation was contracted to 
provide religious services, and the court affirmed the conclusion “that Florer had not 
named a state actor as a defendant” (p. 919). 
Butts v. Martin (2017) was brought by a Hasidic Jewish offender who claimed he 
was forced to choose between eating his meal and wearing his yarmulke.  The prison 
official denied the offender a meal because the offender was wearing a yarmulke that the 
official claimed was the wrong color.  The offender failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies against all but one prison official – the one who initially denied the meal.  The 
court ruled that summary judgement was inappropriate for the First Amendment Free 
Exercise claim, and due process claim.  They remanded on the retaliation claim, and 
affirmed on the Equal Protection claim. 
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Muslim prayer oil. Charles v. Verhagen (2003) was an interesting case because 
the offender filed his claim based on RLUIPA and the First Amendment.  The court 
found that the denial of prayer oil violated RLUIPA but did not violate the First 
Amendment.  Under the First Amendment, the state showed that the regulation was based 
on a legitimate penological interest.  Under RLUIPA, the state did not show that the 
regulation was the least restrictive means.  As Gower (2004) wrote, “such an analysis 
best demonstrates the contrasting standards and inconsistent results that govern inmates’ 
religious exercise claims” (p. 34).  Further it is noted that such discrepancies between 
standards are, in Gower’s opinion, an excellent argument for RLUIPA being used as the 
sole standard for reviewing the religious exercise suits of offenders.  
Native American items. An offender claimed a violation of the Equal Protection 
clause.  He was not allowed Native American religious items because he was not Native 
American.  In Morrison v. Garraghty (2001), the state did not prove that the items were 
more dangerous in the hands of a non-Native American more than a Native American. 
The State, in Fowler v. Crawford (2008), showed prohibiting a sweat lodge was in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and denying the request was the least 
restrictive means to further compelling interest in safety and security.  The offender 
wished to practice his Native American beliefs with other offenders.  The Missouri prison 
officials showed the use of items such as rocks, willow poles, shovels, deer antlers, and 
split wood necessitated by the sweat lodge could be used as weapons and was a potential 
threat to the safety and security of the maximum security prison. 
A Native American offender claimed a violation of his Bill of Rights by the 
prohibition against the use of tobacco for Native American ceremonies and the wearing 
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of headbands.  In Alvarez v. Hill (2008), the issue was if the failure of the offender to 
invoke RLUIPA would vanquish its use in his suit.  The court ruled that the facts of the 
case established “a ‘plausible’ entitlement to relief under RLUIPA” (p. 1157). 
Chance v. TDCJ (2013) was filed by an offender who claimed a violation of 
RLUIPA.  The prison officials did not allow him to possess a deceased relatives’ lock of 
hair.  The court ruled that the prohibition was a substantial burden on the offender’s free 
exercise of religion.  He had asserted that the practice was a central tenet of his faith, and 
part of the Keeping of Souls ritual. 
In the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, a Navajo offender wanted to wear a 
multi-colored headband for worship.  The prison officials only allowed white or black 
headbands.  The offender offered to wear it only in his cell.  The prison officials claimed 
the accommodation would cause a problem with gang identification.  The court pointed 
out it was not a problem if the offender only wore it in his cell.  The DOC also did not 
show that the prohibition was the least restrictive means of obtain a legitimate 
penological purpose.  Therefore, the policy did violate the offender’s free exercise of his 
religious beliefs (Schlemm v. Wall, 2015). 
Davis v. Davis (2016) was a case where the offender brought suit alleging a 
violation of RLUIPA and his First Amendment rights.  At issue was the prohibition 
against wearing his medicine bag to and from his cell.  The offenders did not adequately 
brief the court on the issue and the court considered it abandoned.  Thus, the ruling for 
summary judgment was upheld. 
Odinist. An Odinist offender brought suit in Smith v. Allen (2007) regarding the 
possession of quartz crystal and the use of a fire pit.  The offender was released prior to 
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the decision, but was reincarcerated and thus, bound by the same decisions – so the claim 
was not moot.  However, the offender did not show the denials substantially burdened his 
religious beliefs.  
In Mayfield v. TDCJ (2008), the Fifth Circuit Court ruled the offender must prove 
the burdened activity is a religious exercise and the burden is substantial.  The state must 
prove it is supported by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means.  In this 
case, Odinist offenders claimed violation of religious exercise by not allowing them to 
assemble without an approved volunteer; prohibition of possession of runestones; and the 
limitation of access to rune publications in the library.  The district court held the 
prohibition of possession of runestones was in furtherance of a legitimate penological 
interest as they could be used for gambling, gang identification, or secret communication.  
The offenders showed evidence the policy requiring an approved volunteer was applied 
in an inconsistent manner.  The state did not show any penological interest in denial of 
access to rune publications.  The district court had held the offender’s claims were barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment.  The Fifth Circuit noted the offender could still pursue 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  Summary judgment for the state under §1983 was 
overturned for the issue of the approved volunteer policy; upheld regarding the policy on 
runestones; and remanded the issue regarding rune literature.  The RLUIPA claims 
regarding the approved volunteer policy and possession of runestones were vacated by 
the Fifth Circuit as the state did not show their policies were narrowly tailored. 
Religious seals. In Mark v Gustafson (2008), the offender claimed the state had 
violated his religious rights by breaking religious seals he had on his walls and doors.  
The offender did not show how the seals had religious meaning to him.  The state, 
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however, was able to show legitimate reasons for not allowing offenders to affix anything 
to cell doors or walls.  The policy was intended to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of searches as well as to eliminate potential conflict between cellmates.  
The court also held the policy was neutral and was not intended to affect any particular 
religion. 
Religious texts. The offender did not prevail however, in Dunlap v. Losey (2002), 
as he could not show why a softcover bible would not have been an adequate substitution 
for the hardcover bible he was prohibited.  The offender was only denied access to the 
bible for a month while he was at a reception center.  The court ruled the regulation did 
not coerce the offender into acting against his religious beliefs. 
Tarpley v. Allen County, Indiana (2002) was a case where the offender’s bible 
was taken and another given to him.  He claimed the new bible did not have the study 
materials he needed.  The court ruled that the provision of an alternative bible was the 
least restrictive means of meeting a compelling governmental interest because the 
offender’s essential religious materials were provided. 
An offender alleged that the Wisconsin DOC did not make Wotanist literature and 
videos available to offenders although other religions were allowed access to similar 
materials.  The DOC did not recognize the organization as a religion due to its white 
supremacy credo.  The court ruled that the refusal to make the materials available 
because of that failure to recognize the religion did violate Constitutional rights.  The 
court may have found that there was a legitimate penological interest in not recognizing a 
white supremacy organization but no evidence of this was brought by the DOC (Lindell 
v. McCallum, 2003). 
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In Sutton v. Rasheed (2003), the Nation of Islam offenders were not allowed to 
have their religious texts in the housing unit for high-risk offenders.  Although the 
Pennsylvania DOC did not show they met the Turner test, their qualified immunity was 
affirmed. 
An offender claimed his First Amendment rights were violated by limiting the 
number of books he could keep in his cell.  The Kansas DOC argued that the policy was 
related to legitimate administrative and penological policies regarding fire safety, 
institutional security, control of contraband, and behavior-incentives.  The court agreed 
and ruled that the limitation of the amount of property did not substantially burden the 
offender’s religious freedom (Neal v. Lewis, 2005). 
In Borzych v. Frank (2006), the Odinist offender was not allowed to have books 
he claimed were necessary to practice his religion.  The court examined whether a policy 
forbidding publications “advocat(ing) racial or ethnic supremacy” violated RLUIPA (p. 
391).  It determined it did not burden the offender’s free exercise and that the Wisconsin 
DOC’s mission for order gave it a compelling interest to enforce the policy. 
As a member of the Children of the Sun Church, the offender claimed his religion 
required him to read four Afro-centric books each day.  The Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections’ policy prohibited offenders from keeping more than 10 books in their cells 
at one top on the basis of security, hygiene, and safety interests.  In Washington v. Klem 
(2007), the court ruled a substantial burden exists when a follower is forced to choose 
between following the precepts of his religion – thus forfeiting benefits otherwise 
generally available to other offenders, and the alternative of abandoning one of the 
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precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit.  It also found the policy was not the 
least restrictive means of protecting the relevant government interests. 
British nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay alleged “…denying them copies of 
the Koran and prayer mats and throwing a copy of the Koran in a toilet bucket” (Rasul v. 
Myers, 2008, p. 650).  The District of Columbia Circuit held (2008) that non-citizen 
detainees were not subject to the protections of RFRA.  The U.S. Supreme Court (2008) 
vacated and remanded in light of the decision in Boumediene v. Bush (2008)4.  The D.C. 
court again held (2009) that non-citizen detainees were not subject to the protections of 
RFRA. 
Immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the 
plaintiff alleged his Koran was routinely confiscated.  In Iqbal v. Hasty (2008), the 
Second Circuit held that the defendants at the federal BOP were not entitled to qualified 
immunity due to failure to state a claim and because the defendants claimed no personal 
involvement.  The Supreme Court held (2009) that conclusory allegations that 
government officials knew of actions taken by subordinates could not be a basis for an 
unlawful discrimination claim. 
In the New York prison, the offenders’ Holy Blackness book was confiscated as 
well as correspondence with a self-publishing company.  At issue was whether the policy 
against proselytizing violated offenders’ free exercise by not allowing them to have 
personal possession of the book.  The court disagreed, noting that offenders were allowed 
access to the book by submitting a request to the chaplain (Jova v. Smith, 2009). 
                                                 
4 Foreign detainees were entitled to habeas corpus hearings. 
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In Colvin v. Caruso (2010), the Jewish offender brought suit against the lack of 
Jewish services and books in the library.  However, the court ruled that the offender did 
not show the Michigan prison was required to have a certain number of books.  The 
offender did not show he was deprived of receiving books through an alternative manner. 
In DeMoss v. Crain (2011), the offender brought suit claiming the Texas policy 
prohibiting the carrying of a pocket-sized Bible or Koran during medical appointments, 
work, and recreation was a violation of RLUIPA.  The Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
offender did not show that the policy limiting access was a substantial burden to his 
religious practice. 
A straightforward case was presented in Kendrick v. Pope (2012).  The offender 
complained her rosary beads, Bible, and other religious items were confiscated and never 
returned.  The Arkansas DOC argued that the inmate had not exhausted her 
administrative remedies.  The court disagreed and remanded the case back to the district 
court. 
In Kaufman v. Pugh (2013), the offender wanted to wear a “knowledge thought 
ring” and also have the atheism books he donated available in the library.  The Seventh 
Circuit found that the denial of the ring was not a substantial burden on the offender’s 
free exercise.  Also, it was reasonably justified by security reasons.  The three books had 
been lost, but there was no indication that they were lost purposefully by the Wisconsin 
prison system. 
Assemblies and Ceremonies 
The majority of cases regarding religious assembly fall into two categories:  either 
the service is offered and the offender is not allowed to attend; or the service is not 
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offered.  Gaubatz wrote the difference between cases under RLUIPA and those under 
Turner and RFRA is significant.  “Plaintiffs have consistently prevailed in establishing 
that prison restrictions on group worship are substantial burdens” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 566)  
The two main reasons a prison system will cite for prohibiting assembly are because of 
security threat group concerns or limited resources (Vallely, 2007, p. 224). 
A summary of the case law disposition for religious assembly is given in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Summary of Religious Assembly and Ceremonies Cases  
Topic # of Cases 
Atheism 2 
Church of the New Song 1 




Religious Categorization 1 
RLUIPA issue 2 
Security 1 
Sweat Lodge 1 
Tobacco 2 




Topic # of Cases 
Universal Life Church Assembly 1 




Atheism. In the Wisconsin DOC, an offender wanted to start a new group to 
study atheism and was denied.  The prison officials had classified the request as an 
activity rather than a religious group.  The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
ruled atheism “as equivalent to a ‘religion’ for purposes of the First Amendment on 
numerous occasions” (Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 2005, p. 682).  Eight years later, in 
Kaufman v. Pugh (2013), the same issue arose.  The court found that only two members 
had an interest in the group and thus, there was a legitimate penological purpose in 
denying the use of resources. 
Church of the New Song. The Church of the New Song, otherwise known as 
CONS, had been ruled as a religion by the Eighth Circuit in Remmers v. Brewer (1974).  
However, it had been deemed a “masquerade” in a similar case in Texas (Theriault v. 
Silber, 1978).  Nonetheless, when Iowa offenders sued over denial of prison officials to 
recognize their church as a religion in Goff v. Graves (2004), the Eighth Circuit ruled that 
their circuit’s precedent stood.  
Food and wine. In Levitan v. Ashcroft (2002), the District of Columbia Circuit 
ruled that the district court had granted summary judgment without considering the 
Turner/O’Lone test.  The offenders had brought suit over the denial of communion wine.  
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The court noted that the partaking of wine was not mandatory in Catholic masses.  The 
court reversed and remanded to the lower court.  
Jewish. In Walker v. Maschner (2001), an African Hebrew Israelite offender 
claimed he was not allowed to attend Jewish services.  He admitted that he had not 
exhausted his administrative remedies and the court found for the Iowa DOC.  
In Baranowski v. Hart (2007), the state argued the offender was provided 
reasonable alternative accommodations.  The religious services policy did not place a 
substantial burden on the prisoner’s free exercise as no rabbi or approved volunteer were 
available on the days when services were not already provided.  Also, the state showed 
the dietary policy was the least restrictive means of meeting compelling government 
interests of maintaining prison order and operating within available resources.  
An offender brought suit against the lack of Jewish services in Colvin v. Caruso 
(2010).  The Michigan DOC had a policy requiring a certain level of interest by a number 
of offenders before allowing group services.  The court ruled that the state had a 
legitimate governmental interest in committing its resources to those faiths which had the 
most offenders’ interest.  The court also noted the offender was not prohibited from 
practicing his religious beliefs in other ways.  
In the Sixth Circuit, the Michigan offender sued over the lack of Jewish services 
(Little v. Jones, 2010).  The state argued that the offender was the only one at the unit 
who requested them and it was not in their legitimate penological interest to use the 
resources for just one offender.  The court agreed and ruled that the lack of Jewish 
services were not a violation of the offender’s constitutional rights.  
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A Washington state offender sued when contract chaplains denied a visit with a 
rabbi as they did not consider him Jewish.  In Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 
N.A. (2010/2011), the court ruled that the decision about the offender’s religious status 
was religious, not penological.  They also found that contract agents could not 
substantially burden religious exercise through a religious sincerity decision.  
In Sisney v. Reisch (2012), the Jewish offender claimed he was denied permission 
to eat his Succoth meal in a succah in a recreation yard.  He sued for compensatory 
damages.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not allow for compensatory 
damages if physical injury did not result.  The offenders did not clearly show that the use 
of a succah was a “reasonable dietary and meal accommodation” (p. 19).  Therefore, the 
denial of the succah was not a violation of the offender’s constitutional rights.  
The Indiana offenders sued over their transfer to a new facility to maintain a 
kosher diet, but before group services were available at the new facility.  At the time of 
the transfer, the court pointed out there was no clearly established constitutional right to 
assemble and study without outside clergy to supervise.  They held that it was not a 
constitutional violation to have assembly services unavailable (Kemp v. Liebel, 2017).  
Muslim. In New York, a Muslim offender claimed that he was denied the 
opportunity to celebrate the end of Ramadan with the Eid ul Fitr Feast.  Ford v. McGinnis 
(2003) found that the offender’s religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the 
policy.  The court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded to ascertain whether 
the prison officials’ policies were reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes.  
In Lovelace v. Lee (2006), a Virginia offender alleged his Nation of Islam 
religious exercise was denied.  The offender was on a list of offenders allowed to 
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participate in Ramadan.  While participating, he complained about some of the items 
provided.  The officer to whom he complained later claimed the offender had broken fast 
and Lovelace was removed from the Ramadan participation list.  With this removal, he 
not only was denied the Ramadan meals, but he was also denied the opportunity to 
participate in any Ramadan activities.  The officer later admitted he had made a 
“mistake.”  The state did not show any evidence the offender had, in fact, broken his fast 
and therefore, the court ruled his religious exercise was substantially burdened.  The 
court also wrote, “A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that (the officer) acted 
intentionally, perhaps even maliciously, in misidentifying Lovelace and in failing to 
correct his error during the remainder of Ramadan 2002” (p. 196).  The state did not 
show the Ramadan policy was in furtherance of a legitimate government interest or that it 
was the least restrictive means of achieving any such interest.   
In New York, an offender brought several issues before the court in Salahuddin v. Goord 
(2006).  The offender claimed: 
• Sunni Muslims had to worship with Shi’ite Muslims – the court ruled the 
offender's free exercise was substantially burdened and was not ""justified by a 
legitimate penological interest or,…the compelling governmental interest…" (p. 
275); 
• He was not allowed to attend services or eat holiday meals while in keeplock for 
assaulting another inmate – Again, the DOC did not show the policy was justified 
by either of the two prongs required; 
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• The facility would not provide a Muslim chaplain and no Koran was kept in the 
library – The DOC's attorneys did not request summary judgment for the 
Koran/chaplain allegation; 
• He was not allowed to bring legal mail into the religious assembly – The offender's 
free exercise was not shown to be substantially burdened regarding the legal mail, 
therefore summary judgment was affirmed; and 
• He was forced to choose between attending religious services and going to the law 
library – the court ruled that summary judgment was vacated. 
The court, in essence, ruled that, absent some justification, they could not violate an offender’s free 
exercise of his or her religion. 
Immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the 
plaintiff alleged he was not allowed to attend Friday night prayers.  In Iqbal v. Hasty 
(2008), the Second Circuit held that the defendants at the federal BOP were not entitled 
to qualified immunity due to failure to state a claim and because the defendants claimed 
no personal involvement.  The Supreme Court held (2009) that conclusory allegations 
that government officials knew of actions taken by subordinates could not be a basis for 
an unlawful discrimination claim. 
In Texas, the offender claimed the policy of recording Muslim services was discriminatory 
in that it was not required of other faiths.  The state argued that Muslim services were allowed 
without a volunteer or staff present.  The court, in DeMoss v. Crain (2011), found that the taping of 
Muslim services was not a substantial burden to offenders’ religious exercise.  The policy ensured 




Odinism. An Alabama offender requested the use of quartz crystal and a fire pit 
in a designated place of worship for his Odinist beliefs.  The offender was released prior 
to the case, but was reincarcerated and bound by the same decisions – so the claim was 
not moot (Smith v. Allen, 2007).  The court ruled however, that the offender did not show 
the denials substantially burdened his religious beliefs. 
In Mayfield v. TDCJ (2008), Odinist offenders were not allowed to meet without an 
outside, security-trained, religious volunteer.  The only one available lived some distance from the 
prison unit and was unable to be present for regular services.  The state denied the offenders’ 
request to meet under the supervision of prison security.  However, Muslim and Native American 
religious groups were allowed to meet without outside volunteers.  The court ruled that the policy 
was imposed in a discriminatory manner and that the policy violated RLUIPA. 
Religious categorization. In Freeman v. TDCJ (2004), the Church of Christ 
offenders protested being lumped as “Christian/Non-Catholic.”  The court found that the 
use of five “major faith sub-groups” (p. 859) were not unconstitutional and the offenders 
were treated the same as similarly-situated offenders.  The policy was reasonable related 
to the state’s penological mission and was a neutral policy. 
RLUIPA issue. The Oregon offender requested an order requiring the hiring of a 
Native American Spiritual Leader, and to allow pipe ceremonies, drums, and the use of a 
weekly sweat lodge (Alvarez v. Hill, 2008).  The state argued that the failure of the 
inmate to invoke RLUIPA vanquished its use in the suit.  The court ruled that it did not, 




Offenders requested more assembly and language study time in Van Wyhe v. Reisch 
(2009).  They also requested a succah and tape player for a religious ceremony.  They were denied 
and claimed they were substantially burdened in their free exercise.  They also claimed that 
RLUIPA was unconstitutional under the Spending Clause.  The court ruled that RLUIPA was 
constitutional and that a state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity for monetary 
damages by accepting federal funds under RLUIPA.  The court found that the offenders were not 
substantially burdened in their free exercise and the state was entitled to summary judgment. 
Security. In Greene v. Solano County Jail (2008), a maximum security detainee 
claimed that his religious freedom was substantially burdened by the prohibition against 
assembly.  The court ruled that the jail did not show that the policy was the least 
restrictive means to achieve a legitimate penological interest – less restrictive measures 
had not even been considered.  The court remanded the case for further consideration. 
Sweat Lodge. Two groups of death row offenders in Kentucky filed suit that their 
rights were violated by denial of access to a sweat lodge.  In Haight v. Thompson (2014), 
the offenders offered to pay for the sweat lodge.  The court remanded the case for 
consideration of a promised policy study ordered by the DOC Commissioner.  
Tobacco. In Chance v. TDCJ (2013), the court ruled that offenders did not have 
to be allowed a personal peace pipe, avoiding contracting diseases by sharing pipes.  
TDCJ responded by having the Native American chaplain symbolically smoke for the 
assembly.  Also in Texas, an offender brought suit in Davis v. Davis (2016), alleging that 
his RLUIPA and First Amendment rights were violated with the prohibition against 
participation in the pipe ceremony.  Citing Chance v. TDCJ (2013), the court ruled that 
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logistics, health, and security concerns outweighed the burden on religious 
accommodations. 
Trained volunteer. In Adkins v. Kaspar (2004), the offender alleged he was 
unable to practice his religion properly as the prison did not allow proper lay-ins or 
assembly.  The offender was allowed to listen to tapes on Mondays but not Saturdays 
(Sabbath) unless an approved volunteer was available.  The State showed an alternative 
accommodation was provided by the availability of tapes.  The offender did not have an 
Equal Protection claim because all religious groups were required to have an approved 
volunteer to lead services, not just Yahweh Evangelical Assembly.  This policy did not 
place a substantial burden on the offender’s free exercise because the State’s policy did 
not cause the offender to significantly modify his behavior or violate his religious beliefs. 
The New York Tulukeesh offenders were required to obtain an outside religious 
clergy leader, as well as an inmate facilitator to hold group meetings.  The state argued 
the policy was in place to ensure organizations were not covers for gang organizations or 
other nefarious purposes.  The offenders were alternatively allowed to practice their 
religion in their cells.  Otherwise, the offenders would be charged with unauthorized 
organization.  The court ruled that the policy requiring outside clergy met the least 
restrictive means of furthering governmental interests (Jova v. Smith, 2009). 
Universal Life Church Assembly. For seven years, a Universal Life Church 
offender was allowed to preach in the chapel.  The new warden prohibited him from 
continuing preaching with the threat of disciplinary action if he continued to do so.  In 
Spratt v. Rhode Island DOC (2007), the court ruled that the state did not show the 
compelling governmental interest in prison security was furthered by prohibiting 
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offenders from preaching.  The state did not even show that the prohibition would have 
been the least restrictive means available. 
White supremacy. Under RLUIPA and the Equal Protection Clause, the court in 
Murphy v. Missouri Department of Corrections (2004) required more than allegations of 
violence for prisons officials to overcome strict scrutiny review.  The same allegations 
however, were enough to overcome the rational basis review of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The offender’s religion of choice (Christian Separatist Church Society) included 
beliefs in white supremacy.  He sued over the prison’s restrictions on assembly, 
television programming, and delivery of religious publications.  Prison administrators 
claimed such decisions were made to avoid racial disruption and violence.  The court 
determined the policies were in the interest of prison security and found that the other 
group services allowed did not have separatism as a central belief.  The policies were 
rationally related to legitimate government interests in security.  The Eighth Circuit 
remanded the issues of unlawful censorship and RLUIPA violation.  Sufficient evidence 
as to the inflammatory nature of the publication was not shown. 
Wiccan. The Wiccan offenders sued over limitation of the Samhain religious 
holiday observation, specifically the time allotted and the food permitted (Gladson v. 
Iowa, 2009).  The court held that it was not a violation of their First Amendment rights 
because the offenders did not show that the policy substantially burdened their ability to 
practice their religion. 
In McCollum v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2011), offenders 
and their volunteer Wiccan chaplain claimed their religious accommodations were denied because 
five other faiths had paid chaplains and the Wiccan offenders only had a volunteer chaplain.  The 
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court determined that the offenders did not show that the use of a volunteer Wiccan chaplain 
infringed on their free exercise.  They noted that prisons are not required to provide a paid, full-time 
chaplain.  Furthermore, the volunteer chaplain’s claim was dismissed.  The court ruled that a third-
party who is not incarcerated may not seek relief under RLUIPA. 
Offenders claimed the failure to hire a full-time Wiccan chaplain hindered their free 
exercise of religion.  They claimed there were more practicing Wiccan offenders at the California 
prison than there were Jewish, Muslim, or Catholic inmates.  The court ruled that the failure to 
provide a paid, full-time chaplain for their faith did not burden the offenders’ free exercise of 
religious beliefs.  The offenders were already provided with a volunteer Wiccan chaplain 
(Hartmann v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2013). 
Diet 
“Several cases have involved challenges to prison policies refusing to 
accommodate kosher or other religious diets and have almost all met with success under 
RLUIPA” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 558).  As noted by Vallely (2007), RLUIPA protects those 
practices that are an element of, but not necessarily essential to, to a religious belief.  This 
includes dietary requests.  Therefore, prison officials often find they are unable to 
successfully prohibit such requests (Vallely, 2007). 









Summary of Diet Cases  
Topic # of Cases 
African Hebrew Israelite 1 
Church of the New Song 1 




Native American 2 
Pork 2 
Ramadan 4 
RLUIPA issue 2 








African Hebrew Israelite. An African Hebrew Israelite offender claimed he was 
not given blackstrap molasses, sesame seeds, kelp, brewer’s yeast, parsley, fenugreek, 
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wheat germ, and soybeans as required by his religion.  The court ruled that while the 
Turner prongs must be considered, they do not have to be separately addressed by prison 
officials.  The practice of other prisons of allowing the supplements is not, in and of 
itself, sufficient to override prison’s argument that denial meets a legitimate penological 
interest (Mays v. Springborn, 2013).  
Church of the New Song. Offenders sued over prison official’s denial to allow 
banquet food trays to offender members in segregation.  CONS had been ruled a religion 
in the 8th Circuit, but deemed a masquerade in Texas.  The court ruled the denial of food 
trays was not a violation of the offenders’ First Amendment rights and was rooted in a 
legitimate penological purpose (Goff v. Graves, 2004). 
Eid ul Fitr Feast. A Muslim offender claimed he was denied the opportunity to 
celebrate the end of Ramadan with the Eid ul Fitr Feast.  In Ford v McGinnis (2003), the 
court found that the offender’s religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the 
policy.  The court vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded to ascertain whether the 
prison officials’ policies were reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes.  
In Shakur v. Selsky (2004), the district court had held that denial of a single 
religious festival meal was not a substantial burden on the offender’s religious exercise.  
The district court dismissed the claim.  On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded the case 
to the district court for further proceedings in regards to the offender’s First Amendment 
and RLUIPA allegations.  The claims regarding due process and equal protection were 
dismissed. 
Halal. Williams v. Morton (2003) was unsuccessful for some Islamic offenders’ 
attempting to force the New Jersey prison system to provide halal meat.  The court ruled 
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the regulation furthered a legitimate penological interest in simplified food service, 
security, and costs.  It also determined the offenders’ equal protection claims were not 
valid because it was not shown that the meals provided to Jewish offenders contained 
meat.  The meals offered as an alternative were vegetarian (Gower, 2004). 
The offender did not prevail in Patel v. United States Bureau of Prisons (2008) as 
the offender did not show how the dietary policy of the BOP substantially burdened his 
practice of religion.  As a Muslim, he claimed the alternative means offered by prison 
administrators were inadequate.  The court ruled the offender did not show evidence that 
he requested to be allowed to store halal food for days when kosher meat would be 
served.  The record also did not show why foods available to the offender at the 
commissary would not be appropriate to his religious beliefs on those days when kosher 
meat would be served. 
In Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections (2009), the jail 
officials did not want to provide halal meals to Muslims as often as it provided kosher 
meals to Jewish offenders.  Although the case was ultimately dismissed, the offenders 
still prevailed.  The lawsuit was dismissed after the jail agreed, not willingly, to serve 
halal meals at the same rate as kosher meals.  Attorneys’ fees were also awarded to the 
offenders’ attorneys because the offenders prevailed even though the lawsuit was 
dismissed. 
An Oklahoma offender claimed he was forced to accept pudding and jello that 
was not halal.  He claimed that the non-pork and vegetarian diets were not sufficient.  
The court ruled, in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone (2010), that the offender showed his free 
exercise was substantially burdened.  The court remanded the case in order for the state to 
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show that the policy served a compelling governmental interest and was the least 
restrictive means for doing so. 
Kosher. In Madison v. Ritter (2003), denial of a kosher diet, when mandated by a 
religion, placed a substantial burden on the offender’s religious exercise.  The Virginia 
prison offender identified himself as a Hebrew Israelite and noted his religious beliefs 
required he maintain kosher dietary practices.  The prison system denied his request for 
kosher meals and claimed the diets currently provided (regular, vegetarian, and no pork) 
were adequate for his purposes.  The system’s denial was based on disbelief of the 
offender’s sincerity in his religious beliefs as well as his prolific institutional behavioral 
problems.  The offender brought suit based on RLUIPA and prevailed as the State did not 
prove a rational or compelling reason for its denial (Gower, 2004).  The prison system 
subsequently appealed on the constitutionality of RLUIPA.  While the district court had 
found RLUIPA to be a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Fourth Circuit ruled the 
Act was not a violation. 
A BOP offender who was an Orthodox Jew required a kosher diet.  At that time, 
offenders were required to submit a “written statement articulating the religious 
motivation for participation” in the diet (Resnick v. Adams, 2003, p. 765).  The court 
found that the requirement to fill out a form to receive kosher food was not a violation of 
the First Amendment.  They wrote, unless the offenders “participated, or attempted to 
participate, in the [diet program], he could not be injured by, and would have not standing 
to challenge,” the policy (Resnick v. Adams, 2003, p. 767).  The offender also sued under 
RFRA in another case (Resnick v. Adams, 2003), but again the court ruled that the 
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offender had not shown sufficient cause to constitute a RFRA violation and affirmed 
summary judgment for the BOP officials. 
Searles v. Dechant (2004) was a Tenth Circuit case that was brought by a Jewish 
offender.  Despite the rabbi telling him that it was allowable, he refused to work at a job 
assignment in a non-kosher kitchen and received disciplinary cases.  As a result of the 
disciplinary cases, he lost his privileges to own some property items.  The court ruled that 
working in the kitchen was not a violation of the offender’s religious expression of 
freedom, as evaluated by the Turner test. 
In Madison v. Virginia (2006), the offender brought suit over the denial of kosher 
meals.  The state counter argued that RLUIPA was unconstitutional.  The Fourth Circuit 
held that RLUIPA was not an overreach of Congress’ powers nor was it a violation of the 
Spending and Commerce Clause.  The case was remanded to the district court for 
reconsideration of the kosher diet issue. 
Baranowski v. Hart (2007) said that the State did not need to change their 
religious diet policy if doing so would place undue costs and administrative burdens on 
the State.  The Texas Department of Criminal Justice was sued by a Jewish offender for 
not providing a kosher diet.  The court held the policy of not providing kosher meals was 
the least restrictive means of meeting a compelling government interest in prison order 
and controlling costs. 
In Shakur v. Schriro (2008), the Arizona offender had originally adopted a 
vegetarian diet.  However, the offender asked to switch to a kosher meat diet after 
experiencing some health issues.  He claimed the prison’s refusal violated the Free 
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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The court agreed and found that the offender’s 
belief was sincere. 
After several disciplinary cases, an offender was sent to a Michigan facility that 
had segregation, but did not serve kosher meals.  When the warden was notified the 
offender was not eating, she transferred him to another facility.  The court ruled that the 
unavailability of kosher meals for five days was not a violation of the offender’s Eighth 
Amendment rights because the warden transferred him as soon as she became aware of 
the issue (Cardinal v. Metrish, 2009). 
In accordance with the PLRA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
lower court in Gallagher v. Shelton (2009).  The Kansas offender alleged there were 
bodily fluids in his kosher meal.  The court ruled that the offender did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
In Maryland, an offender was not able to eat many of the available food items and 
still keep kosher.  He lost 23 pounds and sued under RLUIPA.  The Fourth Circuit found 
that RLUIPA does not allow damages to be awarded against “private individuals who are 
not themselves recipients of federal funding” (Rendelman v. Rouse, 2009, p. 187).  The 
offender had been transferred to a federal prison, prior to the decision, to serve additional 
sentences.  The Maryland DOC also changed its policy.  The court ruled the offender’s 
request for injunctive relief was moot based on the offender’s transfer to the BOP and 
Maryland’s change in policy. 
Colvin v. Caruso (2010) was a case where a Jewish offender was mistakenly 
believed to be Muslim and not given kosher meals for 16 days.  Even after the error was 
discovered, there were still occasions when he was accidentally given non-kosher food.  
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The court ruled that the offender’s lack of knowledge of Jewish scholarship did not 
necessarily indicate an insincere belief in his religion. 
The Eighth Circuit court was not clear in El-Tabech v. Clarke (2010).  After a 
Nebraska offender sued for kosher meals, the district court awarded him monetary costs 
and fees.  The court was not firm on whether RLUIPA allowed for monetary costs and 
fees, but remanded the case to the lower court for reconsideration of the award. 
In Little v. Jones (2010), a Michigan offender was mistakenly taken off his kosher 
diet and was also served food that was non-kosher.  The court found that the mistaken 
removal of an offender from a kosher diet did not violate his constitutional rights.  The 
court affirmed the granting of summary judgment. 
A Texas offender demanded free kosher food as he had been provided on his 
previous unit.  He was transferred due to a serious disciplinary infraction.  The Fifth 
Circuit denied a rehearing, stating that RLUIPA does not require prison officials to 
provide kosher foods (Moussazadeh v. TDCJ, 2012/2013).  The state had noted that the 
offender would order and consume non-kosher items from the commissary, giving rise to 
doubts about the sincerity of his beliefs. 
In Florida, an Orthodox Jewish offender sued over his request to have kosher 
meals (Rich v. Sec., FDOC, 2013).  In the Florida DOC, a new policy was enacted that 
would have required the offender to eat non-kosher food for 90 days before being 
considered.  The court ruled that the new policy substantially burdened the offender’s 
religious freedom and was not the least restrictive means to render the offender’s claim 
moot.  There was also no indication that the kosher meals would be ongoing – rather than 
a short-term policy. 
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In U.S. v. Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections (2015/2016), the state 
claimed that the provision of kosher meals was prohibitively expensive.  The offenders 
sued.  The court held that the denial of kosher meals did not meet a compelling 
governmental interest and was not the least restrictive means of doing so.  Along with not 
meeting the Turner test, the state failed to show why other states and the BOP provided 
kosher meals and they could not.  They also failed to show why kosher was difficult 
when they provided vegan, medical, and therapeutic diets. 
Meat-free. A Catholic offender requested a non-meat diet for all meals as part of 
his penance and was denied.  The offender lost approximately 50 pounds.  The court 
asked if the denial of the diet was a substantial burden of free exercise for the offender’s 
religion.  The answer was yes, and the court held that if the offender had been affiliated 
with a less traditional group, the diet would have been accommodated (Nelson v. Miller, 
2009). 
Native American. Haight v. Thompson (2014) was a case where two groups of 
death row offenders filed suit claiming their rights were violated by the denial of buffalo 
meat and other traditional foods for a powwow.  The offenders offered to pay for the 
food.  The court found that there was “a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives 
the inmates a right to buffalo meat and other traditional foods for a faith-based once-a-
year powwow” (p. 558).  The case was remanded for consideration of whether in the 
inmates’ beliefs were sincerely held and whether the State met the Turner prongs. 
In Schlemm v. Wall (2015), a Navajo offender requested venison or even ground 
beef for a Ghost Feast.  He argued that outside vendors were allowed to send in sealed 
Seder platters for Jewish offenders.  The court wrote that the denial was a violation of the 
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offender’s free exercise.  The Wisconsin DOC did not show that the policy was the least 
restrictive means.  They had not tried to price outside vendors.  The court limited the 
decision to the current situation and stated, “the costs of accommodating other inmates’ 
requests (should any be made) can be left to future litigation” (Schlemm v. Wall, 2015, p. 
366). 
Pork. In Pennsylvania, an offender was fired for refusing to handle pork and 
given a job where he made less money (Williams v. Bitner, 2006).  The Third Circuit 
court pointed out the U.S. Courts of Appeal from the Fifth (Kenner v. Phelps, 1979), 
Seventh (Chapman v. Kleindienst, 1974, and Eighth Circuits (Hayes v. Long, 1995) had 
previously held that prison officials were required to accommodate a Muslim inmate’s 
religious beliefs regarding the handling of pork.  Also, the Third Circuit court itself 
(Williams v. Bitner, 2005), along with the U.S. Supreme Court (Sherbert v. Verner, 1963) 
supported the principles underlying the inmate’s asserted right.  Thus, the state of the law 
at the time of the violation gave the prison officials fair warning that their treatment of 
the inmate was unconstitutional. 
An Oregon DOC offender alleged he was served pork in a pie, contrary to his 
religious beliefs (Jones v. Williams, 2015).  He also alleged he was required to cook pork 
in his job.  He also alleged the method of cleaning grills did not ensure that pork grease 
was removed.  The court held the allegation that the pork was in a pie was hearsay and 
summary judgment was awarded to the DOC.  The DOC violated the offender’s right 
when they required him to cook pork.  The claim regarding the grill cleaning was denied, 
with the court affirming summary judgment in favor of the DOC. 
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Ramadan. In Lovelace v. Lee (2006), a Virginia offender alleged his Nation of 
Islam religious exercise was denied.  The offender was on a list of offenders allowed to 
participate in Ramadan.  While participating, he complained about some of the items 
provided.  The officer to whom he complained later claimed the offender had broken fast 
and Lovelace was removed from the Ramadan participation list.  With this removal, he 
not only was denied the Ramadan meals, but he was also denied the opportunity to 
participate in any Ramadan activities.  The officer later admitted he had made a 
“mistake.”  The state did not show any evidence the offender had, in fact, broken his fast 
and therefore, the court ruled his religious exercise was substantially burdened.  The 
court also wrote, “A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that (the officer) acted 
intentionally, perhaps even maliciously, in misidentifying Lovelace and in failing to 
correct his error during the remainder of Ramadan 2002” (p. 196).  The state did not 
show the Ramadan policy was in furtherance of a legitimate government interest or that it 
was the least restrictive means of achieving any such interest.  
A New York offender was required to give a urine sample during Ramadan when 
he could not drink water, and was disciplined for doing so (Holland v. Goord, 2014).  
The DOC argued that the matter was a de minimis burden on the offender’s religious 
exercise.  The court disagreed and ruled that it was a substantial burden to the offender’s 
religious exercise. 
In Wall v Wade (2014), the Nation of Islam offender was required to show 
property related to his religion in order to sign up for Ramadan.  The offender claimed his 
property had been lost during a transfer.  He argued that he was forced to choose between 
not eating and his religious beliefs.  The court agreed and held that the state did not show 
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that the policy was the least restrictive means of meeting a compelling governmental 
interest. 
A Muslim offender was denied meal bags during part of Ramadan.  The 
Wisconsin DOC claimed he had violated policy and was thus denied the bags.  The court 
found that the state “intentionally and unjustifiably forced this burdensome choice” on 
the offender, causing him to choose between his religious beliefs and starvation 
(Thompson v. Holm, 2016, p. 381).  If the facts were disputed and decided in the most 
favorable light to the non-moving party, the court ruled the state did infringe on the 
offender’s RLUIPA rights. 
RLUIPA issue. A Jewish offender in Georgia brought suit that he was not 
allowed to constantly wear a yarmulke, eat only kosher foods, as well as observe holy 
days and rituals, in violation of RLUIPA (Benning v. GA, 2004).  The DOC argued that 
RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  The court 
disagreed and ruled that the U.S. Congress did not overstep its power by predicating 
receipt of federal funds on adherence to RLUIPA.  The case was remanded to the district 
court for a decision on the other matters. 
In Van Wyhe v. Reisch (2009), the offenders requested a succah for religious 
ceremonies in which to eat their meals.  They were denied and claimed they were 
substantially burdened in their free exercise.  They also claimed that RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional under the Spending Clause.  The court ruled that RLUIPA was 
constitutional and that a state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity for 
monetary damages by accepting federal funds under RLUIPA.  The court found that the 
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offenders were not substantially burdened in their free exercise and the state was entitled 
to summary judgment. 
Succoth meal. In Sisney v. Reisch (2012), the offender was denied permission to 
eat his Succoth meal in a succah in the recreation yard.  He sued the South Dakota DOC 
for compensatory damages.  The court held that the denial of a succah was not a violation 
of the offender’s constitutional rights and noted that the PLRA does not allow 
compensatory damages if physical injury does not result.  It was not clear that use of a 
succah was a “reasonable dietary and meal accommodation” (Sisney v. Reisch, 2012, p. 
19).  
Thelema. An Illinois offender was denied a non-meat diet because it was not 
required by his religion, Thelema5.  In the Illinois DOC, the offenders were required to 
have their religious affiliation verified by a prison chaplain.  The court held that the 
length of time the offender pursued the issue showed his belief was sincere.  The policy 
requiring verification of sincerity from a religious leader was not in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest, nor was it the least restrictive means available.  
Therefore, the delay in the recognition of a change in the offender’s religious beliefs was 
a violation of his freedom of religious practice (Koger v. Bryan, 2008). 
Tulukeesh. New York offenders claimed they must eat “only a complex, highly 
regimented non-soybean-based vegan diet” (Jova v. Smith, 2009, p. 414).  The court ruled 
that the state did not prove that their religious/meatless diet was the least restrictive 
means of further the New York DOC’s compelling governmental interests.  The case was 
remanded to determine if an entirely vegetarian diet was possible.  
                                                 
5 A religion based on the teaching of English philosopher Aleister Crowley (DuQuette, 2005). 
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Vegan. In DeHart v. Horn (2004), a Buddhist offender requested a special diet.  
The state complained that the diet would require individualized preparation and denied it.  
The court held that the religious practice held that the religious practice did not have to be 
usual or even mandatory to inhibit someone’s religious freedom rights.  The court also 
clarified that RLUIPA replaced RFRA for the U.S. states. 
A Moorish Science Temple of America offender claimed he was required to have 
a vegan diet, even though his religion required a pork-free diet.  The offender was moved 
to another prison and received a vegan diet there.  The court found that a sincerely held 
belief is entitled to RLUIPA protections even if it not the central tenet of a religion.  
However, if the request for the diet was not related to religious purposes, the chaplain did 
not err in denying it (Vinning-El v. Evans, 2011). 
Vegetarian. Kind v. Frank (2003) was a case where a Muslim offender requested 
a vegetarian diet.  The state offered him a pork-free diet in convention with Islamic 
practices.  The court found that the denial of the vegetarian diet was not a violation of the 
offender’s sincerely held religious beliefs and affirmed the granting of summary 
judgment. 
When Koger v. Bryan (2008) was decided, the offender prevailed.  The offender 
in this case also had changed his religious affiliation (several times).  He was denied a 
vegetarian diet because he did not have a letter from a rabbi verifying his religious 
affiliation and that the diet was part of the religious belief.  The court ruled the length of 
time the offender pursued the issue was testament to the sincerity of his religious beliefs.  
The policy requiring verification from the rabbi was shown neither to be a compelling 
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government interest or the least restrictive means of furthering such an interest if it 
existed.   
A Shetaut Neter6 offender sued over a use of force and denial of a vegetarian 
meal.  The state argued that the officers thought the offender was Muslim.  The court held 
that the denial of a specific meal did not violate the Equal Protection clause if the official 
did not know the offender was entitled to receive the meal.  In addition, the offender did 
not show he was treated any differently than any other inmate in such a situation 
(Furnace v. Sullivan, 2013). 
Wotanist. In Wisconsin, an offender alleged that his Wotanist7 dietary 
restrictions were ignored (Lindell v. McCallum, 2003).  The court agreed that refusal to 
allow dietary restrictions because of the failure to recognize a religion violated the 
offender’s Constitutional rights.  The case was remanded to the district court for 
recognition of the religion.  
Grooming 
In the recent decision of Holt v. Hobbs (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
the Arkansas Department of Corrections violated RLUIPA when it did not allow a 
Muslim offender to grow a short beard.  The offender met his burden of proof by 
showing that growing a beard was a religious exercise, and that the department’s policy 
prohibiting it substantially burdened his right of free exercise.  The state was required to 
show that the policy was “…in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
                                                 
6 A religion based on Egyptian/African philosophy including yoga practices (Ashby, 2007). 




(2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest” 
(RLUIPA, 2000).  The Court found the state did not meet its burden. 
The state’s case rested on the compelling governmental interest in offender 
identification and preventing the concealment of contraband.  Justice Stephen Breyer 
mentioned that the state was not able to show a single example when contraband was 
found secreted in a prisoner’s beard (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015, oral arguments, p. 48).  The 
state’s argument that permitting facial hair would allow an offender to quickly alter his 
appearance was also set aside.  Justice Ruth Ginsburg mentioned that it would be easy 
enough to take two pictures of the offender upon intake – one with facial hair and another 
with the offender clean shaven.  Thus, the policy was not the least restrictive means, even 
if the state was found to have a compelling interest.  It was also observed that many other 
states were able to operate with less restrictive policies (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015).  Also, 
Arkansas’s policy allowing short beards for medical reasons undermined the states’ 
arguments regarding security (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015, oral arguments). 
The case was not without its points for the state however.  In oral arguments, 
Chief Justice John Roberts expressed concern about parameters of the case, stating, “I 
don’t want to do these cases half inch by half inch” (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015, oral arguments, 
p. 7).  He was concerned that the case would not really settle the issue.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia pointed out that even having an inch long beard would be a violation of the 
offender’s religious beliefs.  The plaintiff’s attorney responded that it would be less of a 
violation. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ fears seem to have been shared somewhat by Justice 
Sotomayor, who concurred but wanted the Court to have a consensus on the deference to 
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be given to prison officials.  She opined that deference was owed to prison officials, but 
should be tempered with good judgment.   
A summary of the case law for religious grooming is in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Summary of Religious Grooming Cases  
Topic # of Cases 
Dreadlocks 5 
Facial Hair 9 
Facial Hair and Long Hair 3 
Hair Length 7 
Kouplock 2 
 
Dreadlocks. A Rastafarian offender brought suit against the California policy that 
required him to cut his dreadlocks, claiming it violated his religious beliefs (Wyatt v. 
Terhune, 2002/2003).  The offender had filed using RFRA, which had been declared 
unconstitutional.  The Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling in this case, and the equal 
protection claim was dismissed because the offender’s administrative remedies had not 
been exhausted.  The policy was ruled constitutional.  A rehearing was denied in 2003 
and the previous opinion vacated. 
In Grayson v. Schuler (2012), an African Hebrew Israelite offender claimed the 
ban on his dreadlocks was a violation of his First Amendment rights.  Illinois prison 
officials claimed they were a security risk, but allowed Rastafarians to have them.  The 
court ruled that despite the chaplain’s opinion that the African Hebrew Israelites did not 
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require dreadlocks, the policy was discriminatory.  It was not constitutional to allow one 
religious group to have an accommodation that is not allowed for another group. 
In Stewart v. Beach (2012), a Rastafarian offender was required to cut his 
dreadlocks or forfeit a transfer to be closer to his ill mother.  Officers were warned the 
policy may violate the First Amendment.  The court held that the warning of a potential 
First Amendment violation did not negate an officer’s qualified immunity.  Also, the 
court held that RLUIPA does not allow individual-capacity claims.  The warden was 
properly granted summary judgment as denying a grievant appeal did not create a 
personal violation of rights.  The plaintiff did not clearly establish that the enforcement of 
the policy violated his rights.  RLUIPA only allowed a cause of action against the 
government, not individuals. 
Lewis v. Sternes (2013) was a case regarding an offender who had made a 
Nazirite vow committing to not cutting his hair.  The offender’s hair was in dreadlocks.  
The Illinois DOC’s policy allowed long hair if it did not create a security risk.  The 
offender was not allowed to have visitors until he consented to have his hair cut.  Prior to 
the court hearing, the offender was given the choice of cutting his hair or going into 
segregation.  He cut his hair.  The Seventh Circuit examined if the ad hoc policy of 
removing the dreadlocks in some cases violated RLUIPA and determined it did not.  The 
Illinois prison had a different policy from another similar Illinois prison.  However, their 
visitation policies were different.  The offender’s dreadlocks were too difficult to search 
and the vow was not mandatory for the religion. 
In Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections (2017), a Rastafarian offender 
sued under RLUIPA against the policy that prohibited his dreadlocks.  The Fifth Circuit 
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agreed the policy was unconstitutional, stating the state did not show that the policy was 
the least restrictive means of meeting a compelling governmental interest. 
Facial Hair. Shortly after RLUIPA was passed, a Muslim offender filed suit 
regarding the Texas prison policy that required him to be clean shaven.  He claimed it 
violated the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.  The court affirmed the district 
court, finding the policy was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” and 
“did not deprive [the] plaintiff of all means of expressing his religious beliefs” (Green v. 
Polunsky, 2000, p. 391). 
In Taylor v Johnson (2001), a Muslim offender in a Texas prison sued over the 
policy which did not allow beards, claiming it violate his First Amendment rights.  The 
court found the policy prohibiting the wearing of facial hair was not unconstitutional.  In 
Green v. Polunsky (2000), the court had found the policy reasonably related to legitimate 
penological practices.  The Equal Protection claim was vacated and remanded.  It was 
later vacated by the lower court as the offender had been released from prison. 
British nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay alleged “…forced shaving of their 
beards, banning or interrupting their prayers, denying them copies of the Koran and 
prayer mats and throwing a copy of the Koran in a toilet bucket” (Rasul v. Myers, 2008, 
p. 650).  The District of Columbia Circuit held (2008) that non-citizen detainees were not 
subject to the protections of RFRA.  The U.S. Supreme Court (2008) vacated and 
remanded in light of the decision in Boumediene v. Bush (2008)8.  The D.C. court again 
held (2009) that non-citizen detainees were not subject to the protections of RFRA. 
                                                 
8 Foreign detainees were entitled to habeas corpus hearings. 
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In DeMoss v. Crain (2011), the Texas offender claimed that the policy requiring 
offenders to be clean-shaven was a violation of RLUIPA.  The state argued the policy 
aided in the identification of offenders, searching for contraband, and saving money by 
limiting required grooming equipment.  The court ruled the grooming policy was the least 
restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest. 
In Kuperman v. Wrenn (2011), the New Hampshire DOC provided a religious 
waiver to offenders, allowing a ¼” beard.  An offender sued to allow a full, untrimmed 
beard in accordance with his faith.  The court stated the beard length restriction was 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.  Prison administrators were 
granted summary judgment as the offender did not show evidence repudiating the 
prison’s claim that the policy was reasonably related to security. 
Another case prior to Holt v. Hobbs (2015), a Sunni Muslim housed in a Virginia 
prison was denied permission to grow a 1/8” beard.  While the offender showed his free 
exercise was substantially burdened, the state did not show the policy was the least 
restrictive means for achieving a compelling governmental interest.  The court found for 
the offender (Couch v. Jabe 2012). 
Garner v. Kennedy (2013) was another Texas case where an offender claimed that 
the policy prohibiting facial hair violated his exercise of religious freedom.  The court 
ruled the Texas prison’s policy requiring short facial hair was not the least restrictive 
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.  The Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice (TDCJ) did not show the actual cost of changing the policy.  The 
argument of offender identification was negated because shaving their heads would cause 
similar identification needs. 
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An Islamic offender in a Georgia prison claimed that the policy requiring he 
shave his beard was in violation of his religious beliefs (Smith v. Owens, 2017).  The 
district court’s ruling was vacated and remanded in light of the decision in Holt v Hobbs 
(2015). 
In Ali v. Stephens (2016), a Muslim offender claimed his free exercise was 
burdened by the prohibition against wearing a kufi and a 4” beard.  The court agreed that 
it was, noting the Texas prison system did not show that the policies were in the 
government’s compelling interest or that they were the least restrictive means. 
Facial Hair and Long Hair. Flagner v. Wilkerson (2001) was a case where an 
Orthodox Hasidic Jewish offender requested damages after prison officials forcibly cut 
his beard and sidelocks.  The court did not determine that the defendant’s actions violated 
a clear constitutional right.  They reversed denial of summary judgment and remanded to 
consider the constitutionality of the policy. 
Jackson v. the District of Columbia (2001) was a case filed by Rastafarian and 
Muslim offenders.  They alleged a violation of RFRA due to the prison policy requiring 
short hair and prohibiting beards.  The district court ruled they had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies.  The court considered whether the PLRA applied to RFRA 
actions and found that it did.  They also considered if the “irreparable injury” argument 
was sufficient to find the PLRA did not apply in this case (p. 267).  They found it did not.  
The case was remanded with an order to dismiss without prejudice so that the 
administrative remedies could be exhausted.  
An offender claimed that the Arkansas grooming policy was a violation of his free 
exercise (Fegans v. Norris, 2008).  He claimed the policy violated his equal protection 
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rights as the women offenders were allowed a different, less restrictive policy.  He also 
noted the medical exemption policy that allowed offenders to groom a short beard for 
medical reasons.  The court ruled that the policy requiring clean-shaven offenders and 
short hair was not a violation of RLUIPA.  The state had pointed out the female offenders 
are historically less violent than male offenders.  The court found that different policies 
did not violate the offender’s equal protection rights.  Also, the offender did not argue 
that he wanted to wear a beard the same length as those granted in medical exemptions.  
Finally, the court found the policy was reasonably related to the government’s interests in 
safety and security. 
Hair Length. Henderson v. Terhune (2004) was a case where an offender sued 
over the California prison system’s policy regarding hair length, claiming that it violated 
his free exercise.  The Ninth Circuit found the policy was in keeping with prison goals, 
and would unduly burden administrators if removed.  The American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act (AIRFA) did not provide for legal recourse.  The court held that the policy 
meet the Turner test, but the offender could not obtain recourse under AIRFA. 
A Native American offender appealed regarding the hair length policy for male 
offenders in Arizona prisons.  He was housed at a minimum security prison and pointed 
out the policy for female prisoners was different.  The Ninth Circuit found the state did 
not show that the security level of the offender was considered, or that they had 
considered less restrictive means.  They also did not show why the females’ policy 
differed from the males’.  The court also noted that a higher standard of proof was 
required to show compelling governmental interests over legitimate penological interests 
(Warsoldier v. Woodford, 2005). 
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A Fifth Circuit case, Longoria v. Dretke (2007), involved a Native American 
offender who claimed that denial of his request to grow his hair violated his free exercise 
rates.  The court ruled it did not.  The offender, in his pro se complaint, did not name 
RLUIPA.  The court had decided the same issue under RFRA and ruled that the test was 
“sufficiently the same” (p.901). 
An offender’s head was forcibly shaved in accordance with the maximum security 
unit use of force policy (Smith v. Osmint, 2009).  The offender claimed it violated his 
rights under RLUIPA.  The Fourth Circuit wrote that the policy was not the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.  The state did not 
prove that the policy furthered its interests in hygiene and security. 
In California, an offender claimed the grooming policy imposed a substantial 
burden on his free exercise.  He sought monetary damages (Holley v. California 
Department of Corrections, 2010).  The policy was changed during the course of the 
lawsuit, and the offender was allowed to have long hair.  The court ruled that acceptance 
of federal funds did not require the state to waive sovereign immunity regarding 
RLUIPA. 
An offender sued over hair length in Kimbrough v. California (2010).  Before 
reaching the appeals court, he had been released and the California prison system had 
changed the hair policy.  The district court never actually ruled on the offender’s claims.  
The Ninth Circuit court ruled that if the case becomes moot, and no actual violation of 
the offender’s rights is thus found, attorney’s fees should not be awarded. 
In Knight v. Thompson (2013/2015), offenders challenged a policy requiring short 
hair as a violation of practicing their Native American religious freedom.  The court 
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found that the Alabama prison system’s policy requiring short hair was the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.  The case was 
different from Holt v. Hobbs (2015) due to the “detailed record developed” showing the 
policy was necessary to mitigate “actual security, discipline, hygiene, and safety risks” 
(Knight v. Thompson, 2015, p. 1293). 
Kouplock. In Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff (2005), the Ohio offender brought suit over 
the policy requiring he cut his hair in violation of his Native American beliefs.  An 
injunction allowed him to keep a kouplock.  The state argued that the offender had a long 
history of institutional misconduct regarding contraband.  The Sixth Circuit held that 
RLUIPA and RFRA required that suitable deference should be given to prison officials in 
creating policy.  The injunction allowing the kouplock should not have been given. 
In Davis v. Davis (2016), a Texas offender alleged the policy prohibiting the 
growing of a kouplock was a violation of his RLUIPA and First Amendment rights 
because female offenders were allowed to grow their hair long.  The Fifth Circuit vacated 
summary judgment because of Holt v. Hobbs (2015) and the need to reassess the security 
risk of allowing kouplocks.   
Pat and Strip Searches 
The seminal case regarding pat and strip searches is Bell v. Wolfish (1979), as 
discussed earlier.  Although there are several cases at the district court level regarding pat 
and strip searches, they do not often rise to the level of the appeals courts.  Unlike with 
diets, prison officials can make a strong case for searches and their compelling interests 
in having such policies. 
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Kaemmerling v. Lappin (2008) was a case involving the BOP.  An offender 
claimed extracting DNA from any type of sample from his body was a violation of his 
religious free exercise.  The D.C. Circuit found that the offender did not show any 
specific free exercise that was substantially burdened.  He did not argue the collecting of 
the sample was problematic; only the extraction of DNA from the sample.  The court 
ruled that the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 did not violate free 
exercise. 
Tulukeesh offenders claimed they could not appear nude in front of non-members 
(Jova v. Smith, 2009).  The Second Circuit ruled the New York policy for pat and strip 
searches had obvious security benefits and was not a violation of their religious exercise. 
A summary of the case law for pat and strip searches related to religious beliefs is 
given in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Summary of Religious Pat and Strip Searches Cases 
Topic # of Cases 
DNA sample 1 
Tulukeesh 1 
 
General Exercise of Religious Freedom Cases 
The exercise of religious freedom is a fundamental constitutional right.  “Prison 
regulations that prohibit or penalize inmates for following their religious beliefs 
constitute a significant burden” (Chiu, 2004, p. 1020).  RLUIPA cases determine if the 
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regulation is a significant burden, and if so, does it further a compelling government 
interest and is it narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means of doing so. 
A summary of the case law for general offender religious exercise is given in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 
Summary of General Religious Exercise Cases 
Topic # of Cases 
Access to Religious Television Programming 1 
African Hebrew Israelite Fellowship 1 
Banning or Interrupting Prayers 1 
Cross-religion beliefs 1 
Five Percent Nation 1 
Muslim 3 
Name 1 
Odinist housing/ritual 1 
Pork 1 
Praying 1 
RFRA applicability to enemy combatants 1 
RLUIPA issue 3 
Sweat Lodge Ceremony 1 




Topic # of Cases 
Tulukeesh sparring 1 
Universal Life Church Preaching 1 
Wotanism 1 
 
Access to religious television programming. In a Missouri prison, a white 
supremacy religion was only allowed to be practiced individually (Murphy v. MO, 2004).  
The court considered if the policy that prohibited assembly, access to television 
programming and religious publications due to the white supremacy beliefs of the faith 
was a violation of the Equal Protection clause and RLUIPA.  The court found it was not 
for the Equal Protection clause and it was for RLUIPA.  The court held: 
• The state’s allegations of violence were enough to meet the rational basis 
of review of the Equal Protection clause for group meetings; 
• Television programming was not specific to the religion; and 
• The state’s claims regarding inflammatory publications were not enough 
to meet the strict scrutiny review of the RLUIPA. 
The offender’s claim was ultimately denied. 
African Hebrew Israelite Fellowship. During the grievance process about the 
loss of religious services, the Illinois offender claimed he was “never informed that 
grievance was incomplete or procedurally deficient” (Maddox v. Love, 2011, p. 712).  
The court ruled that the cancellation of services due to budget cuts was a violation of the 
offender’s religious rights.  The failure to “provide reasonable access to religious 
materials” was not an issue that was administratively exhausted, so the court affirmed the 
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lower court’s ruling (p. 712).  The two counts regarding budget allocations were reversed 
due to preliminary dismissal during the grievance screening.  The claim regarding group 
worship was vacated. 
Banning or Interrupting Prayers. British nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay 
alleged “…banning or interrupting their prayers…” (Rasul v. Myers, 2008, p. 650).  The 
District of Columbia Circuit held (2008) that non-citizen detainees were not subject to the 
protections of RFRA.  The U.S. Supreme Court (2008) vacated and remanded in light of 
the decision in Boumediene v. Bush (2008)9.  The D.C. court again held (2009) that non-
citizen detainees were not subject to the protections of RFRA. 
Cross-religion beliefs. A BOP Buddhist offender alleged he was denied pastoral 
visits from a Methodist minister (Kikumura v. Hurley, 2001).  The court considered if 
RLUIPA required a religious belief to be mandated by the religion, and determined it did 
not.  The offender did not have to implicitly state whether his beliefs required pastoral 
visits.  The court held the requests for visits were a religious exercise protected by 
RLUIPA.  
Five Percent Nation10. The offenders sued over the decision to designate the 
Five Percent Nation as a Security Threat Group.  The court ruled that the policy did not 
violate the offenders’ First Amendment rights.  The policy was constitutional under the 
Turner test (Fraise v. Terhune, 2002).  
                                                 
9 Foreign detainees were entitled to habeas corpus hearings. 
10 “The Five Percent Nation originated in New York City in the 1960s after its leader, Clarence Smith (also 
known as Clarence 13X and Father Allah), broke away from the Nation of Islam. The group's name derives 
from its belief in “Supreme Mathematics,” which breaks down the population of the world into three 
groups: the Ten Percent, the Eighty Five Percent, and the Five Percent… Finally, the Five Percent are 
African Americans who have achieved self-knowledge” (Fraise v. Terhune, 2002, p. 511). 
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Muslim. Detained immediately post 9/11, the plaintiff alleged he was not allowed 
to pray in prison because he was a Muslim.  The Second Circuit held that the defendants 
were not entitled to qualified immunity (Iqbal v. Hasty, 2008).  The court noted, “Hasty’s 
arguments that the repeated banging on Iqbal’s cell while he prayed shows that he was at 
least allowed to pray” (p. 85).  The U.S. Supreme Court held that conclusory allegations 
that government officials knew of actions taken by subordinates could not be a basis for 
an unlawful discrimination claim (Iqbal v. Hasty, 2009).   
A BOP offender claimed his termination from his prison job was due to his 
supervisor’s prejudice towards the Islamic faith, in violation of RFRA (Johnson v. 
Rowley, 2009).  The court determined the failure to submit the RFRA allegation until the 
last step of the grievance did not constitute exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The 
BOP policy did not allow offenders to amend their grievance with other issues not raised 
in lower levels of the grievance process. 
In Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI (2016), the BOP offender brought suit under 
RFRA for harassment due to his Muslim faith, and its effects on his ability to pray at 
work.  The court ruled that RFRA prohibited individual conduct that substantially 
burdens an offender’s religious exercise.  The offender’s failure “to challenge a prison 
policy or regulation does not defeat his RFRA claim” (Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 
2016, p. 302). 
Name. In Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali v. District of Columbia (2002), an offender sued 
over his transfer to a District of Columbia prison where administrators decided he must 
serve his sentence under his birth name rather than his legal name (which he had changed 
for religious purposes).  The court did not determine if the policy was a burden to the 
112 
 
offender’s free exercise in violation of RFRA, but ruled that, for recordkeeping, 
administrators could continue to use the name under which the offender was convicted. 
Odinist housing/ritual. An Odinist offender claimed that the California prison 
system’s housing policy would interfere with his religious beliefs by potentially housing 
him with a non-white cellmate.  He also claimed he could not perform an Odinist ritual in 
front of any non-white person – therefore, he would be precluded from performing the 
ritual due to the housing policy.  The Ninth Circuit held that while the offender’s 
religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the policy – the policy itself is the least 
restrictive means of meeting the compelling governmental interest of nondiscrimination 
in housing offenders (Walker v. Beard, 2015). 
Pork. The Moorish Science Temple of America offender claimed his job as a 
dishwasher caused him to come into contact with pork products violating his religious 
beliefs (Clark v. Long, 2001).  The offender had to choose between washing pans or 
disciplinary action.  The court reviewed the lower court’s decision to grant judgment as a 
matter of law11.  Upon review, the court held that the judgment was correct because the 
offender had sufficient notice to correct his case weaknesses. 
Praying. In Texas, an offender sued over the policy requiring offenders to sit in 
the day room so that officers could have an unobstructed view.  He claimed it was a 
violation of RLUIPA because he had to leave the dayroom to pray.  The Fifth Circuit 
                                                 
11 “Motion for judgment as a matter of law (1956) A party's request that the court enter a judgment in its 
favor before the case is submitted to the jury, or after a contrary jury verdict, because there is no legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis on which a jury could find for the other party. • Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a party may move for judgment as a matter of law anytime before the case has been 
submitted to the jury. This kind of motion was formerly known as a motion for directed verdict (and still is 
in many jurisdictions). If the motion is denied and the case is submitted to the jury, resulting in an 
unfavorable verdict, the motion may be renewed within ten days after entry of the judgment. This aspect of 
the motion replaces the court paper formerly known as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2010). 
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determined the offender’s religious exercise was not substantially burdened as he was 
allowed to decide whether to stay in the dayroom or go to his cell to pray (DeMoss v. 
Crain, 2011). 
RFRA applicability to enemy combatants. In Padilla v. Yoo (2012), the 
plaintiff was arrested and detained after 9/11, after being designated as an enemy 
combatant.  He alleged, among other issues, that he was not able to freely exercise his 
religion in violation of RFRA.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that the prison officials were 
entitled to qualified immunity, as it was not clearly established that RFRA was applicable 
to enemy combatants. 
RLUIPA issue. A Jewish offender in a Georgia prison brought suit that he was 
not allowed to constantly wear a yarmulke, eat only kosher foods, and observe holy days 
and rituals (Benning v. GA, 2004).  The Eleventh Circuit also considered the issue if 
RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment.  The court ruled 
Congress did not overstep its powers by predicating receipt of federal funds on adherence 
to RLUIPA. 
In Madison v. Virginia (2006), an offender brought suit over the denial of kosher 
meals.  The state argued that RLUIPA was unconstitutional.  The Fourth Circuit 
examined whether RLUIPA was an overreach of Congress’ powers and a violation of the 
Spending and Commerce clause and determined it did not.  The court ruled however, that 
RLUIPA does not require monetary damages to be paid. 
A Native American offender sued for the right to practice religion without 
discrimination or harassment (Alvarez v. Hill, 2008).  The Ninth Circuit ruled the failure 
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of the inmate to invoke RLUIPA did not vanquish its use in this suit.  The facts of the 
case established “a ‘plausible’ entitlement to relief under RLUIPA” (p. 1157). 
Sweat Lodge ceremony. In Fowler v. Crawford (2008), the offender brought suit 
over the Missouri prison system’s refusal to allow him access to a sweat lodge.  The state 
refused on the basis that the ceremony would include access to property such as rocks, 
willow poles, shovels, deer antlers, and split wood, which could be used as weapons.  The 
Eighth Circuit found that the offender did not have a right under RLUIPA to exercise his 
Native American religious beliefs through sweat lodge ceremonies with other offenders 
at the maximum-security prison.  The prohibition against the sweat lodge met a 
compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means to obtain safety and 
security.  
Trained volunteer. An offender claimed his Yahweh Evangelical assembly free 
exercise was hindered because officials would not let followers observe holy days or 
allow assembly without a trained volunteer (Adkins v. Kaspar, 2004).  The Fifth Circuit 
determined the prohibition against assembly without a trained volunteer did not 
substantially burden the offender’s religious exercise.  The state allowed sufficient 
alternative means for the followers to practice their religious beliefs. 
Tulukeesh sparring. In Jova v. Smith (2009), Tulukeesh offenders claimed they 
must fight and spar with each other as part of their religious practice.  The Second Circuit 
ruled the prohibition against sparring had obvious security benefits.  The prohibition of 
potentially violent physical activities provided the least restrictive means of fulfilling a 
compelling governmental interest. 
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Universal Life Church preaching. In Rhode Island, an offender had been given 
permission to preach at group services and had done so for seven years.  Upon the arrival 
of a new warden, the offender was told he was no longer allowed to preach and if found 
doing so, he would be subject to disciplinary action.  The new warden cited prison policy 
as his reason for the prohibition which only permitted institutional chaplains to direct 
services.  Although the State had a compelling interest in maintaining prison security in 
Spratt v. Wall (2007), they failed to show that prison security was furthered by barring 
the offender from engaging in preaching at any time.  The court ruled the State did not 
show a blanket ban on all offender preaching was the least restrictive means available to 
achieve its interest. 
Wotanism. The trial court in Lindell v. McCallum (2003), denied the offender the 
right to proceed in forma pauperis noting his complaint was motivated by harassment.  
The crux of the offender’s complaint was the Wisconsin Department of Corrections’ 
refusal to recognize Wotanism as a mainstream religion.  The system’s rationale was the 
religion was based on racist beliefs and potentially disruptive to prison life.  The Seventh 
Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings noting the claim was reasonable under 
RLUIPA even if the main intent was harassment.  The circuit court also ruled the federal 
courts should not rule on whether the prison system should extend more credit to 
offenders for their legal endeavors, as it was not their business.  Upon remand, the district 
court dismissed the offender’s suit for failure to follow the Federal Rules of Civil 




 Generally, there was ambiguity over when the Turner test was used.  Also, non-
citizen detainees were not subject to RFRA.  The entity being sued has to be a state actor, 
not a contract agent, and the one bringing suit has to be incarcerated.  Failure to invoke 
RLUIPA does not mean the suit cannot be tried under RLUIPA.  The PLRA does not 
allow for compensatory damages if physical harm does not result.  A state does not waive 
its Eleventh Amendment immunity for monetary damages by accepting federal funds 
under RLUIPA.  RLUIPA only allows cause of action against the government not 
individuals.   
 In the above cases, some general findings were noted.  The findings are illustrated 
in Figure 4.  Following is a brief summary of the case types regarding agreement 
between circuit.  The category of General Exercise is not included because the case 












Summary of Property Cases. Property issues included what property was 
allowed and where it was allowed.  When the state argued that space for storing property 
was a consideration, they tended to prevail.  The outcome was mixed however, on where 
property was allowed.  Offenders usually prevailed on being able to wear religious 
clothing and head covering outside their cells.  For other property, the courts sometimes 
decided it was only available through the chaplain. 
Offenders brought suit against property that was a central tenet to their religious, 
which usually prevailed, unless it was a danger to the security of the institution.  There 
were differences in the types of property that was allowed for individuals and the 
property available to group assembly.  Surprisingly, color mattered.  The state would 
argue the color of an item, unless regulated, could be used to identify an offender as a 
gang member.  The courts did not always agree, noting that it was not the least restrictive 
means of meeting a compelling governmental interest.  The majority of cases were about 
religious texts. 
Finally, the use of property with an incendiary message could be decided for 
prison officials if they banned the property for security reasons.  They would not prevail 
however, if the state refused to recognize the religion because of its central tenets (e.g., 
white supremacy). 
Summary of Assembly Cases. Lack of religion is the same as a religion.  Prison 
officials could use available resources serving the largest groups.  Accommodations 
could be denied because of the small number of offenders involved.  It is very difficult to 
rule what is and what is not a religion.  Prison officials usually prevailed if efforts were 
made to obtain a paid or volunteer spiritual leader to conduct services.  The compelling 
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governmental interest in having assemblies of offender monitored (to ensure gang or 
other nefarious activities were taking place) was recognized by the courts. 
The state absolutely has to argue its side of the case.  Several cases appeared to be 
found for the offender simply because the state did not refute each of the offender’s 
arguments (e.g., Salahuddin v. Goord, 2006).  All religions have to be treated equally or 
some compelling reason must be shown why they are not.  Also, least restrictive means 
must be examined and, if rejected, sufficient reason must be shown why the decision was 
made.  Finally, health concerns went along with security concerns in decisions regarding 
peace pipes.  
Summary of Diet Cases. While the category of diet had quite a few cases, the 
offender typically prevailed.  It is hard for prison officials to show that denying a special 
diet is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest – 
especially when they already provide medical diets.  Although costs were frequently an 
argument used by the states – it was one that rarely prevailed (although it did in 
Baranowski v. Hart, 2007).  Courts simply asked the states why they could not provide 
special diets to offenders when other states could (U.S. v. Secretary of Florida 
Department of Corrections, 2015/2016).  They rarely had an answer.  Also, the state had 
to show that they had considered alternative means and rejected them for reasonable 
fiscal and logistical issues.  
The majority of cases were related to kosher diets.  Filling out a form to receive a 
diet was not burdensome.  Working in a kitchen serving pork was also burdensome if the 
offender’s religious practices forbade it (Searles v. Dechant, 2004; Williams v. Bitner, 
2005/2006; Jones v. Williams, 2015).   
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If an offender was mistakenly given the wrong diet, it was not a violation of his 
constitutional rights.  Sincerity or lack thereof can be shown by the offender eating 
prohibited foods (prohibited by religious tenets) either from the commissary or the dining 
hall.  Offenders should not have to choose between not eating and his religious beliefs.  
Also, offenders do not have to have their sincerity verified by a religious leader. 
One article pointed out the difficulty in providing special diets for offenders.  
“When a prison begins to offer a kosher alternative meal, often a large number of inmates 
will begin to claim that they are Jewish, also requiring the other meal” (Naim, 2005, note 
312).  The same article quoted an interview with the Utah Director of Corrections.  “’In 
the case of the Church of the New Song their religion required a special diet of 
Porterhouse steak and Bristol Cream Sherry.’” (Naim, 2005, note 311).  Such requests do 
not typically prevail, but require time and resources to address. 
Summary of Grooming Cases. Holt v. Hobbs (2015) is the ruling case, allowing 
facial hair.  Ali v. Stephens (2016) ruled that Texas offenders should be allowed to grow a 
four inch beard for religious purposes, bringing to fruition the U.S. Supreme Court’s fear 
that the beard issue would be decided inch by inch.  Again, if a practice is allowed for 
other groups of offender, it should be allowed for the plaintiff.  Likewise, if prison 
officials allow facial hair for medical reasons, it is difficult to argue why it cannot be 
done for religious accommodations.   
If the state had been able to show any example where contraband had been 
secreted in hair or a beard, the outcome may have been different (see Knight v. 




The states have argued that grooming policies were needed for identification 
purposes.  The courts argued that other states managed their populations with less 
restrictive grooming policies, with adverse effects.  The courts also noted that 
identification problems could arise whether an offender was bearded or clean shaven.  
For example, if an identification card showed a clean shaven individual and the inmate 
escaped, subsequently growing a beard – law enforcement may have more difficulty 
locating him.  The court pointed out the opposite was true.  If an offender had a beard and 
escaped, they could change their features simply by shaving their face. 
An offender arguing that women’s grooming policies are less restrictive is 
unlikely to prevail on that argument alone.  Women are historically less violent (Trulson, 
et al., 2011). 
Summary of Pat and Strip Searches. Bell v. Wolfish (1979) is the leading case 
regarding cross-gender pat and strip searches.  There were not many cases on this topic, 
primarily due to the ubiquitous nature of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (2003), 
specifically Standard §115.115 which states in part,  
 (a) The facility shall not conduct cross-gender strip searches or cross-
gender visual body cavity searches (meaning a search of the anal or genital 
opening) except in exigent circumstances or when performed by medical 
practitioners. 
 (b) …the facility shall not permit cross-gender pat-down searches of 




As noted in Appendix A, many of the states’ policies for pat and strip searches 
have almost this exact same language.  Therefore, one could reasonably assume that the 
driving force behind same sex searches is PREA and not religious accommodations.  A 
review of Cross-gender Searches:  A Case Law Survey (Smith & Loomis, 2013) 
indicated that the majority of cases on cross-gender searches were brought under §1983, 
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims.  A few cases involved RFRA or 






As noted above, the policies tended to mirror the case law with few exceptions.  
Alabama did not allow facial hair nor did Mississippi allow religious diets.  Different 
religious property was allowed – presumably based on requests received.  Assembly was 
primarily based on space and security requirements, following the case law.   
Diet cases and policies differed from state to state, with unique policies stemming 
from the requests made and the case law in each circuit.  There was uniformity in the 
determination that forcing an inmate to choose between not eating and adhering to 
religious beliefs was a violation of religious freedom. Also, there was consensus 
regarding offenders working in kitchens where pork was served.  If the offenders’ 
religious beliefs were violated by the job assignment, the courts ruled that it was a 
constitutional violation.  Of course, the only cases examined involved working in 
kitchens that served pork.  It would be interesting to see how courts would rule if an 
offender claimed another type of job, such as working in the fields, violated his 
constitutional rights. 
Grooming was almost completely uniform across the country because of Holt v 
Hobbs (2015).  Pat and strip searches policies were consistent because of Bell v. Wolfish 
(1979) and PREA.  The case law was very sparse on this subject because prison officials’ 
legitimate penological interest in searches speaks to the goal of institutional safety and 
security.  Also, it would be difficult for offenders to argue anything other than cross-
gender searches, which were generally not allowed. 
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Does the Prison System Population Size Matter? 
The review of religious accommodation policies was used to determine if there 
was a difference between the policies of large prison systems compared to small prison 
systems.  As a basis for comparison, the largest prison systems for prisoners under 
custody were compared to the smallest prison systems for prisoners under custody.  Table 
13 lists the prison systems and their jurisdiction populations as of December 31, 2016 
(U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2018). 
Table 13 
Ten Largest and Ten Smallest U.S. Prison Systems by Prisoners under Jurisdiction in 
2016 
Ten Largest U.S. 
Prison Systems Custody Population 
Ten Smallest U.S. 
Prison Systems Custody 
Texas 163,703 Vermont 1,735 
California 130,390 North Dakota 1,791 
Florida 90,974 Wyoming 2,374 
Georgia 53,627 Maine 2,404 
Ohio 52,175 New Hampshire 2,818 
New York 50,716 Rhode Island 3,103 
Pennsylvania 49,244 Montana 3,814 
Illinois 43,657 South Dakota 3,831 
Arizona 42,320 Alaska 4,434 
Michigan 41,122 Nebraska 5,302 
 
The number of cases per state were divided by the 2016 population and multiplied 





Federal and State Prison Systems’ Top Ten Court Case Rates per 1,000 as of 2018 
State Rate per 1,000 offenders 
South Dakota 1.31 
Iowa 0.66 









New York and Michigan were the only state in the top 10, population-wise, that 
were also in the top 10 of the case rates.  South Dakota, the top state in case rate per 
1,000, was in the bottom 10 of the number of offenders in its jurisdiction.  Rhode Island 
was another small state that had a high rate per 1,000.  Quite a few states had a rate of 
0.00 including:  Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  It was surprising that 







The concept of an individual being able to freely express his or her religious 
beliefs is a founding philosophy of the United States.  Scholars sometimes question 
whether this inherent right extends to those incarcerated by society.  Offenders have 
shown an inability to follow the rules of society and courts send them to prison.  As part 
of the punishment, they may lose some of the freedoms that law-abiding citizens enjoy.  
The courts have heard many cases regarding the right of an offender to freely express his 
or her religious beliefs compared to the difficulty of accommodating those beliefs in a 
prison setting, while still meeting the goals of security and rehabilitation. 
In the current political climate, it is unclear how courts will rule on future 
accommodation cases.  The current executive branch is appointing judges at a fevered 
rate (Kim, 2018), and has already appointed two U.S. Supreme Court justices.  As the 
administration is self-reportedly conservative, it could signal the demise of strides made 
in offenders’ rights.  However, it should also be noted that judges have been known to 
surprise those who appoint them.   
Strictly by examining recent cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. (2014), and Holt 
v. Hobbs (2015), one would presume that only the most significant circumstances would 
be reason for infringing on someone’s religious freedom.  In a recent case involving an 
execution however, the U.S. Supreme Court lifted a stay of execution, in a 5-4 vote, for a 
Muslim offender who sued to have his imam present in the execution chamber, rather 
than the Christian chaplain employed by the state of Alabama.  “Attorneys for the state 
said only prison employees are allowed in the chamber for security reasons” (Chandler, 
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2019, ¶4).  The 11th Circuit had stayed the execution, but the Supreme Court “cited the 
fact that Ray did not raise the challenge until Jan. 28 as a reason for the decision”12 
(Chandler, 2019, ¶7).  It will be interesting to see if the case outcomes change after the 
recent additions to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
For many legal issues, scholars write articles about the case law or the practices of 
different entities.  It is important to bring the two together.  The case law influences the 
policies and practices of a prison system, but the policies and practices of a prison system 
may also influence case law.  It was noteworthy to determine the policies and procedures 
of each prison system typically reflected each circuit’s case law in that circuit.   
Prison policies can be very fluid and change quickly, unlike legislation.  A 
limitation of this article is the fluidity of the data on state policies that were gathered; 
nonetheless, it is an accurate portrayal of state policies as of 2019.  Some of the states had 
a lengthy policy approval process while others were able to change policies with the flick 
of a pen. 
Another limitation is the accuracy of the policies themselves in reflecting the 
actual practices of the prison system.  As with any entity, although a policy may be in 
place, prison official may not actually implement it.  Unless interested parties conduct 
field research or interviews in each prison system to determine if the practice matches the 
policy, the reader must assume consistency between the two.  Even if a study included 
such research methods at each system, it would be difficult to ensure accuracy in 
responses.  Prison staff would most likely be reluctant to admit not following policy. 
                                                 
12 The offender was executed February 7, 2019. 
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Does religion in prison make a difference?  Does lack of religious accommodation 
make a difference?  Future research should study how traditionally liberal states’ 
religious accommodation policies compare to traditionally conservative states’ religious 
accommodations (DiIulio, 2009).  Additionally, recidivism rates between offenders who 
actively practice a religious during incarceration compared to offenders who do not, may 
prove insightful – especially if study results indicated differences between rates for 
conservative and liberal (in terms of religious accommodations) states.  Further study on 
incidents when religious accommodations have led to safety or security breaches would 
help establish whether there are actually legitimate penological interests in restricting 
religious accommodations. 
As mentioned above, the author gave some thought to the examination of prison 
policies as categorized by Dilulio’s Governing Prisons (1987):  control, responsibility, 
and consensual models.  A review of the prison systems’ current categorization along 
with a study of religious accommodations compared to a prison system’s model type 
would be of great interest.  Prison systems containing faith-based prison units and 
housing areas (Hallett & Johnson, 2014), to have a consensual component to their 
penological management would provide more religious accommodations to the offenders 
in their custody. 
Other proposed studies could include a review of the district court level cases, as 
well as the non-published cases regarding accommodation of religious beliefs and 
practices.  Although beyond the scope of this very lengthy dissertation, perhaps the 
author will muster enough life force to tackle these additional projects at a later date. 
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In conclusion, religion is an important right for everyone in the United States, but 
it may also have a positive effect on incarcerated offenders.  It can be difficult to separate 
those offenders who have embraced religion sincerely from those who have done so as a 
means to a manipulative end.  For prison officials, there may be those who deny religious 
accommodations because they would truly cause difficulty in meeting the mission of the 
prison system, while others may deny them based on the belief that offenders should not 
be allowed any rights at all.  For the courts to parse out the constitutionality in each case 
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States’ Religious Property Policies 
State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Alabama 
“Buddhist are only allowed…a picture of 
Buddha, prayer oil, incense and incense 
holder, prayer beads, books, and study 
materials…These items will be stored in 
the Chaplain’s office and be used at the 
assigned area for them” (p. 23) Also 
allowed are medallions on breakable 
string, fezzes, koofies, and yarmulke, 
prayer oils, prayer beads, prayer rugs, 
prayer shawl, religious literature, audios, 
DVDs, VCR tapes of videocassettes (that 
are not racially offensive or would cause a 
security problem of conflict), Islamic 
Turban, dream catcher, medicine bag, 
feathers, moccasins, herbs, drums and 
rattles, ceremonial items such as 
armbands, chokers, and headbands, 
talking stick, Wiccan items. 
Policy specifically prohibits 
ritual knives, broadswords, 
robes, skyclad (ritual nudity), 
drugs, scourge. Although the 
policy allows wine for Catholic 
ceremonies, it also prohibits 
alcohol. 
Alabama DOC AR 462 
Religious Program 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Alaska 
“Permit prisoners to possess and wear 
head covering and religious attire… one 
faith medallion or pendant, or medicine 
bag, which must be worn underneath 
clothing and suspended from an approved 
chain or strap” (p. 4) Religious 
publications allowed.   
 
Only property “consistent with 
the listing for a recognized faith 
group…” (p. 4) 
Alaska Policy Index 
#816.01, 8/24/2014 
Arizona 
“Religious symbols or clothing items, 
including head coverings may be worn 
openly only during religious ceremonies 
and at no other time or place” (#904, p. 
11)  “Publications threatening the safety 
and security of the institution, e.g., 
materials that advocate violence, rebellion 
or blatant prejudice/bigotry against any 
race or creed shall not be included [in the 
library]” (#904, p. 3)  Pipes, drums, 
musical equipment, smudging material 
and communion supplies are allowed 
(offenders are not allowed to use alcohol).  
Inmates placed in detention lose 
property, to include religious 
property.  Inmates may be 
excused from work on holy 
days. 
Arizona Dep. Order #704, 
1/12/2017 






State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Arkansas 
Offenders are allowed a religious medal 
or emblem worn on the chain for their I.D. 
Prayer mat/rugs, special headdress (during 
religious service only), beads, Wiccan 
worship items (book, bell, chalice, and 
religious text), rune stones, and tarot cards 
are allowed. 
 
Arkansas DOC Inmate 
Handbook, July 2015 
Arkansas DOC Policy and 
Procedure, Religious 
Services Manual, 9/15/17 
#625 
California Offenders are allowed to have medicine bags.  Otherwise, not specified. 
Prior written approval is 
necessary for any offender to 
possess a religious artifact or 
wear it outside of approved 
events. 
“All religious items shall be 
subject to searches by staff.” 
Article 1 §3213, California 
Code of Regulations Title 
15 
Colorado 
Offenders allowed religious medallions, 
medicine bags, prayer beads, rosaries, 
teffilin, prayer rug/meditation cushion, 
“Tallit Katan,” and religious head 
coverings 
Homemade items are not 
allowed. 
Colorado DOC Reg. No. 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Connecticut 
“An inmate may retain a religious article 
on admission in accordance with the 
following criteria: 
A. The article conforms to Attachment B, 
Female Property Matrix or Attachment C, 
Male Property Matrix, as appropriate, and 
to the approved commissary list; 
B. The value of the article does not 
exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) except an 
inmate may retain religious pendants or 
medallions, the aggregate value of which 
does not exceed $50; and, 
C. The size, volume, design or other 
characteristics are not deemed a threat to 
safety and security.” 
Religious articles shall be 
available for commissary 
purchase...Inmates requesting to 
purchase religious articles not 
available through the 
commissary may be allowed to 
purchase these items via mail 
order with the written 
authorization of the Director of 
Programs and Treatment 
(Division) or 
designee…Religious articles 
shall be worn or carried under 
the inmate’s clothing, and shall 
not be openly displayed.” 
Policy #6.10, Inmate 
Property, 3/14/2018 
Delaware Nothing specific to religious items. 
Very general.  Offenders may 
not have property, except for a 
wedding band, with a value of 
more than $25.00. 
Policy 8.36, Inmate 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Florida 
Allowed prayer shawl, prayer rug, runes 
and accompanying cloth bag, prayer rope, 
black or brown Rakusu, Koofi, prayer 
rope, scapular, tarot cards, tefillin, Tzitzit, 
yarmulke(kippah), zafu, medicine bag, 
headband, feather, headscarves, prayer 
beads, symbols or medallions, stones or 
crystals, sacred texts, prayer books, and 
devotional literature.  
“Limitations on possession or 
access, if any, that may be 
dictated by the characteristics of 
the inmate’s custody 
classification or management 
status…Religious property and 
other religious items shall be 
acquired through an authorized 
source, bona fide religious 
organization, or donor.” 
Admin. Rule 33-503.001 
8/15/17 and 33-602.201 
8/15/17 
Georgia 
“Religious…equipment, and supplies 
shall be provided at each institution in 
accordance with the needs of the 
institutional population.” 
“Religious literature and related material 
which a visiting clergyman or guest 
speaker proposes to distribute shall be 
submitted to the institution in advance in 
order to avoid any inference of contraband 
entering the institution by this means.” 
The Offender Orientation 
Handbook does not contain any 
prohibitions specific to religious 
items. 
Georgia Administrative 
Code 125-4-7-.01 7/20/85 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Hawaii 
“Literature, publications, and/or books of 
or about religion, or religious ideology 
shall be permitted…Liturgical apparel, 
such as skull caps and prayer shawls, 
temple garments and/or ritual underwear, 
or other articles of religious significance 
may be retained by offenders…Requests 
to wear liturgical garments outside of 
religious services shall require written 
verification from the head of the 
offender’s affiliated church” (p. 11) 
“Offender may also wear religious 
medallions or ornaments on break-away 
chains...shall not contain any precious 
stones [metals]…Oils utilized for 
religious ceremonies, rites, and/or rituals 
may be kept by the offender in his/her 
cell…other religious items may be 
allowed upon prior written authorization 
from the Warden” (p. 12). 
Items may be disallowed if they 
“jeopardize the security, safety 
and good government of the 
facility.” 
Hawaii Department of 






State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Idaho 
“…may wear a neck adornment and/or 
medallion tucked underneath the 
offender’s shirt, except during a religious 
ceremony or service or in the inmate’s 
cell.  Head covers, headbands, other 
religion (sic) apparel, icons, photographs, 
etc. must only be worn or displayed 
during a religious ceremony or services or 
in the inmate’s cell…religious apparel and 
accessories must not be worn in any other 
locations, including when going to and 
from religious ceremonies or services.  
Prayer/ceremonial rugs must remain in the 
inmate’s cell. 
Personal property policy had an 
appendix which listed the 
property that was allowed. 
Religious Activities policy has 
an appendix which listed the 
group activities property that 
was allowed. 
Idaho DOC SOP 
320.02.01.002 
11/25/15 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Illinois 
“…shall be permitted to have…two 
traditionally accepted religious 
symbols…These may include …medals, 
medallions, scapulas, or prayer 
beads…items may be limited, restricted, 
or denied…based upon concerns such as 
safety, security…institutional 
order…shall not exceed 2” in height or 
width.  The chain…shall not exceed 24” 
in length.  The combined value…shall not 
exceed $50…may restrict the color of 
religious items…Medals or medallions 
shall not contain precious gems or 
stones…(or) be of a design that could be 
used as a weapon or to conceal 
contraband...pins shall not be 
permitted…candles and incense, shall be 
restricted…for use during approved 
religious activities…Prayer rugs may be 
permitted…but…limited to the…living 
area during prayer or the area of religious 
service. Committed persons may wear 
articles of religious clothing, including 
…robes, prayer shawls, or talits, (fezzes, 
kufis, and yarmulkes) in their …sleeping 
areas during prayer or in the area of 
religious service…” 
“Staff shall not touch personal 
religious items, such as 
medicine bags, considered 
sacred by the wearer and worn 
as part of the traditional or 
religious dress of a volunteer or 
religious specialist. These items 
may be thoroughly inspected 
visually, with the volunteer 
handling the items. When a 
visual inspection indicates no 
threat to security, these items 
may be worn into the facility for 
the scheduled programming.” 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Indiana 
“Religious practice and symbols/items 
related to a religion unfamiliar to the 
Department and for which a request for 
services or religious symbols/items has 
been made shall undergo an authorization 
process…When a Warden/designee 
considers that an authorized religious 
practice, item, or symbol should be 
restricted based upon facility mission, 
identifiable security concerns, and/or 
management concerns, the 
Warden/designee shall notify the Director 
of the request for an exemption.” 
“Religious practice and symbols/items 
related to a religion unfamiliar to the 
Department and for which a request for 
services or religious symbols/items has 
been made shall undergo an authorization 
process. 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Iowa 
“Offenders may be authorized to 
designate three personal religious items, 
in addition to the medallion…One 
religious medallion not to exceed one and 
one-half inches on a light gauge chain 
(which shall not exceed 24 inches in 
length). If the item is worn around the 
neck or wrist it is considered a medallion 
and must be placed on 
inventory…Rosaries and prayer beads 
shall be black in color. Items shall be 
allowed only upon approval of the 
appropriate chaplain or authorized staff 
member and must not jeopardize security. 
Religious cassette tapes, compact discs 
and religious books shall be included as 
part of the limits for all tapes and books.” 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Kansas 
“Offenders shall generally be allowed to 
possess a bible or other primary text of 
their religion that shall be provided to 
them… religious items shall be provided 
to offenders at State expense. The use or 
possession of religious items may be 
limited to religious services, supervised 
activities, ceremonies, or prayers that the 
offender is allowed to conduct privately in 
his or her assigned living area, room or 
cell, with the items being unavailable to 
the offenders at all other times…religious 
medallions and scapulars shall be worn 
around the neck, inside the shirt. Medicine 
bags shall be worn around the neck inside 
the shirt, or carried in a pocket. 
Yarmulkes, koofi and tams may be worn 
at all times. Offenders shall not be 
permitted to wear religious attire, 
including clothing, jewelry or other 
ornaments, or head garments unless the 
prohibition against the particular attire is 
not based on legitimate concerns for 
order, security, and hygiene.” 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Kentucky 
Headwear – kufi, headband, crown, 
turban, hlath13 
Females – scarf, headband, hijab, dress 
The institution shall permit an inmate to 
possess items identified in the Religion 
Reference Manual (not available) as 
personal religious items. 
 Kentucky DOC Policy 23.1 11/16/18 
Louisiana   Not available 
Maine 
State has a length list of items that are 
available, categorized by religion:  
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, 
Jehovah’s Witness, Judaism, Native 
American, Odinism, Pagan/Wicca, and 
Santeria 
“A personal religious item must 
pass a security inspection prior 
to being allowed to the prisoner.  
After being allowed to the 
prisoner, a personal religious 
item is subject to security 
inspection at any time.” 
Maine DOC Policy 10.1 




Includes general property (e.g., Menorah, 
medicine bag), cards, medallions, 
chains/necklaces, beads, books, deity 
picture/statue, special clothing, herbs and 
small objects. 
The Religious Services Manual 
has an appendix showing the 
specific items allowed. 
Maryland Department of 
Public Safety and 
Correctional Services 
Religious Services Manual 
3/20/2017 
(continued) 
                                                 




State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Massachusetts 
“Religious Articles. Inmates may retain 
certain authorized religious articles.  A list 
of approved religious articles shall be 
posted quarterly in the inmate libraries. If 
an inmate seeks to retain religious articles 
which are not on the approved list or 
authorized for retention pursuant to 103 
CMR 403.00, he or she must submit an 
Inmate Religious Services Request Form 
to the Institution Director of Treatment, 
for processing, pursuant to 103 CMR 
471.00: Religious Programs and 
Services.” 
 
Massachusetts DOC Policy 
103 CMR 403.00 
6/30/17 
Michigan 
“In addition to religious reading material, 
prisoners are allowed to possess personal 
religious property which is necessary to 
the practice of the prisoner’s religion 
unless an item presents a threat to the 
safety, security, and good order of the 
facility.”  Appendix includes listing of 
property allowed. 
Includes items such as prayer 
rugs, meditation beads, crosses, 
yarmulke, Star of David, fez, 
Moorish Science Circle Seven 
pendant, medicine bag, tarot 
card, and kufi caps. 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Minnesota 
“Offenders/residents are authorized to 
designate five personal religious items, 
which includes religious clothing, that 
may be kept in their possession and are 
governed by facility property procedures.  
Community religious items may be stored 
in a safe and secure staff-designated 
location.” 
“Offenders/residents are 
allowed to wear or use personal 
religious items in their cells, or 
during religious services, 
activities, and scheduled 
religious group meetings, unless 
the warden determines that the 
wearing or use of such items 
would threaten institution 
security, safety, or good order.  
Articles of ceremonial clothing 
that may be worn for religious 
services or in the 
offender’s/resident’s cell, but 
not on the grounds, housing 
units, or visiting room, include 
such examples as a tabard or 
shalwar/kurta.” 
Minnesota DOC Policy 
302.300 
7/3/18 
Mississippi Only general policy regarding property – nothing specific to religious property.  
MDOC Offender Handbook 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Missouri 
“Approved items may be acquired by 
purchase from outside vendors in 
accordance to department policy. Vendor 
catalogs are made available to offenders.” 
“Free literature – includes donated ‘sacred 
texts’ and religious educational 
materials…” 
 







Contains appendix listing property 
available for the following religions:  
Asatru/Odinist, Buddhist, Islam, Judaism, 
Native American, Protestant 
Denominations, Roman Catholic, and 
Wiccan 
 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Nebraska 
Offenders who have specified a religious 
affiliation are allowed to possess 
approved religious property as set forth in 
Appendix E of the policy (appendix not 
available).  Items specified in the policy 
itself included head covering, audio-
recorded religious material, Chinshasha14, 
prayer ties, books and other religious 
publications, medicine bags, and sacred 
pipes. 
“Inmates are not permitted to 
possess custom-made, 
handmade, or hobby-produced 
religious articles.” 
“Religious head covering that 
have blue, red or black, as a 
predominant color are not 
permitted…may be worn any 
place or at any time…except 
where such compromises the 
safety, security, and good order 
of the facility.” 
“Fragrant oil may not be used in 
a manner which causes a safety 
or security concern.” 
Nebraska Admin. Reg. 
208.01 10/31/2018 
(continued) 
                                                 




State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Nevada 
“No inmate may be approved to purchase 
or have a religious item unless the inmate 
has completed and submitted a Faith 
Group Affiliation Declaration Form…and 
the requested item is allowed for his 
declared faith as listed in the Faith Group 
Overview.” 
Faith Group Overview has items 
allowed for all faith groups and 
then a separate section 
delineating property available 
for American Indian, 
Asatru/Odinism, Baha’I, 
Buddhism, Christian (Non-
denom), Christian (Orthodox), 
Christian (Protestant), Church 
of Christ (Scientist), 
Scientology, Druid, Celtic 
Pagans, Pre-Christian, Hindu, 
Islam/Muslim (orthodox), 
Nation of Islam, Jehovah’s 
Witness, Judaism, Judaism 
(Messianic), Hare Krishna, 
Moorish Science Temple of 
America, Mormons, 
Rastafarian, Roman Catholic, 
Seventh Day Adventist, Siddha 
Yoga, Sikh, Thelema, and 
Wicca. 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New Hampshire 
Offenders are allowed: 







Additional property is listed in 
Attachment 3 of the policy for the 
following faith groups:  Buddhist, 
Catholic, Episcopal/Anglican, 
Islam/Muslim, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Jewish, Native American, Neo-pagan, 
Protestant/Christian, Rastifarian, Russian 
Orthodox, Seventh Day Adventist, Siddha 
Yoga, Taoist, and Mahailimara/Thelema 
Offenders must claim a 
preference for a religion to 
obtain additional property. 
Religious head coverings must 
be removed during count and 
upon request during searches 
NH DOC Policy 9.02 
06/15/14 
New Jersey 
Offenders permitted to have: 
*Religious medal and chain 
*Prayer Rug 
 
“Inmates shall be permitted to 
receive through the mail and 
retain religious literature and the 
indicia of religion, such as 
missals, prayer books, shawls 
and prayer rugs.” 
N.J.A.C. §10A:17-5.12 






State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New Mexico 
Policy Attachment A contains property 
allowed for the following religious 
groups: 





*Church of Christ Scientist 







*Protestant (General Christian) 
*Satanism 
*Seventh Day Adventist 
*Unitarian Universalism 
*Universal Life Church 
*Wicca 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New York 
Offenders may possess one musical 
instrument, prayer rug, scarfs (solid color 
only), books, head coverings, beads, and 
Tefillin15, medicine bag, sacred herbs, 
personal smoking pipe, smudging astray, 
artifacts or symbols, religious beads, 
shrines, rosarys, dhikr beads, religious 
publications and texts 
New York offenders are 
allowed to possess cigars, 
tobacco and snuff according to 
the policy, but Dir #4202 refers 
to the department’s non-
smoking policy. 
NY CCS Dir #4913 
10/27/16 
NY CCS Dir 4202 
10/19/2015 
North Carolina 
Contains specific property allowed for the 
following religions:  American Indian, 
Asatru, Assemblies of Yahweh, 
Buddhism, Christian (Protestant), 
Christian (Catholic), Christian (Eastern 
Orthodox), Hindu, Islam, Judaism, 
Moorish Science Temple, Rastafarian, and 
Wiccan 
“All approved religious items 
are subject to routine searches, 
but all items must be handled 
with the utmost respect.” 
North Carolina Department 
of Correction Division of 
Prisons Religious Practices 
Reference Manual 
(2004) 
North Dakota Allowed religious medallions/necklaces, spiritual books, papers, and magazines  
Facility Handbook  
March 2018 
(continued) 
                                                 




State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Ohio 
Allow: 
*Chain (necklace) with religious 
medallion 
*Japa Mala Beads (wood, no red) 
*Prayer Beads (wood, no red) 
*Prayer Robe (white) 
*Prayer Rug (solid or multicolored, no 
solid red…) 
*Skull Cap (Yarmulke, Kufi; white or 
beige cloth) 
*Religious literature and recordings 
Specific policies provided additional 
property guidance for the following 
religions: 
Protestant, Jehovah Witness, Jewish, 
Buddhist, Wiccan, Asatru, Roman 
Catholic, Muslim, and Native American. 
“All religious objects, apparel, 
and literature are subject to the 
general regulations affecting 
similar property in 
institutions…Religious items 
not otherwise permitted in the 
institution may be approved if 
their use or possession is 
religiously based and their 
presence does not constitute a 
threat to the security and good 
order of the institution.” 
Ohio DORC Policy #61-
PRP-01 
2/25/19 
















State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Oklahoma 
“Inmates may receive and retain 
possession of personal religious 
items/symbols essential to their stated 
religious preference.” 
Personal items allowed included 




chalice, dream catcher, feathers, 
kangha16, medicine bag, 
meditation cushion/zafu, 
Omamori Gohonzon17, Tefillin 
(Phylacteries), prayer cloth, 
prayer rug/Zabution, prayer 
shawl, prayer wheel, religious 
headgear, religious literature, 
religious undergarments, runes 
set, scapular, sea salt, sun 
wheel, tarot card deck, Thor’s 
hammer.  The policy specifies 
which property goes with which 
religious affiliation.  Another 
policy provides a list of 
property that is allowed for 
group worship. 




                                                 
16 Wooden comb used by the Sikh Muslim followers (Oklahoma DOC Policy OP-030112, 2017, Attachment B). 




State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Oregon 
“Items authorized are only to be used in a 
manner consistent with the purpose of the 
item.”  Items allowed include Native 
American prayer feathers, spiritual 
medallions, modesty clothing (shorts or 
robes for Muslim men and women while 
showering), Islamic prayer rugs, tefillin 
(sincerity interview must be given), and 
religious literature. 
Policy contains two lists; one 
for offenders in general housing 
and one for offenders in special 
housing. 
ODOC Policy 90.2.4 
11.14.08 
Pennsylvania 
Allow religious medal, religious headgear, 
prayer rugs, articles of clothing, Native 
American Medicine Bag, prayer beads, 
hijabs, prayer phylacteries/tefillin, prayer 
rope, cloth scapular, altar cloth, and 
sacred texts 
Offenders are not allowed to 
have sacred objects that contain 
colors other than white; may 
also not have robes, incense or 
oils, any symbols associated 
with a STG, individual prayer 
cushion, or individual religious 
smoking instrument.  The policy 
has an attachment with allowed 
religious items, including 
pictures, vendors, and pricing. 





Allow religious medal with neck chain, 
religion handbook (Bible, Koran, etc.), 
Muslim oil 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
South Carolina 
Religious media, religious literature, 
religious necklace (medallions, crucifixes, 
etc.).  Appendix contains property 
allowed for each recognized religious 
group. 
Inmate may not possess more 






“Religious items pertinent to the practice 
of an inmate’s chosen religion, which do 
not pose a threat to the safety, security 
and/or orderly operation of the institution, 
may be authorized by the Cultural 
Coordinator or designated staff…” 
 
Policy 1.3.C.4 
Inmate Personal Property 
8/15/2017 
Tennessee 
“Inmates may possess objects of religious 
significant in accordance with policy…”  
Religious property is subject to space 
constraints.  “…certain objects may be 
prohibited if they are identified as security 
threat material…” 
“By July 1 of each year, the 
Commissioner shall publish a 
list of religious property that 
inmates are permitted to have in 
their possession, and/or in 
approved group religious 
gatherings.” 




Offenders are allowed “…one religious 
text, specific to the offender’s declared 
faith, if those items are consistent with 
chaplaincy guidelines.” 
Another reference is made to unspecified 
“religious items” that are allowed 





State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Utah 
Inmates may have one approved religious 
symbol in their possession (Native 
American eagle feather, prayer beads, 
rosary beads, neck chain).  Also allowed 
are religious literature, approved medicine 
bag/necklace, head apparel. 
Other items are allowed as 
indicated in the “Inmate 
Property Matrix.”  Lists the 
symbol allowed for each 
religion including Asatru, 
Assembly of God, 
Baptist/Southern Baptist, 
Buddhism, Catholic (Roman), 
Catholic (Greek Orthodox), 
Catholic (Russian Orthodox), 
Episcopalian, Hindu, Islam 
(Muslim), Jehovah’s Witness, 
Judaism/Hebrew, International 
Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
Lutheran, Native American 
religions, Non-Denominational 
(Christian), Odinist, Protestant, 
Seventh Day Adventist, Wicca. 
Utah DOC 
FD14 Inmate Property 
8/1/06 
Utah DOC 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Vermont 
May keep religious medallions and 
symbols, medicine bag, prayer rugs, 
religious head coverings, religious beads, 
oils, religious publications and texts, 
cards, herbs, teas, feathers 
“Inmate possession of security 
threat group materials or 
symbols is prohibited. First 
Amendment free exercise of 
religion protection applies to 
religious ideas and symbols by 
faith groups whose only purpose 
is religious; it does not extend to 
security threat group use of 
religious ideas and symbols as a 
means of organizing and 
meeting.” 
Directive #380.01, 




“Offenders may possess individual items 
as authorized on Attachment 5, Approved 
Religious Items. [Not available]” 
“In the course of searching or 
examining offender religious 
items, employees shall remain 
cognizant that consecrated or 
blessed items, or items that are 
considered sacred, should be 
treated with respect and 
appropriate care.” 
Operating Procedure 




“The wearing or carrying of relevant 
religious apparel and paraphernalia must 
comply with Allowable Individual 
Religious Items (Attachment 1).  Apparel 
and paraphernalia are subject to 
inspection procedures.” 
Attachment 1 contains a list of 
allowable items (3 pages). 
Washington State DOC 






State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
West Virginia N/A N/A N/A 
Wisconsin 
“Inmates may possess approved religious 
property items associated with their 
recorded religious preference. 
List includes religious 
emblem/pendant/jewelry, and 
floor covering – prayer rug, 
throw rug, yoga mat 
Attachment to DAI Policy 
309.61.02 has list of all items 
that may be allowed for 
umbrella religious, Catholic, 
Eastern Religion, Islam, Jewish, 
Native American/American 
Indian, Pagan, and 
Protestant/Other Christian 
DAI Policy 309.20.03 
Inmate Personal Property 
and Clothing 
10/1/18 




“Inmates may receive and retain 
individual possession of approved 
religious objects/symbols provided the 
object/symbol is not viewed as a threat to 
the safety, security and good order of the 
facility…” 
“Inmates may have property 
items that are approved in 
WDOC Form #355, Unified 
Matrix for Authorized Personal 
Religious Property even when 
this is not their declared faith.” 
Wyoming DOC Policy 







State Property Policy Specifics Comments Source 
BOP 
“Each inmate, upon commitment, will be 
permitted to retain religious items 
approved by the Warden.”  “The Warden 
will authorize retention of religious items 
unless they pose a threat to the security 
and orderly running of the institution.” 
Items permitted include “one 
religious medallion and chain 
with no stones, non-metallic…” 
and prayer shawls and robes, 
Kurda or ribbon shirts, medals 
and pendants, Medicine 
pouches, various types of 
approved headwear. 
BOP Program Statement 
CPD/CSB #5580.08 






States’ Religious Assembly Policies 
State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Alabama 
Traditional religious ceremonies are allowed 
for Buddhism (solo study only), Catholics, 
Five Percent Nation of Islam, Jehovah’s 
Witness, Judaism, Moorish Science Temple 
of America, National of Islam, Native 
American, Protestants, Seventh-Day-
Adventist, Sunni Muslims, Wiccan. Includes 
Sweat Lodge ceremonies. “Any inmate who 
speaks at any religious service, large or 
small, must have the prior approval of the 
Chaplain of that institution” (p. 22). 
Work proscriptions are not noted 
for the religious ceremonies. 
Alabama DOC AR 
333 Religious 
Program Services, 
December 17, 2004 
Alaska 
“Prison participation in organized faith 
group activities where there is 
supervision…shall not be limited except by 
documented threat to the secure or orderly 
operation of the institution.” (p. 3). 
Offenders are allowed to miss work, 
without pay, for religious purposes.  
In ceremonies, the “use of a non-
alcoholic substitute for altar wine 
must be considered. 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Arizona 
“Approval of worship study opportunities 
based on:  inmate requests, space 
availability, time considerations of the 
monthly religious services calendar, 
institutions’ safety and security 
requirements, and availability of a qualified 
religious leadership” (p. 4)  Sweat Lodge 
ceremonies, multi-faith gathering, and 
smoke generating ceremonies are allowed. 
 Arizona Dep. Order #904, 6/11/2016 
Arkansas 
Worship approved if space and security 
concerns permit.  “A minimum of three (3) 
inmates…are required to schedule specific 
denominational services” (p. 64)  Baptism, 
communion, Jumu’ah Prayer, Ramadan, 
E’id-Ul-Fitr, E’id-Ul-Adea, and Jewish 
Services are permitted. 
Offenders are allowed one-half 
ounce of communion wine. 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
California 
“When feasible, separate space for services 
of the faith groups represented by a 
substantial number of inmates shall be 
provided. However, in some facilities, such 
as camps, it shall be necessary for the 
various faith groups to share such space as is 
available for religious 
services…Accommodation for religious 
services that are not granted, shall be for 
reason(s) which would impact facility/unit 
safety and security, and orderly day to day 
operations of the institution." 
Offenders are allowed to used 
tobacco product in religious 
ceremonies. Sweat lodges are 
permitted. 
Article 1 §3210, 
California Code of 
Regulations Title 15 
Colorado 
“The DOC shall…ensure that offenders 
have the opportunity to participate in 
practices deemed essential by the faith 
judicatory of that faith group, individually or 
corporately, as authorized. This shall be 
limited only by documentation showing 
threat to the safety of DOC employees, 
contract workers, volunteers, offenders, or 
other persons involved in such activity, or 
that the activity itself disrupts the security or 
good order of the facility.” 
“…To ensure adequate meeting 
space and volunteer…DOC 
employee coverage…certain faith 
groups will be combined into 
umbrella faith groups.” 
Colorado DOC Reg. 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Connecticut 
“An inmate may have the opportunity to 
participate in practices of his/her religious 
faith that are in accordance with that faith, 
limited only by documentation showing 
threat to safety of persons involved in such 
activity or that the activity itself disrupts 
order in the institution.” “An inmate may 
only participate in collective religious 
activity for the religion in which the inmate 
is registered.  Based upon present inmate 
designations, those denominations are:  
Catholics, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, 
Native American and Jehovah’s Witness.” 
“In determining what constitutes 
legitimate religious practices, the 
Director of Religious Services 
should consider whether there is a 
body of literature stating principles 
that support the practices and 
whether the practices are recognized 
by a group of persons who share 
common ethical, moral or 
intellectual views.” 
Dir. 10.8, Religious 
Services, 12/3/18 
Delaware 
“The DOC acknowledges the inherent and 
constitutionally protected rights retained by 
offenders to believe express and exercise the 
religion of their choice.  The DOC shall 
extend to all individuals under its custody 
and/or supervision those opportunities 
necessary to practice religious freedoms 
consistent with the prudent requirements of 
facility security, safety, health and 
orderliness.  The DOC will not tolerate 
offenders being subjected to coercion, 
harassment or ridicule due to religious 
affiliation.” 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Florida 
“In the interest of security, order, or 
effective management of the institution, the 
warden may limit the number of religious 
services or activities inmates may attend per 
week. When it is considered necessary for 
security or good order of the institution, the 
warden may limit attendance at or 
discontinue completely a religious service or 
activity. The warden may not restrict or 
allow the religious group itself to restrict 
attendance at or participation in a religious 
service or activity on the basis of race, color, 
or nationality…The warden or designee may 
authorize the introduction into the institution 
of altar or sacramental wine to be used in a 
sectarian or interfaith service when the use 
of such wine is deemed essential to the 
observance of the service…Approved 
tobacco, lighters, and matches may be used 
during approved religious ceremonies.” 
“It is the policy of the Department 
to extend to all inmates the greatest 
amount of freedom and opportunity 
for pursuing individual religious 
beliefs and practices consistent with 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Georgia 
“A worship service is held each week at 
every institution.  In addition, religious 
education is available, either as a class, or 
through correspondence.  Pastoral 
counseling is also available.” 
“Inmates may not be required to attend 
Religious Services.” 
“Religious instruction on the Bible, the 
Koran and other spiritual guides is 
available.” 
“Participation in any meeting or 
gathering which has not been 
specifically authorized…” is 
considered a security violation. The 
Facility Descriptions contains the 
religious programs available at each 
facility to include Seventh Day 
Adventist, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Catholic, Protestant, Jumah and 




Handbook, p. 15 & 28 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Hawaii 
“…no offender shall be denied the right to 
practice the religion of his/her choosing, and 
to allow religious programs for offenders, 
including opportunities to practice the 
requirements of one’s faith, and use of 
community resources, while balancing 
security concerns of the facility…offenders 
will have the opportunity to participate in 
practices of their faith group, both 
individually and as a group, that are deemed 
to be essential by the tenets of that faith 
without being subjected to coercion, 
harassment, and ridicule” (p. 4). 
“Offender shall be offered the opportunity to 
attend services, activities, or meetings of 
other denominations unless there is a 
compelling reason to restrict attendance due 
to custody and/or security reasons” (p. 5). 
“Religious beliefs may not be used 
to subvert correctional authority or 
interfere with the order and security 
of the facility.” 
Sacramental wine may be used by 
officiant and white tea is substituted 
for kava. 
Unique policy in that pg. 8-9 
contains religious practices and 
activities that are prohibited. 







State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Idaho 
“The IDOC provides reasonable and 
equitable opportunities to inmates of all 
faiths to pursue religious beliefs and 
activities, when those opportunities can be 
provided within budgetary limitations and 
are consistent with the safe and orderly 
operation of a facility and its custody level.  
The IDOC does not interfere with an 
inmate’s religious belief.  However, the 
IDOC has a compelling government interest 
to maintain safety and security in its 
facilities.  Therefore, the IDOC may 
substantially burden an inmate’s exercise of 
religion when the application of the burden 
is based on a compelling IDOC interest and 
it is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that interest” (p. 3) 
Contains a list of prohibited 
activities (e.g., domestic or foreign 
terrorism, nudity, etc.) (p. 4-5).  
“Sermons, teachings, and 
admonitions must be delivered in 
English” (p. 6).  Wine for officiant 
only, sweat lodge.  Provides 
procedure to request property or 
activity for new or unfamiliar 
religious components. 







State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Illinois 
“Committed persons shall be provided 
reasonable opportunities to pursue their 
religious beliefs and practices subject to 
concerns regarding security, safety, 
rehabilitation, institutional order, space, and 
resources.” “Religious activities approved 
by the Chief Administrative Officer shall be 
conducted or supervised by a chaplain or 
religious program volunteer…The Chief 
Administrative Officer may limit, restrict, 
discontinue, or deny a religious activity 
based upon concerns regarding security, 
safety, rehabilitation, institutional order, 
space, or resources…Nothing in this Part 
shall require the provision of group religious 
activities to committed persons in impact 
incarceration program facilities, reception 
and classification centers, or in segregation 
areas, the condemned unit, or  specialized 
housing units within the facility, such as the 
hospital…Nothing in this Part shall require 
the Department to provide each separate 
religious group or sects within a group with 
a chaplain or with separate religious 
activities regardless of the size of the 
religious group or the extent of the demand 
for the activities. 
Policy contains provisions for 
assembly if a chaplain or approved 
volunteer are not available. 
20 Admin. Code 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Indiana 
Policy allows for offenders to identify as 
Native/Indigenous, Jewish, Islamism, 
Buddhist/Eastern, Muslim/Islam , Wicca , 
Catholic, Eckankar, Other, General 
Christian , Rastafarian, Asatru/Odinism , 
Hebrew Israelite, Satanism, Orthodox 
Christian, Yahwist/Messianic, Other or 
None. 
“Offenders shall be free to practice…a 
personal religious belief within the 
limitations of this policy and administrative 
procedure. No offender shall be required to, 
or coerced into, adopting or participating in 
any religious belief or practice.” 
“Religious practice and symbols/items 
related to a religion unfamiliar to the 
Department and for which a request for 
services or religious symbols/items has been 
made shall undergo an authorization 
process.” 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Iowa 
“It is the policy of the IDOC to support 
offender participation in religious worship 
and activities.  IDOC affirms an offender’s 
right to maintain religious beliefs in the 
prison setting and shall accommodate 
religious expression consistent with the 
governmental interest in institutions and the 
security, health and safety of its staff and 
offenders.” 
The policy sets forth procedures to “request 
recognition of a new religion, religious 









State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Kansas 
“Offenders shall be permitted to practice a 
religion to which they sincerely ascribe 
within the limitations imposed by individual 
facility physical structures, staffing levels, 
other considerations of security, good order 
and discipline, consistent with consideration 
of costs and limited resources…Offenders 
shall be permitted the opportunity to learn 
about other religious affiliations but shall 
not be allowed to fully engage in the 
practices of other religions except when a 
change of affiliations is requested…The use 
or possession of religious items may be 
limited to use or possession by clergy during 
visits, religious services or 
ceremonies…Fermented wine for use in 
communion services may be authorized by 
the warden/superintendent or 
designee…tobaccos and/or tobacco mixtures 
shall be allowed in specified amounts in 
accordance with facility policy.” 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Kentucky 
“The Department of Corrections shall ensure 
that an inmate has the opportunity to 
participate in practices of his religious faith 
in accordance with the Religion Reference 
Manual…These practices shall include 
religious publications, religious symbols, 
congregational religious services, individual 
and group counseling, and religious study 
classes…Religious practices shall be limited 
only by documentation showing a threat to 
the safety of persons involved in an activity 
or that the activity itself disrupts order in the 
institution.  
Policy contains a list of practices 
that are not allowed, such as animal 
sacrifice. 




“Inmates shall be permitted to attend 
religious services of their own 
denomination.” 
Allows faith group services and studies for:  
Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Muslims, Institute of Divine Metaphysical 
Research and WICCA.  “Chaplains, 
chaplains (sic) assistants and volunteers of 
the appropriate faith group conduct services 
and faith group studies.  Chaplains (sic) 
assistants and volunteers teach discipleship 
groups and intensive biblical studies.” 
 









State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Maine 
Services are allowed for:  Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jehovah’s 
Witness, Judaism, Native American, 
Odinism, Pagan, Santeria, and Wicca 
“Where feasible and not contrary to 
safety, security, or orderly 
management of the facility, group 
religious ceremonies…shall be 
allowed consistent with a religion’s 
recognized practices.” 




“The Religious Services Program is 
designed to afford offenders a reasonable 
opportunity to pursue the practice of religion 
within a correctional setting where a 
plurality of religious beliefs, traditions, and 
practices are accommodated within program 
limits…When necessary to place a burden 
on the religious exercise of offenders, the 
Department will do so in the least restrictive 
means.” 
“Requests for accommodations of 
certain religious practices and 
observances shall be considered 
from offenders who provide 
sufficient evidence of their belief 
and affiliation with the 
religion…equal and consistent 
treatment of all religions or 
religious beliefs may not always 
require the same accommodations 
or the same religious practices in all 
facility or for all offenders.” 
Maryland Department 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Massachusetts 
“Each institution shall make reasonable 
efforts to establish and maintain religious 
activities and services for all inmates who 
are affiliated, or wish to become affiliated, 
with recognized religious denominations or 
groups. Approved religious practice and 
property items for recognized religious 
denominations or groups are listed in the 
Religious Services Handbook [not 
available].” 
“Recognized religious groups or 
denominations are listed in the Religious 
Services Handbook. An inmate who is 
affiliated with, and wishes to participate in, 
a recognized religious group not currently 
functioning at an institution, should comply 










State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Michigan 
Religious groups authorized to conduct 
group religious services/activities:  Muslim 
(Al-Islam), Asatru/Odinism, Baha’i, 
Buddhism, The Church of Christ, Scientist, 
Mormons, Church of Scientology, Hare 
Krishna, Institute of Divine Metaphysical 
Research, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaism, 
Moorism Science Temple of America, 
Nation of Islam, Native American, Orthodox 
Christian, Protestant Christianity Roman 
Catholic, Sacred Name, Seventh Day 
Adventist, and Wicca. 
Although recognized religious 
groups, the following are not 
authorized to conduct group 
religious services/activities:  
Hebrew Israelite, Hinduism, 
Thelema, and Yoruba. 




“Minnesota Department of Corrections 
(DOC) facilities provide offenders/residents 
with reasonable opportunities to pursue 
individual religious belief and practices, 
within facility budgetary and security 
constraints.” 
“Offenders/residents are banned from all 
facility-scheduled religious activities for 60 
days or more for inappropriate conduct 
during a ceremony or meeting.  This ban 
may be progressive if inappropriate conduct 
is repeated.  Any ban may be coupled with 
formal discipline.” 
“Offenders/residents may request 
the introduction of new or 
unfamiliar religious components 









State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Mississippi 
“Inmates will be assisted by Religious 
Programs chaplains to participate in 
activities (i.e., worship, study groups) 
related to their stated religious preference.  
Disruptive behavior on the part of any 
individual may result in disapproval to meet 
within group activities. Inmates in 
administrative segregation, disciplinary 
detention, protective custody, death row or 
other lock-down situations will be assisted 
by the chaplain to practice their faith 
individually.” 
 MDOC Offender Handbook (June 2016) 
Missouri 
Fully accommodated religions include:  Al-
Islam/Muslim, Buddhism, Christian – 
General, Christian – Roman Catholic, 
Judaism, Messianic, Moorish Science 
Temple of America, Nation of Islam, Native 
American Spirituality and Wicca 
“Faith specific worship services and study 











State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Montana 
“It is the policy of the Department of 
Corrections to provide reasonable and 
equitable opportunities to pursue religious 
activities.” 
“Offenders will be provides the opportunity 
to participate in activities deemed essential 
by the governing body of the offender’s 
faith when consistent with safety and 
security requirements…The facility must 
provide, to the extent practical, resource to 
support religious activities including 









State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Nebraska 
“To the extent possible, except in 
Community Corrections facilities, each 
accommodated religious group (two or more 
inmates) shall receive comparable religious 
programming, time and space, including one 
weekly worship opportunity, and 
opportunities to observe a religious holidays, 
as approved.” 
“Special religious events may be approved 
by the facility Warden.  No religious group 
will displace the time and space allotted for 
another religious group for special religious 
activities.” 
Ceremonies listed included Native American 
Sweat and Pipe Ceremony, Baptism, and 
Funerals. 
“With staff supervision and 
approval, religious groups may 
conduct worship or study without a 
volunteer present.” 
“No general population inmate will 
be denied an opportunity to attend 
group worship unless his/her 
attendance threatens the safety or 
good order of the institution.  
Inmates may be removed from 
worship and/or religious study 
events for non-participation and/or 
causing disruption.” 
Nebraska DOC Policy 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Nevada 
“The NDOC acknowledges the inherent and 
constitutionally protected rights retained by 
inmates to believe, express, and exercise the 
religion of their individual choice.  The 
NDOC, therefore, extends to inmates those 
opportunities necessary to practice religious 
freedom that are consistent with the security, 
safety, health and orderly operation of each 
institution/facility.” 
Recognized faith groups include:  
American Indian, Asatru/Odinism, 
Baha’I, Buddhism, Christian (Non-
denom), Christian (Orthodox), 
Christian (Protestant), Church of 
Christ (Scientist), Scientology, 
Druid, Celtic Pagans, Pre-Christian, 
Hindu, Islam/Muslim (orthodox), 
Nation of Islam, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Judaism, Judaism (Messianic), Hare 
Krishna, Moorish Science Temple 
of America, Mormons, Rastafarian, 
Roman Catholic, Seventh Day 
Adventist, Siddha Yoga, Sikh, 






“All individuals under DOC custody shall 
have access to religious resources, services, 
instruction or counseling on a voluntary 
basis.” 
“The institution shall extend to all 
individuals under DOC custody the greatest 
amount of freedom and opportunity to 
pursue any recognized religious belief or 
practice…within the boundaries of security, 
safety, discipline and the orderly operation 
of the institution.” 
Attachment 3 of the policy 
delineates the special assemblies for 
the following faith groups:  
Buddhist, Catholic, 
Episcopal/Anglican, Islam/Muslim, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jewish, 
Native American, Neo-pagan, 
Protestant/Christian, Rastifarian, 
Russian Orthodox, Seventh Day 
Adventist, Siddha Yoga, Taoist, and 
Mahailimara/Thelema 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New Jersey 
“Each inmate has the right to freedom of 
religious affiliation and voluntary religious 
worship while incarcerated, but the exercise 
of such right may be subject to reasonable 
restrictions related to penological interests in 
order to maintain the safe, secure and 
orderly operation of the correctional 
facility.” 
“(a) Correctional facility 
Administrators shall not be required 
to provide every religious sect or 
group with 
1. Outside clergy; 
2. Space; and/or 
3. Schedule time for religious 
activity.” 
Procedures in place to review 
requests and approve those that 
“would not threaten or otherwise 
interfere with the internal discipline, 
safety, security, or orderly operation 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New Mexico 
Policy Attachment A contains assembly 
allowed for the following religious groups: 





*Church of Christ Scientist 







*Protestant (General Christian) 
*Satanism 
*Seventh Day Adventist 
*Unitarian Universalism 
*Universal Life Church 
*Wicca 
“The New Mexico Corrections 
Department (NMCD) shall provide 
religious programming for an 
inmate that is appropriate for the 
inmate’s custody placement, 
including program coordination and 
supervision, opportunities to 
practice one’s sincerely held 
beliefreligion (sic), and the use of 
community resources, including 
volunteers, religious facilities and 
equipment.  The religious programs 
offered will reflect the diversity of 
traditions available in the larger, 
outside community, to the extent 
possible.” 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
New York 
Policy contains procedures for approval of a 
new or unfamiliar religion. 
The number of times the religion is allowed 
to assemble is based on the number of 
recognized members it has. 
Generally, offenders must be a member of a 
religion to attend its services but they can 
attend up to three services per year of 
another religion about which they wish to 
learn. 
“In recognition of the First 
Amendment right of “religious 
liberty” and in pursuit of the 
objective of assisting inmate to live 
as law abiding citizens, it is the 
intent of DOCCS to extend to 
inmates as much spiritual assistance 
as possible, as well as to provide as 
many opportunities as feasible for 
the practice of their chosen faiths, 
consistent with the safe and secure 
operations of the DOCCS 
correctional facilities.” 
NY CCS Dir#4202 
10/19/15 
North Carolina 
Contains specific assembly procedures 
allowed for the following religions:  
American Indian, Asatru, Assemblies of 
Yahweh, Buddhism, Christian (Protestant), 
Christian (Catholic), Christian (Eastern 
Orthodox), Hindu, Islam, Judaism, Moorish 
Science Temple, Rastafarian, and Wiccan 
“Inmates in the general population 
will be permitted to attend religious 
activities of their choice so long as 
that attendance does not cause 
undue hardship on their work or 
program assignments and does not 
interfere with the orderly operations 
of the facility.” 
North Carolina 
Department of 






“Bible studies and fellowship services are 
available on a weekly basis.  Religious 
group activities will be listed on the weekly 
religious activity schedule.” 
“You are entitled to freedom of 
religious affiliation and worship.  
You have the responsible to 
recognize and respect the religious 
rights of others.” 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Ohio 
Specific policies provided additional 
assembly guidance for the following 
religions: 
Protestant, Jehovah Witness, Jewish, 
Buddhist, Wiccan, Asatru, Roman Catholic, 
Muslim, and Native American. 
“It is the policy of the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction (DRC) to ensure that 
inmates, who wish to do so, may 
subscribe to any religious belief 
they choose.  Inmate religious 
practices, as opposed to beliefs, 
may be subject to reasonable time, 
place and manner restrictions.  
Inmate participation in religious 
activities shall be voluntary.  The 
opportunity for inmates to engage in 
particular religious practices shall 
be subject to the legitimate 
departmental or institutional 
interests and concerns, including 
security, safety, health, discipline, 
rehabilitation, order, and the 
limitations of and allocation of 
resources.” 
















State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Oklahoma 
“All inmates remanded to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections (ODOC) retain 
the right to choose their religious beliefs and 
to practice their religion.  Religious 
practices will be allowed in accordance with 
security needs and must conform to all 
safety and health requirements.  When it is 
necessary to place a burden on the religious 
exercise of inmates, ODOC will do so in the 
least restrictive means.” 
Recognized religions include:  
Christianity, Judaism, Left-Hand 
Path, Pagan, Native American, 
Pagan, Moorish Science, Buddhism, 





“Inmates should have the opportunity for 
reasonable access to religious activities 
which may include but are not limited to the 
following: 
(a) Regular religious services and 
ceremonies; 
(b) Special ceremonies, holiday services, 
and sacraments; 
(c) Individual religious counseling; 
(d) Inmate religious group meetings; and  
(e) Religious moral instruction.” 
“An inmate whose religious 
expression includes odor or smoke-
producing substances (e.g., tobacco, 
sage, sweet grass, kinnick kinnick, 
and incense) may be authorized to 
burn small amounts of these 
substances as part of an approved 
religious activity in a manner 
consistent with facility security, 
safety, health and order.” 








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Pennsylvania 
“Each facility will provide a separate 
physical location for use as a Religious 
Services Area that shall be made available 
for religious activities.  This space will be 
faith-neutral when not in use.  Faith group 
symbols will be displayed only when a 
respective faith group is using the Religious 
Services area.” 







“All inmates have the right to the free 
exercise of their religious beliefs and the 
liberty of worship according to the dictates 
of their consciences.  However, the exercise 
of this right may be restricted for legitimate 
security reasons…No inmate shall be 
required or expected to attend any religious 
programs or services, or to adhere to any 
religious belief.” 
“All religious organizations have 
equal access to the physical space, 
equipment and services which the 
institution normally provides for 
religious purposes…The Warden or 
designee may limit religious 
programs, practices, or services if 
such would threaten the security, 
safety, or well-being of the 
institution, its visitors, inmates, or 
staff, and whether there are specific 
facts to substantiate the threat.” 
“Religious organizations include, 
but are not necessarily limited to:  








State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
South Carolina 
Inmates will be given the opportunity to 
practice their religious faith to the extent 
that such practice does not interfere with the 
security and safety of the institution, staff, or 
other. 
Recognized groups include Al-
Islam (Muslim), Buddhism, 
Christianity, Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, House of Yahweh, 
Native American, Odinism/Asatru, 
Rastafarian, Shetaut Neter, 
Unitarian Universalist, Wicca, 
World Deist Society, and other 
faiths recognized but not requested 





“Permissible religious practices are practices 
of that religion for the purpose of worship, 
devotion, instruction and spiritual 
development which are not contrary to the 
safety or security requirements of the 
institution.” 
Recognized groups include Wiccan, 
Asatru, Buddhist, Islam, Judaism, 
Native American, and Christian 
church dinners as determined by the 
pastor. 
Policy 1.5.F.4 




“The Department shall provide opportunities 
for inmates to voluntarily practice their 
religion and receive appropriate pastoral 
care during incarceration.” 
“Religious worship and study 
groups shall be open to all inmates 
unless such participation is limited 
to maintain order and security of the 
institution.  Inmate attendance shall 
be voluntary.” 
Tennessee DOC 






State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Texas 
“Religious services and support are provided 
to all interested offenders.  There is at least 
one chaplain assigned to each unit.  
Chaplains provide general spiritual support.” 
“It is the policy of the TDCJ to 
extend to all offenders as much 
freedom and opportunity as possible 
for pursuing individual beliefs and 
practices, consistent with security, 
safety and orderly operations of the 
institution.” 
The website refers to Muslim 
chaplains as well as Native 
American and Jewish chaplains. 
Offender Orientation 




“It is the policy of the Department that 
inmates have: 
A. the opportunity for free exercise of their 
religion within the limits of security, safety, 
orderly operation of facilities or other 
compelling governmental interests; and 
B. access to individual and congregate 
religious worship services, counseling and 
assistance within security and classification 
guidelines.” 
Recognized religions included:  
Asatru, Assembly of God, 
Baptist/Southern Baptist, 
Buddhism, Catholic (Roman), 
Catholic (Greek Orthodox), 
Catholic (Russian Orthodox), 
Episcopalian, Hindu, Islam 
(Muslim), Jehovah’s Witness, 
Judaism/Hebrew, International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, Lutheran, Native 
American religions, Non-
Denominational (Christian), 
Odinist, Protestant, Seventh Day 
Adventist, Wicca 
Utah DOC 







State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Vermont 
“All recognized inmate religious groups will 
have equal access to the physical space, 
which is dependent on the number of 
adherents, equipment, and services, which 
the institution normally provides for 
religious purposes… The 
Superintendent/designee retains the right to 
limit participation in religious programs. 
This would occur upon documentation of a 
compelling governmental interest such as an 
individual has shown a threat to the safety of 
staff, inmates, or other persons involved in 
the religious activity; or an individual’s 
conduct which disrupts the security or order 










State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Virginia 
“All facilities will designated adequate 
space and equipment appropriate for the 
conduct and administration of religious 
activities to include adequate office space, 
storage space, and an area for a Religious 
Library.” 
The following religions are approved to 
operate in the Virginia DOC:  African 
Hebrew-Israelite, Asatru/Odinism, 
Buddhists, Christian Science, Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints/Mormons, 
Coptic Church, Druidry-Celtic, Eckankar, 
Green Orthodox/Eastern Orthodox, Hare 
Krishna, Hindu, Humanism (Religious and 
Secular), Integral Yoga, Islam (Sunni 
Muslims, Shiite Muslims, World 
Community of Islam), Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Jewish, Messianic Jews, Moorish Science 
Temple of America, Nation of Gods and 
Earths, Nation of Islam, Natsarim Israel, 
Philadelphia Church of God, Protestants 
(Baptists, Church of Christ/United Church 
of Christ, Episcopalians/Anglican, 
Lutherans (cont.). 
(cont.) Mennonites, Methodists, 
Pentecostal, Presbyterians, 
Quakers/Society of Friends, 
Seventh Day Adventists), 
Rastafarians, Roman Catholics, 
Santeria, Shetaur 
Neter/Neterianism, Sikh, Temple of 
the Way-Out (of sin) Church, 
Unitarian Universalist, Wicca, 
House of Yahweh.  Lost and Found 










State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Washington 
“The Department will provide religious as 
well as cultural opportunities for offenders 
within available resources, while 
maintaining facility security, safety, health, 
and orderly operations.” 
“The Department will not endorse 
any religious faith or cultural group 
and will ensure that religious 
programming is consistent with the 
provisions of federal and state 
statutes…The Department 
recognizes that many religions 
incorporate religious, traditional, 
and cultural practices.  The 
Department offers offender 
cultural/diversity and religious faith 
groups the opportunity to celebrate 
events.” 
Washington State 
DOC Policy 560.200, 
Religious Programs, 
2/17/2014 





State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Wisconsin 
“The Division of Adult Institutions shall 
ensure incarcerated inmates have 
opportunities to pursue lawful practices of 
the religion of their choice consistent with 
security practices and principles; 
rehabilitative goals; health and safety; 
allocation of limited resources; and the 
responsibilities and needs of the correctional 
facilities. 
“DAI does not permit activities of 
property that 
a. Advocate racial, ethnic or gender 
supremacy or purity. 
b. Cast aspersions on any group 
based on race, religion, ethnicity, 
nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or 
disability. 
c. Promote hate crimes against 
persons or property as specified in 
federal or state laws. 
d. Are inconsistent with DAI Policy 
306.00.18 and/or any STF 
management procedures. 
e. Jeopardize the security and order 
of the facility. 
f. Violate federal or state laws or 
DOC administrative rules, policies 
and procedures.” 
Wisconsin DOC DAI 
Policy #309.61.01 







State Assembly Policy Specifics Comments Source 
Wyoming 
“Within the inherent limitations of resources 
and the need for facility security, safety, 
health and good order, it is the policy of the 
WDOC to:  Offender inmates incarcerated in 
WDOC correctional facilities the 
opportunity to reasonably practice the 
religion of their choice…” 
“It is the policy of the WDOC to 
require correctional facilities to 
provide space and equipment 
adequate for the conduct and 
administration of religious 
programs and to make available 
non-inmate clerical services for 
confidential material.” 





“The Bureau of Prisons provides inmates of 
all faith groups with reasonable and 
equitable opportunities to pursue religious 
beliefs and practices, within the constraints 
of budgetary limitations and consistent with 
the security and orderly running of the 
institution and the Bureau of Prisons.” 
“The Warden may periodically 
review religious practices to 
determine whether a religious 
practice remains within the scope of 
best correctional practices and 
religious accommodation.  If upon 
review, the Warden determines that 
a religious practice jeopardizes 
institution safety, security and good 
order, the practiced may be 
temporarily restricted.  The 
religious practice may resume only 
upon completion of a thorough 
evaluation of the practice with 
respect to compelling government 











States’ Religious Diet Policies 
State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Alabama X X X X 
Food may be brought into the unit by 
a “free-world” sponsor (p. 6) for 
Kairos events, Ramadhan Eid Feast, 









AR 701 Food 
Service Admin. 








State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Alaska X X X  
“A request for a religious diet must 
be made through the institution’s 
Religious Coordinator who will 
review the request and make 
recommendations to the 
Superintendent…Regular menu food 
items consistent with the religious 
diet(e.g., no pork) will be used unless 
otherwise approved by the 
Superintendent” (p. 6). 
Temporary accommodations for: 
“a.  Kosher meals for Passover; 
b.  Fasting for Ramadan; and 
c.  Fasting for Yom Kippur” (p. 7). 




Arizona X  X  
Medical diets take precedence over 
religious diets.  If an offender is on 
the religious diet and refuses it, he 
will not be allowed to have the 









                                                 




State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Arkansas   X  
No specifics listed. “An inmate may 
abstain from food items…prohibited 
by the religion of the inmate.  The 
inmate may receive approved 
substitute food items.  The 
Chaplain…shall arrange 
opportunities for the observance of 
occasional or annual religious 
requirements of practices of a 
religious faith” (p. 91). If an inmate 
abuses the Special Religious Diet, 
removal from the Special Diet list 
may result. Abuse includes, but is 
not limited to, refusal to eat the 
Special Religious Diet food, eating 
foods from the regular diet line, and 
purchasing commissary items not 
allowed on the Special Religious 
Diet. Such abuse will result in 
forfeiture of any religious diet for a 












California X  X X 
“Medical diets shall take precedence 
over religious diets.” Religious meat 
alternate diet also available. 








State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Colorado X  X X 
An approved outside volunteer may 
provide food items for holy days.  
Offender may also bring unopened 
canteen food items. 
Colorado DOC 
Reg. No. 800-







Connecticut   X X 
“Common Fare shall be offered to 
the general population as an 
alternative to the Main Cycle entrée 
offered under a 28-day menu. There 
are no restrictions as to who is 
allowed to participate in this special 
diet. The Common Fare menu shall 












State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Delaware  X X  
“Religiously mandated diets are 
accommodated through the provision 
of alternative meals. Inmates may 
also purchase foods from the 
commissary to supplement their 
diet.” 
“The only vegetarian 












Florida X  X  
“The alternate entree and the vegan 
meal pattern provides meal options 








Georgia X    
The Georgia DOC provides an 
Alternative Entreé Plan that does not 










State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Hawaii X  X  
“Religious diets are not classified as 
medical diets.  Food Service may 
offer an alternative vegetarian meal 
for all three meals for the entire 
population in addition to the regular 
menu to decrease requests for special 
diets” (p. 2) 
Winslow, 2007 
Yoro, 2014 











No request for halal 
“Inmates must choose from the 
IDOC diet options to meet the needs 










Illinois X X X  
“Committed persons shall be 
permitted to abstain from any foods 
the consumption of which violates 










State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 











Kansas X    
They do provide some food items 
that are kosher, but not a kosher meal 
or kosher diet 
“Offenders may be provided with a 
diet required by their religion and 
that provides adequate nutrition…an 
offender whose request for a 
religious diet has been 
accommodated may be denied 
continued access to the diet if he or 
she consistently consumes meals 
from the facility meal line that are 













State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Kentucky X  X  
Ramadan Fast 
”The department shall, to the extent 
it is feasible and within appropriate 
institutional resources, provide each 
inmate with the opportunity to satisfy 
the minimum dietary requirements 
deemed essential by the Religion 







Louisiana X X X X 
“The Department does not prepare 
kosher meals, however, approval has 
been granted for a Jewish 
congregation to donate pre-packaged 
kosher meals to one offender – three 




Maine X X   
“…shall ensure that sufficient 
quantities of pork-free and 
vegetarian foods are available to 












State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Maryland X  X X 
All manner of religious services, 
fasting, feast days, etc. are made 














Massachusetts X X X X 
“It is the policy of the Department of 
Correction to provide at each 
institution special diets 
accommodating inmates whose 
religion places restrictions on diets. 
Each Superintendent shall develop 
written procedures regarding the 
preparation and provision of 
religious diets which are consistent 
with 103 CMR 471, Religious 













State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Michigan X  X  
Kosher meal bags are provided 
during major fast days.  During 
Passover, all foods are certified as 
kosher for Passover. 
“The regular diet menu shall be 
posted a minimum of one week in 
advance in all facilities at which 
meals are provided to prisoners to 
permit observance of any religious 
dietary restrictions.  Prisoners shall 
be permitted to abstain from any 
foods that violate their religious 










State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Minnesota X X X  
“Kosher meals are provided in the 
form of purchased entrée.” 
“Offenders/residents requesting a 
religious diet are provided a 
reasonable and equitable opportunity 
to observe their essential religious 
dietary practices within facility 
budgetary and security constraints.” 
“Offenders/residents may attend an 
annual religious group meal if they 
meet requirements specified in 















Missouri   X  
They “provide a certified religious 
diet to try and accommodate several 
religious diets.  The diet contains 
foods in their natural state and 
kosher certified foods.” 
“Religious diets – meals that meet 
religious requirements are provided 
to those who apply and who qualify 












State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Montana X X X  
Very few requests for religious diets 
“Religious diets are provided to 
offenders whose religious beliefs 
require close adherence to religious 
dietary laws and will be approved by 








Nebraska X  X X 
“All religious diets are meatless and 
prepared kosher” 
“The religious diet meals are 
vegetarian and meet recommended 
energy intake and nutritional 
requirements.  The religious diet 
meals are prepared using certified 











State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Nevada   X  
“The Common Fare menu intends to 
accommodate inmates whose sincere 
religious/spiritual dietary needs 
cannot be met by the Master Menu 
without prohibiting their free 
exercise of or without substantially 
burdening their sincere 
religious/spiritual exercise in a 
manner that is prohibited by 
controlling legal authority.” 
“The Common Fare Menu…shall be 
confirmed to meet or exceed Kosher 
Orthodox Union standards…” 
Offenders may be removed from the 
diet list for eating food that is not 





New Hampshire X X X X 
*”Vegetarian with egg:  No meat, 
poultry, game, fish, shellfish or by-
products of slaughter” 
*”Vegetarian without egg:  no meat, 
poultry, game, fish, shellfish or by-
products of slaughter and no egg. 
*No Pork 












State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
New Jersey X    
“An inmate who cannot eat the food 
served to the general population 
because of the inmate’s religious 
beliefs may request a steady diet of 
religious vegetarian meals that shall 






New Mexico X    
“Special diets for inmates whose 
religious beliefs require the 
adherence to religious dietary laws 
shall be made within the inherent 
limitation of resources, and the need 
for facility security, safety, health 
and order, through standard menu 








New York   X  
“The Department offers a Kosher 
Diet as an alternative religious meal 











State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
North Carolina X X X  
“It is the policy of the Division of 
Adult Correction/Prisons that 
religious menu accommodations are 
made available for inmates who 
religious beliefs,…require adherence 
















North Dakota X    
“Every facility must have a written 
policy and procedure that 
includes:…Special diets for inmates 
whose religious beliefs require 
















State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Oklahoma X X X X 
“Meals are provided by purchased 
frozen entrée and supplemented with 
facility prepared items such as salad.  





Oregon   X  
“Requests for inmate religious 
dietary needs that cannot be satisfied 
within the context of the Food 
Services cyclical menu will be 
considered…Inmate requests for 
special religious diets must be rooted 







Pennsylvania X  X  
Pennsylvania “offers a kosher Diet 
Bag meal” 
“In addition to the balanced diet of 
foods provided by the Department, 
the Department seeks to 
accommodate the sincerely held 
religious beliefs of inmates as it 
related to their religious dietary 
requirements.” 
Provide Kosher, no animal products, 
Nation of Islam/Muhammad’s 















State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 




South Carolina X    
“An ‘Alternative Entrée Diet’ or 
vegan diet is available to all inmates 








South Dakota X  X X 
“Religious and alternative diets shall 
be nutritionally adequate and 
consistent with maintaining the 
safety, security and orderly operation 










Tennessee X    
“Inmates may request to participate 
in the Religious Diet Program per 










State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Texas  X X  
Provides a regular diet tray and a 





Utah X  X  
Vegan and alternative fare meet halal 
requirements 
“Inmates may request special dietary 
accommodations based on religious 
tenets…Dietary requests for religious 
periods of time such as Lent, Fast of 
the Ramadan or other ceremonial 
and/or holiday meals…” 
Winslow, 2007 
Utah DOC 




Vermont X    
“…the DOC provides meals that 
appropriately meet the dietary needs 
of inmates who have a medical, 
dental, or religious basis for a special 








State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Virginia  X X  
The only religious diet is the 
common fare diet which is non-pork 
and meets the requirements of all 
religious diet meals. 
“Common Fare is a religious diet 
offered at selected institutions as 
designated by the Chief of 
Corrections Operations and is 
intended to accommodate offenders 
whose religious dietary needs cannot 











Washington X  X X 
“Recognized religious diets are:  








West Virginia  X   
“Will let inmates order special items 









State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
Wisconsin X X X X 
“The Division of Adult Institutions 
shall make religious diets available 
through standard menu alternatives 
as resources permit for inmates 
whose religious beliefs require the 








Wyoming X X X  
“It is the policy of the WDOC to 
provide inmates with a wholesome, 
nutritionally balanced diet, which 
allows for daily variety and for 
personal choice from among the 
menu items offered on the food 
services main line, in order to meet 
individual dietary needs and most 
restrictions on diet that result from 















State Vegetarian/ Vegan 
Pork-
Free Kosher Halal Comments Source 
BOP X    
“The Bureau provides inmates 
requesting a religious diet reasonable 
and equitable opportunity to observe 
their religious dietary practice within 
the constraints of budget limitations 
and the security and orderly running 
of the institution and the Bureau 



















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Alabama X     From Inmate Handbook: 
●"Male inmates are expected to be 
clean shaven and neat…There are no 
exceptions granted for religious 
reasons. All displays of religious 
expressions, regarding clothing or 
appearance, are limited to the service 







Alaska  X X X X ●"Prisoners’ grooming and dress must 
not conflict with an institution's 
requirements for safety, security, 
identification, and hygiene." 
●"Staff shall routinely search 
prisoners' hair for contraband." 
●"Prisoners need not wear a particular 
hair style unless the superintendent 
requires a certain hair style for 
program, security, safety, or hygiene 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Arizona  X  X X  ●Hair may not cover the eyes or ears 





Arkansas    X  ●"All inmates must maintain a hair 
style that is worn loose, clean, and 
neatly combed.  No styles are 
permitted that make it difficult to 
search the hair, including cornrows, 
braid, ponytails or dread locks.  If an 
inmate chooses to maintain facial hair, 
the inmate will be required to shave so 
that his appearance without facial hair 






















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
California  X X X X ●"An inmate’s hair or facial hair may 
be any length but the inmate’s hair 
shall not extend over the eyebrows or 
cover the inmate’s face. The hair 
and/or facial hair shall not pose a 
health and safety risk. If hair or facial 
hair is long, it shall be worn in a neat, 
plain style, which does not draw undue 
attention to the inmate." 
●Basra v. Cate, CDRC changed policy 
to allow offenders to grow beards 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Colorado  * X X * ●"It is the policy of the DOC to allow 
offenders’ freedom in personal 
grooming as long as their appearance 
does not conflict with requirements for 
safety, security, identification, and 
hygiene." 
●”Admission procedures…require that 
newly admitted offenders be clean 
shaven during the admission process… 
Beards will not permitted. Sideburns 
will not extend below the earlobe. 
Moustaches will be neatly trimmed 
and no exceed the corner of the mouth. 
*●”An offender who claims that long 
hair and/or a beard is a fundamental 
tenet of a sincerely held religious 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Connecticut  X X X X ”Hair shall be clean and appropriately 
groomed” Offenders are allowed 
freedom in grooming but must keep 








Delaware  X X X X ●"Grooming and attire 
standards…shall be consistent and 
support security interests." 
●"Male offenders are permitted hair 
styles, beards, and mustaches provided 
they are kept clean and trimmed." 
●"When staff determines that the 
offender's hair style or length presents 
a health or sanitation problem, the 
offender shall be required to wear a 






















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Florida X     …no inmate shall be permitted to 
have..hair…dyed, cut, shaved or styled 
according to fads or extremes that 
would call attention to the inmate or 
separate inmates into groups based 
upon style…(including) dreadlocks, 
tails, woven braids, cutting, sculpting, 
clipping or etching numbers, letters, 
words, symbols or other 
designs…Male inmates shall have 
their hair cut short to medium uniform 
length at all times with no part of the 
ear or collar covered…Sideburns shall 
not extend beyond the bottom of the 
earlobes …inmates shall…either…be 
clean shaven or…grow and maintain a 
½” beard…upon intake…each inmate 
having hair on the face or the front of 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Georgia   X X  ●Mustaches may not extend beyond 
the edge of the mouth 
●Sideburns may not extend below the 
bottom of the ear lobe. 
Violations: “The growing or wearing 
of a beard, goatee, or otherwise not 
being clean shaven; except mustaches, 
which do not extend beyond the edge 
of the mouth and are kept trimmed at 
all times.” 




p. 36 – 36, 
47 
Hawaii  X X X X Upon intake, male offenders are 
photographed with facial hair are 
clean-shaven only with their consent.  
If they decline to shave, and then 
shave during their incarceration, they 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Idaho  X X X X ●Facial hair must remain neatly 
trimmed, clean, and cannot exceed 
one-half inch in length 
●"Offenders housed at the Northern 
Idaho Correctional Institution are not 
permitted to grow facial hair, to 
include mustaches, and sideburns, 
because it would interfere with the 
standards developed for that retained 
jurisdiction program.  However, 
offenders are allowed to grow facial 
hair in accordance with...religious 
exception..." 
●"Inmates may grow beards up to 1” 
in length for religious 
purposes…Identification of any 
practiced religion is not a basis for 
denial of the inmate’s religious 
























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Illinois  X X X X ●"An individual who continuously 
changes his appearance and thereby 
interferes with the orderly function of 
the facility, or otherwise creates a 
security risk or a sanitation problem, 
may be required to abide by an 
individual grooming policy, at the 
discretion of the Chief Administrative 
Officer." 
●Hair may not signify STG affiliation 
- general statements about sanitation 
and hiding contraband" 
●”Committed persons may have any 
length of hair, sideburns, mustaches, 
or beards so long as they are kept neat 





















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Indiana  X X X X ●"Based upon the need to ensure the 
health and wellbeing of staff and 
offenders, all male intake units shall 
cut the offender's hair upon 
arrival...[to] ensure...the offender's hair 
does not touch the collar, extend over 
the eyebrows or cover the ears."" 
Religious beliefs shall be respected to 
the extent possible 
●"Moustaches, sideburns and beards 
must be...of reasonable length and 
style.  Beards shall not extend below 
the chin more than 3"" and no more 
than 1 1/2"" in length and growth on 
the side of the face.  Sideburns shall 
not extend below the ear and shall not 
be more than 1 1/2"" in length and 
growth on the side of the face.  Beards 
are not permitted in facilities housing 
juveniles." 
●May cut an offender's hair again if 






















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Iowa  X X X X ●"When the length or style of an 
offender’s hair, including beards and 
mustaches, is found to present a health 
or sanitation problem, the offender 
may be required to trim or cut the hair 
or wear a hairnet or other covering." 
●"Hairstyles of any personal 
appearance exhibiting or depicting any 
form of Security Threat Group (STG) 
relationship, affiliation, or membership 
will not be permitted." 
●"Periodic examination of the hair by 
medical personnel may be required for 
health reasons. At any time 
concealment of contraband is detected 
in the hair, restricted hair standards 




















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Kansas  X X X X ●"Inmates working in food services 
shall not have facial hair in excess of 










Kentucky  X  X X ●Sideburns are not specifically 
addressed 
●”An inmate shall not have cutouts or 
symbols cut into body hair or 
eyebrows.” 
●”Hair, mustache, and beard length 
may be restricted if not kept clean and 
neat.” 
●“Every inmate shall maintain an 
identification card that matches his 
















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Louisiana    X  ●An offender's hair shall be groomed 
in such a manner as to prevent the 
concealment of contraband and to limit 
the offender's ability to change his 
appearance both in prison and in the 
event of an escape.  Further, offender 
hairstyles may not interfere, delay, or 






Maine  X X X X “Prisoners shall be permitted freedom 
in personal grooming as long as their 
appearance does not conflict with the 
facility’s requirements for safety, 



















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Maryland  X X X X ●"Wear clothing and hair as he/she 
wishes, if it does not violate 












Massachusetts  X X X X ●"Inmates may be permitted certain 
choices in personal grooming, as long 
as their appearance does not conflict 
with the institution's requirements for 






















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Michigan  X X X X "●Offenders ""may maintain head and 
facial hair in accordance with their 
religious beliefs provided that 
reasonable hygiene is maintained and 
prisoner identification cards are kept 
current"" 
●Offenders in the Special Alternative 
Incarceration Program may not have 
beards, mustaches, goatees, or 










Minnesota  X X X X ●"Offenders will be permitted freedom 
in personal grooming as long as their 
appearance does not conflict with the 
facility’s requirements for safety, 















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Mississippi   Unknown X X ●"Male inmate’s hair will be kept 
clean and neatly cut so the hair does 
not fall below the collar and is not 
more than 3” in length. Mustaches will 
be neatly trimmed at all times. Beards 
and goatees in excess of ½” are not 




















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Missouri  X X X X ●"The department has determined that 
incarcerated offenders at all custody 
levels may have whatever hair and 
beard length they prefer. 
●Any offender may be required to cut 
their hair and beard and maintain short 
hair and a clean shaven face for the 
following reasons: 
  ●concealing or transporting any 
contraband or weapon in their hair or 
beard; 
  ●refusing to promptly follow staff 
directions with regard to a search of 
their hair or beard; 
  ●having a history of escape of 
attempted escape; 
  ●failing to maintain a clean and neat 
appearance; or 
●having health, safety, or hygiene 




















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Montana  X X X X ●Religious accommodations - can 
change only once a year instead of day 
to day. 
●Work assignments may require 
stricter grooming standards. 
●Database maintained. 
●Progressive disciplinary system 
where forced showers and haircuts are 
allowed. 
●Intricate braiding and STG related 













Nebraska  X X X X ●"Freedom in personal grooming.  
This choice is limited only by 
institutional requirements for safety, 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Nevada  X X X X ●"Inmates shall be permitted freedom 
in personal grooming as long as their 
appearance does not conflict with the 
institution's requirements for safety, 
security, identification and hygiene.” 
●"Beards, sideburns and mustaches 
may be required to be removed for 
security reasons." 
●"During the intake process inmates 
may be required, for health and/or 
security reasons, to submit to a haircut 
and/or shave."  Force may be used. 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
New Hampshire  X X X X ●"Hair length is a personal choice as 
long as there is no safety hazard when 
working around machinery or a 
sanitation hazard when working 
around food." 
●"Inmates are not required to shave.  
Inmates who choose not to shave must 
maintain facial hair length of no more 
than 1/4" and are not allowed to groom 
or sculpt their beards in any way..." 
●"Mustaches are allowed, but cannot 
grow lower than corner of mouth." 
●"Sideburns cannot be lower than 
bottom of earlobe." 
●"Reasonable boundaries must be 
maintained regarding hair styles. A 
hair style that presents a security or 
safety hazard is inappropriate.  An 
example of a hair style being a 
legitimate security hazard would be if 
the sheer volume of the hair can 






















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
New Jersey  X X X X ●"Inmates shall be permitted to have 
the hair style or length of hair they 
choose, including beards and 
mustaches, provided their hair is kept 
clean and does not present a safety 
hazard, or a health, sanitary or security 
problem." 
●"When the length, style or condition 
of an inmate's hair is found to present 
a safety hazard, or a health, sanitary or 
security problem, the inmate shall be 
required to trim or cut his or her hair 
or wear an appropriate protective head 



















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
New Mexico   X X  ●"Freedom in personal grooming shall 
be permitted…" 
●"Inmates having a...sincerely held 
religious belief which prohibits the 
inmate from cutting his hair may 
request an exception to the grooming 
standards..." 
●Special Management offenders:  "All 
male inmates’ hair will be cut neatly 
and will not exceed three inches in 
length…so as not to touch the shirt 
collar...Hair shall not touch or cover 
any portion of the ears."  "Sideburns 
will not extend below the ear lobe."  
"Moustaches will be neatly trimmed, 
not to exceed ¾” in length, not extend 
below the corners of the mouth or 
cover the lip."  "Beards and goatees 
are not permitted and no other facial 
hair is permitted."  Medical and 
















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
New York  X X X X ●"Initial shaves and haircuts shall be 
required of all newly committed male 
inmates and returned parole violators." 
●An offender who “professes to be of 
a religion that would not allow him to 
shave and thus refuses the initial shave 
based on a religious objection...” may 
be exempted. 
●A returning offender "who professes 
to be a Rastafarian, Taoist, Sikh, 
Native American, Orthodox Jew, or 
member of any other religious sect of a 
similar nature and refuses to have an 
initial haircut cannot be forced to 
comply with the initial haircut 
requirements."  Also, those offenders 
with court orders restraining haircuts. 
●After initial haircut and shave, "an 
inmate may grow a beard and/or 
mustache, but beard/mustache hair 
may not exceed one inch in length 
unless" he has a religious exemption or 















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
North Carolina  X X X X 
The manual contains grooming 




























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
North Dakota  X X X X ●”Every…facility’s policies shall 
allow an inmate to request an 
exception to the facility’s hair and 
facial hair restrictions, if any, based on 
the inmate’s sincerely held religious 
beliefs.” 
●"When the length or style of your 
hair is a security, health, sanitation, or 
safety problem, you may be required 
to trim or cut your hair or wear a hair 
net or other covering to alleviate the 
problem…A trimmed mustache is 
permitted.  Beards must be neatly 
trimmed and clean." 
●"Haircuts, facial hair, or eyebrows 
that provide identification or affiliation 
with security threat groups are 
prohibited and you will be required to 
change, modify, or remove any 
features that identify you with a 























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Ohio   X X X ●Hair may not be any longer than 3 
inches from the scalp but braids are 
allowed (for men as well) 
●Sideburns, beards, and mustaches 
must be clean and neatly trimmed.  
Facial hair must not protrude more 
than one-half inch from the skin. 
●Allow exemption for sincerely held 
religious belief. 
●Required re-photographing if inmate 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Oklahoma  X X X X ●For initial intake, offender's hair is 
cut and facial hair removed as close as 
health reasons allow for picture 
●After initial picture, "Thereafter, 
male hairstyles and appearances, 
including facial hair, will not conflict 
with security, sanitation, safety, or 




●A new ID is required if there is a 
change in the offender's appearance 














Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Oregon  X X X X ●"Head and facial hair must be 
maintained daily in a clean and neat 
manner.  
●If a hair search needs to be conducted 
by staff, it may be necessary to require 
that the inmate unbraid, loosen, or cut 
the hair to complete the search.  
●Inmates who work with machinery 
and whose hair length, in the judgment 
of staff, poses a safety or health 
problem must wear protective hair 
covering when performing their job 
assignment in conformance with 
OSHA guidelines.  
●Head and facial hair must be worn in 
a manner that does not draw undue 
attention or otherwise compromise 
internal order and discipline, 
institutional security, or the health and 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Pennsylvania  X X X X “Inmates are not restricted with regard 
to the length of their hair.  All hair 
must be maintained in a manner that 
does not pose a concern relating to the 
health, safety, and security of the 
facility.  Inmates may have all hair 
searched for the purposes of health, 
safety, and security…a beard, goatee, 
mustache, or sideburns shall be 
permitted.” 
. 












Rhode Island  X X X X 
Personal Hygiene contains no 
reference to grooming of hair, just 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
South Carolina    X  ●"All male inmates' hair must be 
neatly cut (not to exceed 1" in length" 
and must remain above the shirt collar 
and above the ear (not touching the 
ear…" 
●"Facial Hair, full beards or 
mustaches only, of a ½ inch maximum 
length are permitted for all inmates." 
●Refusal to comply with standards 
may result in limitation of visitation 
and also be considered a voluntary 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
South Dakota  X X X X 
●"Hair, including facial hair, must be 
kept clean and neat in appearance and 
cannot pose a threat to the safety or 

























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Tennessee  X X X X ●"Inmates shall be permitted freedom 
in personal grooming and dress as long 
as their appearance does not conflict 
with the institution's requirements for 
safety, security, identification, 
sanitation, and hygiene." 
●"Forcible cutting or trimming of hair 
shall not be done except upon orders 
of a physician for health reasons." 
●"Hairstyles, including facial hair, 
which identify inmates as security 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Texas   X X X “Male offenders shall be clean-shaven.  
No beards, mustaches, or hair under 
the lip shall be allowed, unless the 
offender has been approved to grow a 
beard for religious purposes.” 
“Offenders with religious belief [sic] 
who want to grow a beard…shall be 
required to shave once a year, during 
the month of the offender’s birthday 
and have a clean-shaven picture taken 
for current identification purposes, 
after which time the offender shall be 
allowed to regrow the religious beard.” 
“Religious beards shall be no more 
than fist length and not exceed four 
inches outward from the face.” 
“Male offenders shall keep their hair 
trimmed up the back of their neck and 
head.  Hair shall be neatly cut.  Hair 
shall be cut around the ears.  Sideburns 
shall not extend below the middle of 
the ears...No fad or extreme 

















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Utah  X X X X 
●Religious accommodations are 
allowed. 
●”Hair length and the wearing of 
beards may be regulated by work 
agreements or contracts.” 
“An inmate may wear a mustache or 












Vermont  X X X X 
















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Virginia   X X X ●”Offenders are permitted freedom in 
personal grooming within the 
standards set forth in this operating 
procedure.  Hair styles and beards that 
could conceal contraband; promote 
identification with gangs; create a 
health, hygiene, or sanitation hazard; 
or could significantly compromise the 
ability to identify an offender are not 
allowed.” 
●”Male offenders’ hair will be neatly 
cut, no longer than above the shirt 
collar and around the ears…” 
●”Sideburns will not extend below the 
middle of the ear.” 
●”Beards of a ½ inch maximum length 
are permitted for all offenders.” 
●”A mustache is authorized for male 
offenders; however, it must be neatly 
trimmed and must not extend beyond 


















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Washington  X X X X 
●"Offenders will be allowed to express 
their religious customs and beliefs 
through head and facial hairstyles 
consistent with their religious tradition 









West Virginia X     ●Only if they have a shave slip from a 
doctor 
●"Hair length will not exceed the top 
of the collar or ears, be no more than 
3" on top and be kept neat and clean.  
Hair will have a tapered appearance 
and may not be blocked." 
●"Facial hair will not be permitted.  
Medical and religious issues will be 




















Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Wisconsin  X X X X ●The department has the authority to 
regulate the length of hair, mustaches, 
and beards based upon institution 
health and 
safety concerns. 
●Inmates assigned to food preparation 
and serving areas shall be required to 
wear hairnets or other suitable hair 
covering. 
●Inmates performing work 
assignments that may reasonably be 
considered to be hazardous shall 
maintain suitably cropped hair or wear 























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
Wyoming  X X X X ●”It is the policy of the WDOC that 
each inmate shall be allowed freedom 
in personal grooming except when a 
valid interest justifies otherwise. 
●Male inmates will…receive a 
standard military style haircut prior to 
being photographed. 
●Should the inmate opt not to receive 
a haircut for religious or other reasons, 
he will be photographed with his 
existing hairstyle, as long as that 
hairstyle otherwise complies with this 
policy. 
●If the inmate opts to not receive an 
intake haircut and his hairstyle is in 
violation of this policy, his 
presence…shall be deemed to create a 
threat to security and good order of the 
facility or the safety of any person and 
he shall be placed into an appropriate 




























Comments Source Long 
Hair Sideburns Mustaches Beards 
BOP  X X X X ●The Bureau of Prisons permits an 
inmate to select the hair style of 
personal choice, and expects personal 
cleanliness and dress in keeping with 
standards of good grooming and the 
security, good order, and discipline of 
the institution. 
●Inmates with beards will be required 
to wear beard coverings when working 
in food service or where a beard could 










States’ Policies Regarding Religious Accommodation for Pat and Strip Searches 
State 

























Alabama X X X X No 
Although the policy specifically 
states “There shall be no cross-
gender searches…” of visitors 
or employees, there is not such 




April 6, 2005 
Alaska     Yes 
“No cross-gender pat-down 
searches of female prisoners 
may occur, unless exigent 
circumstances exist…No cross-
gender strip searches may occur 
except when exigent 
circumstances that immediately 
impact the safety or security or 
the institution exist…No cross-
gender pat-down searches of 
known, male Muslim prisoners/ 
arrestees may occur, unless 











































Arizona * **    
*”Male officers shall not pat 
search female inmates, except 
in emergency situations” (p. 10) 
**”Female officers may pat 
search male inmates if no male 
staff member is available to 
conduct the search with a 
reasonable amount of time” (p. 
10) 
Cross gender pat searches must 
have one other staff member 


































Arkansas X X * *  
“Pat searches may be conducted 
by an employee of either gender 
and may be performed in any 
area of the facility and during 
movements” (p. 3). 
“Strip searches shall be 
conducted in a professional 
manner by staff the same 
gender as the offender. [*]In 
cases of emergency (i.e., 
escape, riot, etc.), this provision 
may be waived” (p. 4). 
Arkansas 
DOC #401, 































California * X ** **  
*”Body inspection of clothed 
female inmates shall be 
conducted by female 
correctional employees only, 
except in emergency situations 
requiring the immediate search 
of inmates to avoid the threat of 
death, escape, or great bodily 
injury.” 
**“Correctional employees, 
other than qualified medical 
staff, shall not conduct 
unclothed body inspections of 
inmates of the opposite sex 
except under emergency 






































Colorado * X ** **  
“Pat searches of male offenders 
may be conducted by DOC 
employees or contract workers 
of either sex; female offenders 
shall only be pat searched by 
female DOC employees or 
contract workers, absent 
exigent circumstances…DOC 
employees shall be trained in 
how to conduct cross-gender 
pat-down searches…” 
**“[Strip] searches will be 
conducted by a DOC employee 
of the same sex as the offender 
being searched, except in 
exigent circumstances or when 
performed by medical 
practitioner.” 
Colorado 

































Connecticut X X * * No 
“Reasonable accommodations 
shall be made to provide for 
same gender pat-searches of 
female inmates…Reasonable 
accommodations shall be made 
to provide for same gender 
strip-searches. When such 
accommodation cannot be made 
and the strip-search is deemed 
to be essential without delay, 
then a cross gender strip-search 
shall be conducted.” All cross 






































Delaware X X * *  
*“Strip searches shall be 
conducted by officers of the 
same gender as the offenders 
being searched, except during 
emergencies or exigent 
circumstances.” “Frisk searches 
should be conducted by a 
Correctional Officer of the 






































Florida * X ** ** No 
“[*]Clothed searches of female 
inmates by male staff will only 
be conducted during an 
emergency situation as 
determined by the shift 
supervisor. The only exception 
to this provision is an instance 
when time and circumstances 
do not permit the arrival of 
female staff or consultation 
with the shift supervisor prior to 
conducting the search due to an 
imminent threat of physical 
violence and a search is needed 
to secure the inmate to prevent 
injury to staff or 
inmates…[**]Strip searches of 
inmates shall be conducted only 
by Correctional Officers who 
shall be of the same sex as the 



































Georgia ** X * * No 
•*”The facility shall not 
conduct cross-gender strip 
searches or cross-gender visual 
body cavity searches (Meaning 
a search of the anal or genital 
opening) except in exigent 
circumstances or when 
performed by medical 
practitioners.” 
•**”The facility shall not 
conduct cross-gender pat 
searches of female inmates, 




Hawaii ** X * * No 
*Exceptions for cross-gender 
strip searches only allowed in 
exigent circumstances.  
**Exceptions for cross-gender 
pat strip searches of females 


































Idaho X X ** ** No 
*“When it is necessary to 
conduct a clothed body search, 
an employee of either gender 
may conduct the search.”   
**”When it is necessary to 
conduct an unclothed body 
search, an employee of the 
same gender as the offender 
must conduct the search (except 




Illinois N/A N/A No No No 
“Strip searches and visual 
searches of anal or vaginal body 
cavities of committed persons 
shall be conducted by persons 
of the same sex as the 
committed person and in an 
area where the search cannot be 
observed by persons not 
conducting the search, except in 


































Indiana N/A N/A No No No 
“No facility shall conduct 
cross-gender strip searches or 
cross-gender visual body cavity 
searches except in emergency 
circumstances or when 






Iowa N/A N/A N/A N/A  
“Sufficient same-gender staff 
shall be available to perform 
searches of offenders involved 


































Kansas * ** *** *** No 
*“Pat-down searches of male 
offenders may be conducted by 
trained staff of the same or 
opposite gender as the 
offenders being searched” 
**”Pat-down searches of 
female offenders and all 
juvenile offenders shall be 
conducted by a trained staff 
member of the same gender 
only, except in exigent 
circumstances” 
***”…strip search shall be 
performed by, and only in the 
presence of, employees of the 
same gender as the offender 




































Kentucky ** *** * * No 
*“Except in exigent 
circumstances, a strip search 
shall be conducted by a staff 
member of the same gender as 
the inmate…” 
**“All cross-gender pat down 
or frisk searches of female 
inmates shall only be conducted 
under exigent circumstances 
and shall be documented.  
***Other pat down or frisk 
searches, or area searches of 
inmates may be conducted as 






Louisiana No No No No No 
“Visual body searches shall be 
conducted by trained personnel 
of the same sex as the inmate 
and shall avoid force, undue 




































Maine * Yes ** ** No 
Policy referenced PREA 
Standard §115.15 
**”…shall not conduct cross-
gender strip searches or cross-
gender body cavity 
searches..except in exigent 
circumstances or when 
performed by medical 
practitioners.” 
*”…shall not permit cross-
gender pat-down searches of 




































Maryland * Yes ** ** No 
Facility meets PREA Standard 
§115.15 
**”IIU.100.0008 Strip and 
Body Cavity Searches prohibit 
cross gender strip and body 




Search Plan prohibits cross-
gender pat-down searches of 
female inmates, except in 
exigent circumstances.” 





Jails – North 
Branch Corr. 
Inst. 11-10/12-































Massachusetts * Yes ** ** No 
*” Cross-gender pat searches of 
female inmates shall not be 
permitted absent exigent 
circumstances.” 
**“Except for gender non-
conforming inmates, cross-
gender strip searches or cross-
gender visual body cavity 
searches shall not be conducted 
except in exigent circumstances 




































Michigan * * ** ** No 
*”Department employees have 
authority to conduct a pat-down 
or clothed body search of a 
prisoner at any time. For male 
prisoners, these searches need 
not be conducted by a staff 
member of the same sex as the 
prisoner being searched. Pat-
down and clothed body 
searches of female prisoners 
shall be conducted only by 
female staff except when 
female staff are not readily 
available to conduct a search in 
an emergency or where there is 
a reasonable suspicion that the 
prisoner is in possession of 
contraband.” 
**”A strip search shall be 
performed only by employees 




































Minnesota * Yes ** ** No 
*”Except in exigent 
circumstances, pat searches of 
female offenders must be 
conducted by staff of the same 
gender.” 
**”Except in exigent 
circumstances, unclothed body 
searches are conducted in 
private, by two staff of the same 






Mississippi      Unavailable  































Montana * ** *** *** No 
*”Cross gender clothed body 
searches of residents in juvenile 
facilities, juveniles and adult 
females are not permitted 
unless an exigent circumstance 
requires a cross gender clothed 
body search.”   
**”Staff will conduct clothed 
body searches of individuals of 
the same gender as themselves 
whenever possible.” 
***”Written procedures will 
provide that, except in 
emergency situations, staff of 
the same gender as the offender 



































Nebraska * Yes ** ** No 
*”Staff shall not conduct cross-
gender pat searches of female 
inmates, absent exigent 
circumstances.” 
**”Staff shall not conduct 
cross-gender strip searches or 
cross-gender visual body cavity 
searches…except in exigent 
circumstances or when 




































Nevada Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
“Inmates are subject to pat-
down searches, frisk, strip 
visual body cavity, intrusive 
body cavity, and property 
searches, if necessary, for the 
safety and security of the 
institution/facility.” 
“Pat down, frisk, strip and 
visual body cavity searches of 
inmates and their property will 
be conducted by staff trained in 
conducting searches.” 
There were no specifics 
regarding cross-gender searches 


































New Hampshire Yes Yes No No No 
*”Officers of the opposite sex 
may perform pat down 
searches, when officers of the 
same sex are not immediately 
available, the situation is of an 
emergency nature...” 
*For strip searches, “Trained 
staff of the same gender will 


































New Jersey Yes No ** ** No 
*”Pat searches may be 
conducted by either male or 
female custody staff members 
upon male inmates.  Except in 
emergent circumstances, pat 
search shall only be conducted 
by female custody staff 
members upon female 
inmates.” 
**”A strip search shall be 
conducted…by custody staff of 
the same gender as the inmate 
and may include a 
scanning/testing device 
operator(s) of the same gender 
as the inmate…may be 
conducted…by…the opposite 


































New Mexico * * * * No 
*“The facility shall document 
all cross gender strip searches 
and cross gender visual body 
cavity searches and shall 
document all cross gender pat-
down searches of female 
inmates.  These types of 
searches will only be conducted 



































New York * ** *** *** Yes 
*Male Facilities - ”Pat frisks 
will be performed by Officers 
regardless of sex.  However a 
female Officer shall not 
perform a non-emergency pat 
frisk of any male Muslim 
inmate over the objection of the 
inmate if a male Officer is 
present at the location where 
the pat frisk is to be conducted 
and is available to perform the 
pat frisk.” 
**”Facilities shall not permit 
cross gender pat frisks of 
female inmates, absent exigent 
circumstances.” 
***”Strip searches or strip 
frisks shall be conducted by an 
Officer or employee of the 



































North Carolina * ** * *** No 
*”Routine (pat/frisk) and/or 
Complete (strip) searches of 
female inmates by male staff 
will only be conducted during 
an emergency situation as 
determined by the shift 
supervisor.” 
**”Routine (clothed) searches 
of male inmates may be 
conducted by correctional 
officers of either sex.” 
***”Complete (strip) searches 
of inmates will be conducted 
only by correctional officers of 
the same sex as the inmate, 
except in emergency 
circumstances as determined by 


































North Dakota No No No No No 
“Unclothed cross-gender body 
searches may not be conducted 
on male or female inmates 






Ohio ** Yes * * No 
*“The facility DOES NOT 
conducts (sic) cross-gender 
strip or cross-gender visual 
body cavity searches of 
residents.” 
**“The facility does not permit 
cross-gender pat-down searches 






































Oklahoma ** Yes * * No 
*”Pat down, frisk, strip, and 
visual body cavity searches of 
offenders…will be conducted 
by staff trained in conducting 
searches.  Strip searches and 
visual body cavity searches will 
be conducted by gender specific 
staff…except in exigent 
circumstances of when 
performed by medical 
practitioners.” 
**Cross-gender pat searches of 




































Oregon No Yes No No No 
“Cross-gender clothed searches 
of female inmates will not 
occur unless there is an 
emergency, and shall be 
documented.” 
“Except in emergencies, 
inmates undergoing unclothed 
searches will be removed to a 






Pennsylvania Yes Yes No No No 
For strip searches, “Absent 
exigent circumstances, same 
gender correctional personnel 






































Rhode Island No Yes No No No 
Refrains for conducting cross-
gender pat searches of female 








South Carolina * * ** ** No 
*”Whenever possible, staff of 
the same sex as the inmate 
should conduct frisk searches; 
however, if circumstances 
dictate otherwise, staff of the 
opposite sex are authorized to 
conduct frisk searches.” 
**”Strip searches will be 
performed by employees of the 
same sex as the person being 




































South Dakota N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
“All inmates are subject to pat 






Tennessee No Yes No No No 
“Female correctional officers 
may frisk search inmates of 
both genders.  Male 
correctional officers may frisk 
search only male inmates.  Strip 
searches will only be conducted 







Texas No Yes No No No 
“Staff shall not conduct cross-
gender strip searches or cross-
gender visual body cavity 
searches, such as a search of the 
anal or genital opening, except 
in exigent circumstances or 




































Utah      
Utah is one of two states (also 
Arkansas) that do not comply 
with PREA standards.  No 
policy was found regarding 
offender searches. 
Ramseth, 2017 
Vermont * X ** ** No 
“Inmate strip searches, inmate 
pat searches, and drug testing 
observations, will be conducted 
by staff members of the same 
birth-sex, except when exigent 
circumstances exist; such as no 
female staff is on shirt, or in an 
emergent situation when the 
search of an inmate is 
imperative to the safety and 
security of an inmate, or to the 








































Virginia No No No No No 
“Operating  Procedure 445.1 
(rev 2015):  Requires strip 
searches to be conducted by 
trained DOC employees of the 
same gender as the offender 
being searched, unless there is 
an immediate threat to the safe, 
secure, and orderly operation of 




































Washington * Yes No ** No 
“*Pat searches of female 
offenders will only be 
conducted by female 
employees/contract staff, except 
in emergent situations.” 
“Strip searches of female 
offenders will be conducted by 
female employees.” 
**“Strip searches of male 
offenders require that one of the 
employees conducting the 
search be male.  If the second 
person conducting the strip 
search is female, she will 
position herself to observe the 
employee doing the strip 
search, but will not be in direct 






































West Virginia * Yes ** Yes No 
“WVARJCFA Policy 3052, N., 
Limits to Cross-Gender 
Viewing and Searches, 
**prohibits staff from 
conducting cross gender strip 
searches and cross gender body 
cavity searches absent exigent 
circumstances…*The agency 
also prohibits cross gender pat 
down searches of females 


































Wisconsin * * ** ** No 
*”Except in exigent 
circumstances, adult facilities 
shall not permit cross-gender 
pat-down searches of female 
offenders nor shall juvenile 
facilities permit cross-gender 
pat-down searches of either 
gender.” 
**”Executive Directive 72 
Sexual Abuse and Sexual 
Harassment in Confinement 
(PREA) outlines facilities shall 
not permit-cross-gender strip or 
body cavity searches except in 
exigent circumstances or when 




































Wyoming      
“Cross-gender pat-down 
searches of male inmates by 
female…employees who have 
been trained in proper cross-
gender pat-down search 
procedures shall not be 
routinely limited…” 
Cross-gender pat-down 
searches of female inmates by 
male WDOC employees may 
be conducted by trained 
personnel if a female employee 
is not available, delay is not 
reasonable, and the search is 
conducted under the full-view 
of a security camera or video 
camera.  “Cross-gender pat-
down searches of female 
offenders may also be 
authorized during 
emergencies…”  Cross-gender 






































BOP Yes * Yes ** No 
*”Cross-gender pat searches of 
female inmates are permitted if 
exigent circumstances exist.” 
**Strip-searches – “Staff of the 
same sex as the inmate shall 
make the search, except where 
circumstances are such that 
delay would mean the likely 















U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
Holt v. Hobbs 
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) Grooming 
Arkansas offender claimed DOC 
policy prohibiting facial hair 
violated his free exercise of 
religious beliefs. 
Is it unconstitutional 
to require offenders 
to violate their 
religious beliefs in 
favor of prison 
policy?  MAYBE 
The offender had to 
choose between 
violating the policy or 
his sincerely held 
religious beliefs. 
RLUIPA applied even 
if the religious practice 
was not mandatory. 
DOC did not show the 
policy furthered 
compelling interests. 
Sossamon v. Texas 
563 U.S. 277 (2011) Assembly 
Offender claimed he was denied 
access to religious assembly and 
the chapel at the prison. 
Does RLUIPA allow 
for damages against 
an official acting in 
his or her individual 
capacity?  NO 
"States, in accepting 
federal funding, do not 
consent to waive their 
sovereign immunity to 







Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
Beard v. Banks 
548 U.S. 521 (2006) Property 
Long-term segregation offenders 
claimed policy denying 
newspapers, magazines, and 
photographs violated the First 
Amendment. 
Does the denial of 
materials to 






No.  The policy met 
the Turner v. Safley 
test, and the district 
court had not deferred 
enough to the prison 
officials' expertise. 
Cutter v. Wilkinson  
544 U.S. 709 (2005) RLUIPA Challenge 
Offenders claimed RLUIPA 
violated the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause by giving 
greater protection to religious 





Clause of the First 
Amend.?  NO 
RLUIPA is 
constitutional and does 
not violate the 
Establishment Clause 




494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
Religious Exercise 
Plaintiffs were fired after the use 
of peyote for sacramental 
purposes and claimed a violation 
of religious freedom. 
Is a state law 
criminalizing the use 




Rational basis scrutiny 
is used when the 
burden is due to a 
neutral and generally 
applicable law.  Strict 
scrutiny is used if the 
law burdens specific 





Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
O’Lone v. Shabazz  
482 U.S. 342 (1987) Religious Exercise 
Muslim offenders working 
offsite were not allowed to leave 
work and return to the prison for 
Jumu’ah. 
Is a regulation 
prohibiting 
offenders to leave 
work in order to 




A prisoner's right to 
free exercise may be 
infringed upon if the 
infringement relates to 
a legitimate 
penological interest. 
Turner v. Safley 
482 U.S. 78 (1987) Religious Exercise 
Offenders were not allowed to 
correspond with offenders in 
other prisons except under 





other offenders as 
well as restrictions 




A prison regulation 
that infringes on a 
prisoner's 
constitutional right is 
acceptable if it is 
reasonably related to 
legitimate penological 
interests. 
Bell v. Wolfish 
441 U.S. 520 (1979) Property 
Pretrial detainees claimed 
conditions of confinement were 
tantamount to punishment 
without due process 
Is a jail regulation 
prohibiting 





regulation showed a 
rational basis. 
Goulden v. Oliver 





Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' 
Union 
433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
Assembly 
The warden forbade offenders 
from engaging in union 
activities, and halted delivery of 
union-related materials to 
offenders. 
Is it unconstitutional 
to ban offenders 
from soliciting other 
offenders to join the 
union or sending 
literature through the 
mail for such 
solicitation? NO 
Prison officials' 
concern about any 
potential security risk 
arising from the 
activities of the 
prisoners' union were 
reasonable. The 
regulations were least 
restrictive means to 
ensure security. 
Pell v. Procunier 
417 U.S. 817 (1974) Religious Exercise 
Offenders brought suit over 
regulation, “press and other 
media interviews with specific 
individual inmates will not be 
permitted.” 






Internal security is the 
single most important 
objective of the prison 
system and regulations 
may be upheld if 
offenders have 
alternate means to 





Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
Procunier v. Martinez 
416 U.S. 396 (1974) Religious Exercise 
Offenders claimed censorship 
regulations for mail were 
unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment 
Is a rule restricting 
personal 
correspondence and 
screening of mail 
unconstitutional?  
NO 
Regulation of First 
Amendment freedoms 
must further an 
important 
governmental interest 
and should be least 
restrictive means to 
protect that interest. 
Cooper v. Pate 
378 U.S. 546 (1964) Property 
Offender claimed he was denied 
religious publications and 
privileges allowed other 
offenders because of his 
religious beliefs. 
Is it unconstitutional 
for an offender to be 
denied the right to 
purchase religious 
publications when 
other offenders were 
allowed to purchase 
them?  YES 
Denial for offender to 
purchase religious 
publications was a 
cause of action. 
Signaled ending of 
hands-off doctrine 
although no standard 
of review was 
promulgated. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) Religious Exercise 
Amish and Mennonite parents 
claimed the law requiring their 
children to attend school until 16 
years of age infringed on their 
First Amendment rights. 
Is a regulation that is 
neutral on its face, 
unconstitutional if it 
unduly burdens the 
free exercise of 
religion?  YES 
Only interests of 
highest order justify 






Title of U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Category Facts Issue Holding 
Cruz v. Beto 
405 U.S 319 (1972) Religious Exercise 
Buddhist offenders claimed the 
prison system did not allow 
them to use the prison chapel, 
and were discriminated against 
because of their religious beliefs. 
Does an offender 
have a constitutional 





right against the 
denial of privileges 
given to other 
offenders for 
religious exercise?  
YES 
If other offenders are 
given opportunities to 
practice their religious, 
the State cannot deny 
an offender a 
reasonable opportunity 
to pursue his faith. 
Sherbert v. Verner 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
Religious Exercise 
Employee declined to work on 
Sundays because of her religious 
beliefs.  She was subsequently 
fired.  When she applied for 
unemployment compensation, 
she was denied because her 
religious restriction disqualified 
her. 
Is a requirement for 
an employee to 
choose between her 
job and her religious 
practice 
constitutional?  NO 
Any neutral, general 
laws that burden 
religious exercise are 







U.S Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious property accommodations since passage of RLUIPA (2000) 
Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Butts v. Martin 
877 F.3d 571 (2017) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed he 
was forced to choose 
between eating his meal 
and wearing his 
yarmulke. 
Does the color of the 
yarmulke matter? 
No.  This case is 
ridiculous. 
Knowles v. Pfister 
829 F.3d 516 (2016) Seventh Circuit 
The state contended that 
the five pointed star 
could be used as a gang 
symbol and would not 
allow the offender to 
keep it.  He filed for an 
injunction. 
Is the wearing of such a 
medallion only one 
facet of their religion, 
not to be considered as 
a substantial burden?  
NO 
The court reversed and 
instructed the district 
court to grant the 
preliminary injunction. 
Davis v. Davis 
826 F.3d 258 (2016) Fifth Circuit 
Offender brought suit 
alleging violation of 
RLUIPA and First 
Amendment with the 
prohibition against 
wearing his medicine 
bag to and from his cell. 
Does a policy against 
allowing medicine bags 
to and from their cells 
violate RLUIPA and the 
First Amendment?  NO 
Offenders did not 
adequately brief the 







Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Ali v. Stephens 
822 F.3d 776 (2016) Fifth Circuit 
Muslim offender 
claimed his free 
exercise was burdened 
by prohibition against 
wearing kufi and 4" 
beard. 
Does the policy 
prohibiting a 4" beard 
and wearing a kufi at all 
times violate RLUIPA?  
YES 
The prison did not show 
that the policies were in 
the government's 
compelling interest or 
that they were the least 
restrictive means. 
Schlemm v. Wall 
784 F.3d 362 (2015) Seventh Circuit 
Navajo offender wanted 
to wear a multi-colored 
headband for worship.  
The DOC only allows 
white or black 
headbands 
Does the policy 
regarding headbands 
violate the offender's 
free exercise?  YES 
The DOC did not show 
that it was the least 
restrictive means.  They 
did not show that the 
accommodation would 
cause a problem with 
gang identification 
when the offender 
offered to wear it only 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Davila v. Gladden 
777 F.3d 1198 (2015) Eleventh Circuit 
Inmate, a Santerian 
priest, brought suit that 
necklace and shells had 
been denied him, 
violating RFRA and the 
First Amendment. 
Does refusing the 
possession of specific 
"infused" necklace and 
shells violate RFRA and 
the First Amendment?  
MAYBE and NO 
The court reversed and 
remanded on the lower 
court's ruling of 
summary judgment for 
injunctive relief.  The 
offender's beliefs were 
substantially burdened; 
were not shown to be in 
furtherance of a 
compelling gov't 
interest; and were not 
shown to be the least 
restrictive alternative.  
RFRA does not 
authorize suits for 
monetary damages for 
officers in their official 
capacity. Summary 
judgment for First 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Chance v. TDCJ 
730 F.3d 404 (2013) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed 




smoking and possession 
of a deceased relatives' 
lock of hair. 
Is the denial of the lock 
of hair a substantial 
burden on the offender's 
free exercise of 
religion? 
YES.  The offender had 
asserted that the 
practice was a central 
tenet of his faith (e.g., 
the Keeping of Souls 
ritual). 
Kaufman v. Pugh 
733 F.3d 692 (2013) Seventh Circuit 
Offender wanted to 
wear a "knowledge 
thought ring" and also 
have the library make 
available the books on 
atheism books he 
donated. 
Is the denial of the 
property a violation of 
the offender's free 
exercise?  NO 
The denial of the ring 
was not a substantial 
burden on the offender's 
free exercise and was 
reasonably justified by 
security reasons.  The 
three books were lost 
and there was no 
indication that they 
were lost purposefully 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
McFaul v. Valenzuela  
684 F.3d 564 (2012) Fifth Circuit 
Celtic Druid offender 
was denied a medallion 
that cost more than 
policy allowed. 
Does prohibition on 
nonconforming property 
violate free exercise?  
NO 
Policy for uniformity in 
property is a legitimate 
concern. Offender did 
not show: a lack of 
alternatives; policy was 
not equally applied; and 
that the burdens on his 
free exercise were 
substantial. 
Kendrick v. Pope 
671 F.3d 686 (2012) Eighth Circuit 
The offender's rosary 
beads, Bible, and other 
religious items were 
confiscated and never 
returned. 
Did the offender 
exhaust her 
administrative 
remedies?  YES 
Remanded because the 
court ruled the offender 
had exhausted her 
administrative remedies. 
Florer v. Congregation 
Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A.  
639 F.3d 916 (2011) 
603 F.3d 1118 (2010) 
Ninth Circuit 
Contract chaplains 
denied property to 
Wash. offender as they 
did not consider him as 
Jewish. 
Can contract agents 
substantially burden 
religious exercise 
through a religious 
sincerity decision? NO 
The decision about the 
offender’s religious 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
DeMoss v. Crain  
636 F.3d 145 (2011) Fifth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
the policy prohibiting 
the carrying of a pocket-
sized Bible or Qur’an 
during medical appts, 
work, and recreation 
was a violation of 
RLUIPA. 
Does a policy limiting 
access to religious texts 
during activities violate 
RLUIPA?  NO 
The offender did not 
show that the policy 
limiting access was a 
substantial burden to his 
religious practice 
Colvin v. Caruso 
605 F.3d 282 (2010) Sixth Circuit 
Jewish offender was 
mistakenly believed to 
be Muslim and not 
given kosher meals for 
16 days.  When the 
error was discovered, 
there were still 
occasions when he was 
accidentally given non-
kosher food.  Offender 
also brought suit against 
lack of Jewish services 
and books in the library. 
Does prison's dearth of 
Jewish books violate the 
offender's constitutional 
rights? 
NO.  The offender did 
not show the prison was 
required to have a 
certain number of books 
and he was not deprived 
of receiving them 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Jova v. Smith 
582 F.3d 410 (2009) Second Circuit 
Offenders' "Holy 
Blackness" book was 




Does the policy against 
proselytizing violate the 
offenders' free exercise 
by not allowing them to 
have personal 
possession of the "Holy 
Blackness" book?  NO 
Offenders are allowed 
access to the book by 
submitting a request to 
the chaplain. 
Van Wyhe v. Reisch  




RLUIPA, and denial of 
request for tape player. 
Is RLUIPA 
constitutional under the 
Spending Clause?  YES 
Does a state waive its 
11th Amend. immunity 
for monetary damages 
by accepting federal 
funds under RLUIPA?  
NO 
Does denial of tape 
player significantly 
burden free exercise?  
NO 
RLUIPA is 
constitutional.  The 
offenders were not 
substantially burdened 
in their free exercise.  






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Iqbal v. Hasty 
490 F.3d 143 (2008) 
556 U.S. 662 (2009) 
Second Circuit 
Detained immediately 
post 9/11, plaintiff 
alleged his Koran was 
routinely confiscated. 
Were defendants 
entitled to qualified 
immunity due to failure 
to state a claim and 
because defendants 
claimed no personal 
involvement?  NO 
The Second Circuit held 
that the defendants were 
not entitled to qualified 
immunity. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that 
conclusory allegations 
that government 
officials knew of 
actions taken by 
subordinates could not 
be a basis for unlawful 
discrimination claim. 
Second Circuit noted, 
“…the repeated 
confiscation of his 
Koran shows that he 
was at least permitted to 
have a Koran need no 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Rasul v. Myers  
512 F.3d 644 (2008) 
555 U.S. 1083 (2008) 
563 F.3d 527 (2009) 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
British nationals 
detained at Guantanamo 
Bay alleged “forced 
shaving of their beards, 
banning or interrupting 
their prayers, denying 
them copies of the 
Koran and prayer mats 
and throwing a copy of 
the Koran in a toilet 
bucket” (512 F.3d 644, 
p. 650). 
Are non-citizen 
detainees protected by 
RFRA?  NO 
SCOTUS vacated and 
remanded in light to 
decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008).  D.C. Circuit 
held that non-citizen 
detainees were not 
subject to protections of 
RFRA. 
Fowler v. Crawford  
534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 
2008) 
Eighth Circuit 
The offender brought 
suit over refusal to 
allow access to a sweat 
lodge.  The state refused 
on the basis that the 
ceremony would 
include access to 
property such as rocks, 
willow poles, shovels, 
deer antlers, and split 
wood, which could be 
used as weapons. 
Does an offender have a 
right under RLUIPA to 
exercise his Native 
American religious 
beliefs through sweat 
lodge ceremonies with 
other offenders at the 
maximum security 
prison?  NO 
Prohibition of sweat 
lodge met a compelling 
governmental interest 
and was the least 
restrictive means to 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Mark v. Gustafson 
286 Fed. Appx. 309 
(2008) 
Seventh Circuit 
Offender claimed the 
state violated his 
religious rights by 
breaking seals he had 
placed on his cell doors. 
May a prison system 
implement a neutral 
policy if it is not 
designed to interfere 
with religious practice?  
YES 
The offender did not 
show the seals had 
religious meaning to 
him and the State 
showed legitimate 
reasons for not allowing 
offenders to place items 
on cell walls or doors. 
Mayfield v. TDCJ 
529 F.3d. 599 (2008) Fifth Circuit 
Odinists offenders were 
prohibited from 
possessing runestones 
and access to rune 
literature in the library 
was limited.  The state 
argued the stones could 
be used for gambling, 
and gang activity.  The 
stones could be used 
when the volunteer 
Odinist was present. 
Does the prohibition of 
possession of 
runestones violate the 
First Amendment right 
to free exercise?  NO 
• Possession of 
runestones could be 
prohibited as it was 
reasonably related to 
compelling 
penological interests.  
During the course of 
the suit, a pilot 
program allowing 
limited access to 
runestones was 
planned. 
• The state did not 
show that banning 
rune-related literature 
from the prison 
library was the least 
restrictive means of 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Alvarez v. Hill 
518 F. 3d 1152 (2008) Ninth Circuit 
Offender claimed 
violation of Bill of 
Rights by not allowing 
use of tobacco for 
Native American 
ceremonies and not 
allowing headbands. 
Does the failure of the 
inmate to invoke 
RLUIPA vanquish its 
use in this suit? 
No.  The facts of the 
case establish "a 
‘plausible’ entitlement 
to relief under 
RLUIPA” (p. 1157). 
Smith v. Allen 
502 F.3d 1255 (2007) Eleventh Circuit 
Odinist offender 
requested the use of 
quartz crystal and a fire 
pit. 
Does RLUIPA require a 
religious practice to 
substantially burden the 
offender?  YES 
Although the offender 
was released prior to the 
case, the offender was 
reincarcerated and 
bound by the same 
decisions -- so the claim 
was not moot.  However 
the offender did not 
show the denials 
substantially burdened 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Washington v. Klem 
497 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 
2007) 
Third Circuit 
Offender was only 
allowed to have 10 
books at a time, and 
claimed it hindered his 
religious freedom.  The 
state argued the policy 
was necessary for 
“security, hygiene, and 
safety reasons.” 
Does a policy which 
permits only 10 books 
to be allowed in an 
offender’s possession at 
one time violate an 
offender’s rights under 
RLUIPA if the offender 
belonged to religion that 
required him to read 
four books per day?  
YES 
A substantial burden 
exists when an offender 
is required to choose 
between practicing his 
religious beliefs or 
giving up access to 
privileges available to 
other offenders who do 
not practice that 
religious belief. 
Boles v. Neet 
486 F.3d 1177 (2007) Tenth Circuit 
The offender was not 
allowed to wear his 
yarmulke and tallit 
katan when leaving the 
facility. 
Does a restriction on 
wearing religious items 
when leaving a prison 




right to wear yarmulke 
and tallit katan during 
transport to hospital was 
a substantial burden on 
sincerely held religious 
beliefs as the state did 
not show the regulation 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Borzych v. Frank 
439 F.3d 388 (2006) Seventh Circuit 
Odinist offender was 
not allowed to have 
books he claimed were 
necessary to practice his 
religion. 
Does a policy 
forbidding publications 
"advocat(ing) racial or 
ethnic supremacy" 
violate RLUIPA? 
No.  Although it does 
burden the offender's 
free exercise, the 
prison's mission for 
order gives it a 
compelling interest to 
enforce the policy. 
Neal v. Lewis 
414 F.3d 1244 (2005) Tenth Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
First Amendment rights 
were violated by 
limiting the number of 
books he could keep in 
his cell. 
Is the policy limiting 
religious property a 
violation of the First 
Amendment?  NO 
The limitation of 
amount of property did 
not substantially burden 
the offender's religious 




regarding fire safety, 
institutional security, 
control of contraband, 
and behavior-incentives. 
Benning v. GA 
391 F.3d 1299 (2004) Eleventh Circuit 
Jewish offender brought 
suit that he was not 
allowed to constantly 
wear a yarmulke, eat 
only kosher foods, and 
observe holy days and 
rituals. 
Does RLUIPA violate 
the Establishment 
Clause or the Tenth 
Amendment?  NO 
Congress did not 
overstep its powers by 
predicating receipt of 
federal funds on 





Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Lindell v. McCallum 
352 F.3d 1107 (2003) Seventh Circuit 
The offender alleged 
prison did not make 
Wotanist literature and 
videos available to 
offenders although other 
religions were allowed 
access to materials. 
Does refusal to make 
available materials 
because of failure to 
recognize a religion 
violate Constitutional 
rights? YES 
The court may find 
there is a legitimate 
penological interest in 
not recognizing a white 
supremacy organization 
but no evidence of this 
was brought by the 
DOC. 
Charles v. Verhagen 
348 F.3d 601 (2003) Seventh Circuit 
Practicing Muslim 
offender sued under 
RLUIPA for rule 
prohibiting allowance of 
prayer oil. 
Does RLUIPA violate 
the Spending and 
Commerce Clause, the 
10th Amendment, and 
the Establishment 
Clause?  NO 
Denial of prayer oil 
violated RLUIPA but 
did not violate the First 
Amendment. State had 
legitimate interest in 
denying but did not 
show that doing so was 
the least restrictive 
means. 
Sutton v. Rasheed 
323 F.3d 236 (2003) Third Circuit 
Nation of Islam 
offenders were not 
allowed to have their 
religious texts in the 
unit for high-risk 
offenders. 
Did the policy limiting 
the religious texts meet 
the Turner test?  NO 
Although the state did 
not show they met the 
Turner test, their 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Tarpley v. Allen County, 
Indiana 
312 F.3d 895 (2002) 
Seventh Circuit 
Offender's Bible was 
taken and another Bible 
given to him.  He 
claimed the new Bible 
did not have the study 
materials he needed. 
Was the provision of an 
alternative Bible the 
least restrictive means 
of meeting a compelling 





Dunlap v. Losey 
40 Fed. Appx. 41 
(2002) 
Sixth Circuit 
The offender was 
required to put his 
hardcover Bibles in 
storage for one month, 




hardcover Bible violate 
RLUIPA if softcover 
Bibles are available?  
NO 
The prisoner’s rights 
were not substantially 
burdened as the 
deprivation was 
temporary and he did 
not show why a 
softcover Bible would 
not be sufficient. 
Walker v. Maschner 
270 F.3d 573 (2001) Eighth Circuit 
African Hebrew 
Israelite offender 
claimed he was not 
allowed to attend 
Jewish services or 
possess Jewish religious 
items. 
Does an offender's Free 
Exercise claim prevail if 
administrative remedies 
have not been 
exhausted? NO 
The offender admitted 






Title of Property Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Morrison v. Garraghty 
239 F. 3d 648 (2001) Fourth Circuit 
Offender claimed 
violation of Equal 
Protection. He was not 
allowed Native 
American religious 
items because he was 
not Native American. 
Should non-Native 
Americans be allowed 
Native American 
religious items?  YES 
State did not prove that 
items were more 
dangerous in the hands 
of a non-Native 






U.S. Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious assembly accommodations since passage of RLUIPA (2000) 
Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Florer v. Congregation 
Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A.  
603 F.3d 1118 (2018) 
639 F.3d 916 (2011) 
Ninth Circuit 
Contract chaplains 
denied a visit with a 
rabbi to a Wash. 
offender as they did not 
consider him Jewish. 
Can contract agents 
substantially burden 
religious exercise 
through a religious 
sincerity decision? NO 
The decision about the 
offender’s religious 
status was religious, not 
penological. 
Kemp v. Liebel 
2017 WL 6273825 
(2017) 
Seventh Circuit 
Offenders sued over 
transfer to maintain 
kosher diet but before 
group services were 
available at the new 
facility. 
Is it a constitutional 
violation to not have 
assembly services 
available?  NO 
At the time of the 
transfer, there was no 
constitutional right 
established to assemble 
and study without 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Davis v. Davis 
826 F.3d 258 (2016) Fifth Circuit 
Offender brought suit 
alleging violation of 
RLUIPA and First 
Amendment with the 
prohibition against the 
pipe ceremony 
participation.  In 
Chance v. TDCJ (2013), 
the court ruled that 
offenders did not have 
to be allowed a personal 
peace pipe, avoiding 
contracting diseases by 
sharing pipes.  TDCJ 
responded by having the 
Native American 
chaplain symbolically 
smoke for the assembly. 
Does a policy against 
allowing individual 
peace pipes violate 
RLUIPA and the First 
Amendment?  NO 
Logistics, health, and 
security concerns 
outweigh the burden on 
religious 
accommodations. 
Haight v. Thompson 
763 F.3d 554 (2014) Sixth Circuit 
Two groups of death 
row offenders filed suit 
that their rights were 
violated by denial of 
access to a sweat lodge.  
The offenders offered to 
pay for the sweat lodge. 
"Is there a triable issue 
of fact over whether 
RLUIPA gives the 
inmates a right to have 
access to a sweat lodge 
for faith-based 
ceremonies?" (p. 558)  
YES 
Remanded for 
consideration of a 
promised policy study 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Chance v. TDCJ 
730 F.3d 404 (2013) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed 




smoking and possession 
of a deceased relative’s 
lock of hair. 
Does policy disallowing 
communal pipe 
ceremony for health and 
safety reasons violate 
RLUIPA? 
NO.  The prison system 
could not find a way to 
ensure that the use of 
the pipe by multiple 
people would not spread 
infectious disease. 
Kaufman v. Pugh 
733 F.3d 692 (2013) Seventh Circuit 
Offender wanted to start 
a new group to study 
atheism and was denied. 
Is the denial of 
permission to form a 
religious group a 
violation of the 
offender's religious 
rights?  NO 
Only two members had 
an interest in the group 
and there was a 
legitimate penological 
purpose in denying the 
use of resources. 
Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't 
of Corr. & Rehab.  
707 F.3d 1114 (2013) 
Ninth Circuit 
Offenders claimed 
failure to hire full-time 
Wicca chaplain 
hindered their free 
exercise of religion.  
They claimed more 
practicing Wiccan 
offenders at prison than 
practicing Jewish, 
Muslim, or Catholic 
inmates. 
Does failure to provide 
a paid, full-time 
chaplain for their faith 
burden the offenders’ 
free exercise of 
religious beliefs?  NO 
Offenders did not show 
that the use of volunteer 
Wiccan chaplain 
infringed on their free 
exercise.  Prisons are 
not required to provide 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Sisney v. Reisch 
674 F.3d 839 (2012) Eighth Circuit 
Offender was denied 
permission to eat his 
Succoth meal in a 
succah in a recreation 
yard and sued for 
compensatory damages. 
Was denial of a succah 
a violation of the 
offender’s constitutional 
rights?  NO 
The PLRA does not 
allow compensatory 
damages if physical 
injury did not result.  It 
was not clear that use of 
a succah was a 
“reasonable dietary and 
meal accommodation” 
(p. 19). 
McCollum v. Cal. Dep't 
of Corr. & Rehab.  
647 F.3d 870 (2011) 
Ninth Circuit 
Offenders and volunteer 
Wiccan chaplain 
claimed their religious 
accommodations were 
denied because five 
other faiths had paid 
chaplains and Wiccan 
offenders only had a 
volunteer chaplain. 
Does failure to provide 
a paid, full-time 
chaplain for their faith 
burden the offenders’ 
free exercise of 
religious beliefs?  NO 
May a third-party who 
is not incarcerated seek 
relief under RLUIPA?  
NO 
Offenders did not show 
that the use of volunteer 
Wiccan chaplain 
infringed on their free 
exercise.  Prisons are 
not required to provide 
a paid, full-time 
chaplain.  Chaplain’s 
claim under RLUIPA 
was dismissed because 





Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
DeMoss v. Crain  
636 F.3d 145 (2011) Fifth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
the policy of recording 
Muslim services was 
discriminatory in that it 
was not required of 
other faiths. Muslim 
services were allowed 
without a volunteer or 
staff present. 
Is the taping of Muslim 
services a substantial 
burden to offenders’ 
religious exercise?  NO 
The policy ensured 
security (that the service 
was held, that it did not 
promote violence, that 
other faiths were not 
disparaged), and was 
not a substantial burden 
to religious exercise. 
Colvin v. Caruso 
605 F.3d 282 (2010) Sixth Circuit 
Jewish offender was 
mistakenly believed to 
be Muslim and not 
given kosher meals for 
16 days.  When the 
error was discovered, 
there were still 
occasions when he was 
accidentally given non-
kosher food.  Offender 
also brought suit against 
lack of Jewish services 
and books in the library. 
Does a policy requiring 
a certain level of 
offenders' interest 
before allowing group 
services violate free 
exercise?  NO 
The state has a 
legitimate governmental 
interest in committing 
its resources to those 
faiths which have the 
most offender interest.  
The offender was not 
prohibited from 
practicing his religious 





Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Little v. Jones 
605 F.3d 282 
(2010) 
Sixth Circuit 
Offender sued over lack 
of Jewish Services 
Is the lack of Jewish 
services a violation of 
the offender’s 
Constitutional rights?  
NO 
The offender was the 
only one at the unit who 
requested them and it 
was not in legitimate 
penological interest to 
use the resources for 
just one offender 
Van Wyhe v. Reisch  




RLUIPA, and denial of 
request for more 
assembly and language 
study time.  Offenders 
requested a succah for 
religious ceremony. 
Is RLUIPA 
constitutional under the 
Spending Clause?  YES 
Does a state waive its 
11th Amend. immunity 
for monetary damages 
by accepting federal 
funds under RLUIPA?  
NO 
Does denial of 
additional assembly 
significantly burden free 
exercise?  NO 
RLUIPA is 
constitutional.  The 
offenders were not 
substantially burdened 
in their free exercise.  
The state was entitled to 
summary judgement. 
Gladson v. Iowa DOC 
551 F.3d 825 (2009) Eighth Circuit 
Wiccan offenders sued 
over limitation of 
Samhain observation, 
specifically time 
allotted and food 
permitted. 
Is the limitation of time 
or food a violation of 
the offenders' First 
Amendment rights?  
NO 
The offenders did not 
show that the policy 
substantially burdened 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Iqbal v. Hasty 
490 F.3d 143 (2008) 
556 U.S. 662 (2009) 
Second Circuit 
Detained immediately 
post 9/11, plaintiff 
alleged he was not 
allowed to attend Friday 
night prayers. 
Were defendants 
entitled to qualified 
immunity due to failure 
to state a claim and 
because defendants 
claimed no personal 
involvement?  NO 
The Second Circuit held 
that the defendants were 
not entitled to qualified 
immunity,  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that 
conclusory allegations 
that government 
officials knew of 
actions taken by 
subordinates could not 
be a basis for unlawful 
discrimination claim.  
Mayfield v. Tex. Dep't 
of Crim. Justice  
529 F.3d 599 (2008) 
Fifth Circuit 
Odinists offenders were 
not allowed to meet 
without an outside, 
security-trained, 
religious volunteer.  The 
only one available lived 
far away and was 
unable to be present for 
regular services.  
Offenders were denied 
request to meet under 
the supervision of 
prison security. 
Does the policy 
requiring a volunteer be 
present during religious 
assembly violate 
RLUIPA?  YES 
Muslim and Native 
American religious 
groups were allowed to 
meet without outside 
volunteers.  The policy 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Alvarez v. Hill 
518 F.3d 1152 (2008) Ninth Circuit 
Offender requested 
order requiring the 
hiring of a Native 
American Spiritual 
Leader, and to allow 
pipe ceremonies, drums, 
and the use of a weekly 
sweat lodge. 
Does the failure of the 
inmate to invoke 
RLUIPA vanquish its 
use in this suit? 
No.  The facts of the 
case establish "a 
‘plausible’ entitlement 
to relief under 
RLUIPA” (p. 1157). 
Greene v. Solano 
County Jail 
513 F.3d 982 (2008) 
Ninth Circuit 
Maximum security 
detainee claimed his 
religious freedom was 
substantially burdened 
by prohibition against 
assembly. 
Must a prison or jail 
show they have 
considered less 
restrictive measures 
before adopting a policy 
that infringes on a 
religious exercise right?  
YES 
The jail did not show 
that the policy was the 
least restrictive means 
to achieve a legitimate 
penological interest.  
Remanded to lower 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Baranowski v. Hart  
486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 
2007) 
Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed that 
Jewish offenders were 
treated less favorably 
than other religions and 
that religious services 
were not provided on a 
weekly basis to Jewish 
offenders. 
Was the denial of 
weekly Jewish religious 
services as well as other 
holy day services along 
with failure to provide 
kosher diet a violation 
under the First and 
Fourteenth Amend. and 
RLUIPA?  NO 
•Offender had 
alternative means for 
religious expression; no 
rabbi was available for 
days requested by 
offender for service. 
•Dietary 
accommodations not 
required if they would 
cause undue costs and 
admin. burden on State 
and no kosher meals 
were least restrictive 
means of obtaining 
legitimate gov't interest. 
•Overall policy on 
religious services did 
not substantially burden 





Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Spratt v. Rhode Island 
Dep’t of Corrections 
482 F.3d 33 (2007) 
Fifth Circuit 
For seven years, 
Universal Life Church 
offender was allowed to 
preach in the chapel.  
New warden prohibited 
him from continuing 
preaching with the 
threat of disciplinary 
action if he continued to 
do so. 
Did the change in policy 
which no longer 
allowed an offender to 
preach violate his rights 
under RLUIPA?  YES 
The State did not show 
the compelling 
government interest in 
prison security was 
furthered by prohibiting 
offenders from 
preaching or even that 
the prohibition would 
have been the least 
restrictive means 
available. 
Lovelace v. Lee  
472 F.3d 174 (2006) Fourth Circuit 
Offender was removed 
from list of offenders 
allowed to observe 
Ramadan and attend 
services.  An officer 
“erroneously” identified 
the offender as breaking 
the fast by accepting a 
lunch tray.  The officer 
admitted he made a 
mistake.   
Was the Ramadan 
policy the least 
restrictive means of 
achieving a legitimate 
gov’t interest?  NO 
The state did not show 
that the policy was the 
least restrictive means.  
The offender’s free 
exercise was 
substantially burdened. 
“A reasonable factfinder 









Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Salahuddin v. Goord 
467 F.3d 263 (2006) Second Circuit 
"•  Offender claimed 
Sunni Muslims had to 
worship with Shi'ite 
Muslims 
•  Offender claimed he 
was not allowed to 
attend services or eat 
holiday meals while in 
keeplock for assaulting 
another inmate 
•  The offender claimed 
the facility would not 
provide a Muslim 
chaplain and no Quran 
was kept in the library 
•  Offender claimed he 
was not allowed to 
bring legal mail into 
religious assembly 
•  Offender claimed he 
was forced to choose 
between attending 
religious services and 
going to the law 
library." 
Did the DOC's policies 
substantially burden the 
offender's free exercise 
of his religious beliefs?   
"•  The offender's free 
exercise was 
substantially burdened 
and was not ""justified 





•  Again, the DOC did 
not show the policy was 
justified. 
•  The DOC's attorneys 
did not request 
summary judgment for 
the Qur'an/chaplain 
allegation. 
•  The offender's free 
exercise was not shown 
to be substantially 
burdened regarding the 
legal mail, therefore 
summary judgment was 
affirmed. 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Kaufman v. 
McCaughtry 
419 F.3d 678 (2005) 
Seventh Circuit 
Offender wanted to start 
a new group to study 
atheism and was denied. 
Is classifying the study 
of atheism as an activity 
instead of a religious 
group, a violation of the 
offender's religious 
rights?  YES 
The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled atheism "as 
equivalent to a 'religion' 
for purposes of the First 
Amendment on 
numerous occasions." 
Adkins v. Kaspar  
393 F.3d 559 (2004) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
Yahweh Evangelical 
Assembly free exercise 
was hindered because 
officials would not let 
followers observe holy 
days or allow assembly 
without a trained 
volunteer. 
Does prohibition of 
assembly without a 
trained volunteer 
substantially burden the 
offenders’ religious 
exercise?  NO 
The state allowed 
sufficient alternative 
means for the followers 
to practice their 
religious beliefs. 
Shakur v. Selsky 
391 F.3d 106 (2004) Second Circuit 
The district court held 
that denial of a single 
religious festival meal 
was not a substantial 
burden on the 
offender’s religious 
exercise.  The claim 
was dismissed. 
Is the denial to attend 
the Muslim holiday Eid 
Ul Fitr a legitimate 
claim under an 
offender’s First Amend. 
and RLUIPA rights?  
YES 
The court remanded the 
case to the district court 
for further proceedings 
in regards to the 
offender’s First Amend. 
and RLUIPA 
allegations.  Claims 
regarding due process 






Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Freeman v. Tex. Dep't 
of Crim. Justice  
369 F.3d 854 (2004) 
Fifth Circuit 
Church of Christ 
offenders protested 
being lumped as 
“Christian/Non-
Catholic.”   
Is use of five “major 
faith sub-groups” (p. 
859) unconstitutional?  
NO 
Offenders were treated 
the same as similarly-
situated offenders.  
Policy was reasonably 
related to penological 
mission and was 
neutral. 
Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of 
Corr. 




religion was only 
allowed to be practiced 
individually.  Access to 
religious television 
programming was 
denied as well as a 
religious publication. 
Was the policy that 
prohibited assembly, 
access to television 
programming and 
religious publication 
due to the white 
supremacy beliefs of the 
faith a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause 
and RLUIPA? NO for 
the Equal Protection 
Clause and YES for 
RLUIPA 
The State's allegations 
of violence: 
•Were enough to meet 
the rational basis review 
of the Equal Protection 
Clause for group 
meetings; 
•Television 
programming was not 




publication were not 
enough to meet the 
strict scrutiny review of 
the RLUIPA. 
The offender’s claims 





Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Goff v. Graves 
362 F.3d 543 (2004) Eighth Circuit 
Offenders sued over 
denial of prison officials 
to recognize their 
church as a religion.  
CONS had been ruled a 
religion in THE 8th 
Circuit, but deemed a 
"masquerade" in Texas. 
Is CONS a religion?  
YES 
Precedent of 8th Circuit 
(Remmers v. Brewer, 
494 F.2d 1277[8th Cir., 
1974]) stood. 
Ford v. McGinnis 
352 F.3d 582 (2003) Second Circuit 
Muslim offender 
claimed he was denied 
the opportunity to 
celebrate the end of 
Ramadan. 
Were the offender's 
religious beliefs 
substantially burdened 
by the policy?  YES 
Vacated and remanded 
to ascertain whether the 
prison officials' policies 
were reasonably related 
to legitimate 
penological purposes. 
Levitan v. Ashcroft  
281 F.3d 1313 (2002) 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
Offenders brought suit 
over denial of 
communion wine. 
Is the refusal to allow 
communion wine a 
substantial burden on 
offender’s First 
Amendment rights?  
NO 




Turner/O’Lone test.  
The partaking of wine 
was not mandatory in 







Title of Assembly Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Walker v. Maschner 
270 F.3d 573 (2001) Eighth Circuit 
African Hebrew 
Israelite offender 
claimed he was not 
allowed to attend 
Jewish services or 
possess Jewish religious 
items. 
Does an offender's Free 
Exercise claim prevail if 
administrative remedies 
have not been 
exhausted? NO 
The offender admitted 







U.S. Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious dietary accommodations since passage of RLUIPA (2000) 
Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
U.S. v. Secretary of 
Florida Dep’t of 
Corrections 
828 F.3d 1341 (2016) 
778 F.3d 1223 (2015) 
Eleventh Circuit 
State claimed provision 
of kosher meals was 
prohibitively expensive.  
Offenders sued. 
Does the denial of 
kosher meals meet a 
compelling gov't 
interest and is it the 
least restrictive means 
of doing so?  NO 
Along with not meeting 
the Turner test, the state 
failed to show why 
other states and the 
BOP provided kosher 
meals and they could 
not.  They also failed to 
show why kosher was 
difficult when they 
provided vegan, 
medical, and therapeutic 
diets. 
Thompson v. Holm 
809 F.3d 376 (2016) Seventh Circuit 
Muslim offender was 
denied meal bags during 
part of Ramadan.  State 
claimed he had violated 
policy and was thus 
denied the bags. 
If the facts are disputed 
and decided in the most 
favorable light to the 
non-moving party, did 
the state infringe on the 
offender's RLUIPA 
rights?  YES 
The state "intentionally 
and unjustifiably forced 
this burdensome 
choice" on the offender, 
causing him to choose 
between his religious 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Jones v. Williams 
791 F.3d 1023 (2015) Ninth Circuit 
Offender alleged he was 
served pork in a pie, 
contrary to his religious 
beliefs.  He also alleged 
he was required to cook 
pork in his job.  The 
method of cleaning 
grills did not ensure that 
pork grease was 
removed. 
Does the insertion of 
pork into food 
unknowingly violate the 
offender's rights?  NOT 
DECIDED   
Does the requirement to 
cook pork violate the 
offender's rights?  YES  
Does the grill cleaning 
method violate the 
offender's rights?  NO 
The allegation that pork 
was in a pie was 
hearsay and summary 
judgment awarded to 
the DOC.  The DOC 
violated the offender's 
rights when the required 
him to cook pork.  The 
claim regarding the grill 
cleaning was denied, 
with the court affirming 
summary judgment in 
favor of the DOC. 
Schlemm v. Wall 
784 F.3d 362 (2015) Seventh Circuit 
Navajo offender 
requested venison or 
even ground beef for 
Ghost Feast.  Outside 
vendors are allowed to 
send in sealed Seder 
platters for Jewish 
offenders. 
Does the denial of the 
request for game meat 
for the Ghost Feast 
violate the offender's 
free exercise?  YES  
The DOC did not show 
that it was the least 
restrictive means.  They 
did not try to price 
outside vendors.  The 
court limited the 
decision to the current 
situation and stated, 
"the costs of 
accommodating other 
inmates' requests 
(should any be made) 
can be left to future 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Holland v. Goord 
758 F.3d 215 (2014) Second Circuit 
Offender was required 
to give urine sample 
during Ramadan when 
he could not drink 
water, and disciplined 
for not doing so. 
Is the requirement to 
drink water during a fast 
or face disciplinary 
action a de minimis 
burden on the offender's 
religious exercise?  NO 
The requirement to 
break the fast by 
drinking water is a 
substantial burden to the 
offender's religious 
exercise. 
Haight v. Thompson 
763 F.3d 554 (2014) Sixth Circuit 
Two groups of death 
row offenders filed suit 
that their rights were 
violated by denial of 
buffalo meat and other 
traditional foods for a 
powwow.  The 
offenders offered to pay 
for the food. 
"Is there a triable issue 
of fact over whether 
RLUIPA gives the 
inmates a right to 
buffalo meat and other 
traditional foods for a 
faith-based once-a-year 




whether the inmates' 
beliefs were sincerely 
held and whether the 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Wall v. Wade 
741 F.3d 492 (2014) Fourth Circuit 
Nation of Islam 
offender was required to 
show property related to 
his religion in order to 
sign up for Ramadan.  
Offender claimed his 
property had been lost 
during a transfer.  
Offender was forced to 
choose between not 
eating and his religious 
beliefs. 
Did the policy require 
the offender to choose 
between survival and 
his religious beliefs?  
YES 
The state did not show 
that the policy was the 
least restrictive means 
of meeting a compelling 
gov't interest. 
Rich v. Sec., FDOC 
716 F.3d 525 (2013) Eleventh Circuit 
Orthodox Jewish 
offender sued over 
request to have kosher 
meals.  New policy was 
enacted that would have 
required offender to eat 
non-kosher diet for 90 
days before being 
considered. 
Was the new Florida 
policy the least 
restrictive means to 
render the offender's 
claim moot?  NO 
The new policy 
substantially burdened 
the offender's religious 
freedom and there was 
no indication that the 
kosher meals would be 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Furnace v. Sullivan 
705 F.3d 1021 (2013) Ninth Circuit 
Shetaut Neter offender 
sued over use of force 
and denial of vegetarian 
meal. 
Does denial of a 
specific meal violate the 
Equal Protection clause 
if the official did not 
know the offender was 
entitled to receive the 
meal?  NO 
The offender did not 
show he was treated any 
differently than any 
other inmate in such a 
situation.  The officers 
thought the offender 
was Muslim. 
Mays v. Springborn 
710 F.3d 631 (2013) 




claimed he was not 
given blackstrap 
molasses, sesame seeds, 
kelp, brewer’s yeast, 
parsley, fenugreek, 
wheat germ, and 
soybeans as required by 
his religion. 
Was denial of dietary 
supplements an 
impediment to the 
offenders free exercise?  
NO 
While the Turner 
prongs must be 
considered, they do not 
have to be separately 
addressed by prison 
officials.  The practice 
of other prisons of 
allowing the 
supplements is not, in 
and of itself, sufficient 
to override prison’s 
argument that denial 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Moussazadeh v. TDCJ 
709 F.3d 487 (2013) 
703 F.3d 781 (2012) 
Fifth Circuit 
Offender demanded free 
kosher food as he had 
on his previous unit.  He 
was transferred due to a 
serious disciplinary 
infraction.  Offender 
would order and 
consume non-kosher 
items from the 
commissary, giving rise 
to doubts about the 
sincerity of his beliefs. 
Does RLUIPA require 
that prison officials 
provide kosher foods?  
NO 
Rehearing was denied. 
Sisney v. Reisch  
674 F.3d 839 (2012) Eighth Circuit 
Offender was denied 
permission to eat his 
Succoth meal in a 
succah19 and sued for 
compensatory damages. 
Was denial of a succah 
a violation of the 
offender’s constitutional 
rights?  NO 
The PLRA does not 
allow compensatory 
damages if physical 
injury did not result.  It 
was not clear that use of 
a succah was a 




                                                 
19 “A temporary shelter covered in natural material, built near a synagogue or house and used especially for meals during the Jewish festival of Succoth” 




Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Vinning-El v. Evans 
657 F.3d 591 (2011) Seventh Circuit 
Moorish Science 
Temple of America 
offender claimed her 
was required to have a 
vegan diet, even though 
his religion required a 
pork-free diet. 
Is the denial of a diet a 
violation of RLUIPA if 
the practice is not a 
central tenet of the 
religion in question?  
MAYBE 
Offender was moved to 
another prison and 
received a vegan diet 
there.  A sincerely held 
belief is entitled to 
RLUIPA protections 
even if it is not the 
central tenet of a 
religion.  However, if 
the request for the diet 
was not related to 
religious purposes, the 
chaplain did not err in 
denying it. 
El-Tabech v. Clarke 
616 F.3d 834 (2010) Eighth Circuit 
After offender sued for 
kosher meals, the 
district court awarded 
him monetary costs and 
fees. 
Does RLUIPA allow 
for monetary costs and 
fees?  MAYBE 




Little v. Jones 
605 F.3d 282 (2010) Sixth Circuit 
Offender was 
mistakenly taken off 
kosher diet and also 
served food that was 
non kosher. 
Does the mistaken 
removal of an offender 
from kosher diet violate 
his Constitutional 
rights?  NO 
The court affirmed the 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Colvin v. Caruso 
605 F.3d 282 (2010) Sixth Circuit 
Jewish offender was 
mistakenly believed to 
be Muslim and not 
given kosher meals for 
16 days.  When the 
error was discovered, 
there were still 
occasions when he was 
accidentally given non-
kosher food.  Offender 
also brought suit against 
lack of Jewish services 
and books in the library. 
Were the wrongful-
removal and failure to 
reinstate claims moot? 
No.  The offender's lack 
of knowledge of Jewish 
scholarship did not 
necessarily indicate an 
insincere belief in his 
religion. 
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone 
600 F.3d 1301 (2010) Tenth Circuit 
Offender claimed he 
was forced to accept 
pudding and jello that 
was not halal. He 
claimed non-pork and 
vegetarian diets were 
not sufficient. 
Does denial of halal diet 
when non-pork and 
vegetarian diets are 
available, infringe on 
religious exercise? 
Offender showed his 
free exercise was 
substantially burdened. 
Remanded for state to 
show that the policy is 
from a compelling 
governmental interest 
and is the least 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Gallagher v. Shelton 
587 F.3d 1063 (2009) Tenth Circuit 
Offender alleged there 
were bodily fluids in his 
meal. 
Is the offender required 
to exhaust 
administrative remedies 
before bringing suit?  
YES 
Affirmed because 
offender did not exhaust 
his administrative 
remedies.   
Perez v. Westchester 
County Dept. of Corr. 
587 F.3d 143 (2009) 
Second Circuit 
The Westchester 
County jail did not want 
to provide halal meals 
to Muslims as often as it 
provided kosher meals 
to Jewish offenders. 
Were offenders the 
prevailing party even 
though the case was 
dismissed?  YES 
The jail must provide 
halal meals to Muslim 
offenders as often as it 
provides kosher meals 
to Jewish offenders.  
Lawsuit was dismissed 
after jail agreed, not 
willingly, to serve halal 
meals at same rate as 
kosher.  Attorneys fees 
were awarded to 
offenders' attorneys 
because offenders 
prevailed even though 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Jova v. Smith 
582 F.3d 410 (2009) Second Circuit 
Offenders claim they 





Did the state prove the 
religious/meatless diet 
was the least restrictive 
means of furthering 
their compelling 
governmental interest?  
NO 
The state did not prove 
that their 
religious/meatless diet 
was the least restrictive 
means of furthering the 
compelling 
governmental interests.  
Remanded to determine 
if an entirely vegetarian 
diet was possible. 
Van Wyhe v. Reisch 




RLUIPA, and denial of 
request for more 
assembly and language 
study time.  Offenders 
requested a succah for 
religious ceremony in 
which to eat their meals. 
"Is RLUIPA 
constitutional under the 




RLUIPA, and denial of 
request for more 
assembly and language 
study time.  Offenders 
requested a succah for 
religious ceremony in 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Nelson v. Miller 
570 F.3d 868 (2009) Seventh Circuit 
Catholic offender 
requested non-meat diet 
for all meals as part of 
penance and was 
denied.  Offender lost 
approximately 50 
pounds 
Was the denial of a non-
meat diet a substantial 
burden of free exercise 
of religion?  YES 
If offender had been 
affiliated with a less 
traditional group, the 
diet would have been 
accommodated. 
Rendelman v. Rouse 
569 F.3d 182 (2009) Fourth Circuit 
Offender was not able 
to eat many available 
food items and keep 
kosher.  He lost 23 
pounds and sued under 
RLUIPA.  He was 
transferred to federal 
prison to serve 
additional sentences.  
MDOC changed its 
policy. 
Does RLUIPA allow 
damages to be awarded 
against "private 
individuals who are not 
themselves recipients of 
federal funding" (p. 
187)?  NO 
The offender's request 
for injunctive relief was 
moot based on transfer 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Cardinal v. Metrish 
564 F.3d 794 (2009) Sixth Circuit 
After several 
disciplinaries, offender 
was sent to a facility 
that had segregation, but 
did not serve kosher 
meals.  When warden 
was notified the 
offender was not eating, 
she transferred him to 
another facility. 
Was unavailability of 
kosher meals for five 
days a violation of the 
offender's Eighth 
Amendment rights? 
NO.  The Warden 
transferred him as soon 
as she became aware of 
the issue. 
Patel v. U.S. BOP 
515 F.3d 807 (2008) Eighth Circuit 
Offender argued 
practice regarding halal 
meals substantially 
burdened his free 
exercise. 
Does a policy have to 
require additional 
access to halal foods to 
meet offenders’ free 
exercise rights?  NO 
The BOP did not act 
with discriminatory 
purposes.  The offender 
did not show why 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Koger v. Bryan 
523 F. 3d 789 (7th Cir. 
2008) 
Seventh Circuit 
Offender was denied 
non-meat diet because it 
was not required by his 
religion.  Offenders 
were required to have 
their religious affiliation 
verified by a prison 
chaplain. 
Is a delay in the 
recognition of a change 
in the offender’s 
religious beliefs a 
violation of his freedom 
of religious practice?  
YES 
The length of time the 
offender pursued the 
issue showed his belief 
was sincere.  The policy 
requiring verification of 
sincerity from religious 
leader was not in 
furtherance of a 
compelling government 
interest nor was it the 
least restrictive means 
available. 
Shakur v. Schriro  
514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
Ninth Circuit 
Originally adopting a 
vegetarian diet, the 
offender asked to switch 
to a kosher meat diet 
after experiencing 
health issues.  Claimed 
prison’s refusal violated 
the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
Does denial of a kosher 
meal for the practice of 
religious beliefs 
constitute a First 
Amend. violation?  YES 
The court found the 
offender's belief was 
sincere and the State's 
refusal to allow him a 
kosher meat diet 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Baranowski v. Hart  
486 F.3d 112 (2007) Fifth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
that the provision of 
pork-free and vegetarian 
options was not a 
sufficient substitute for 
kosher meals. 
Was the denial of 
weekly Jewish religious 
services as well as other 
holy day services along 
with failure to provide 
kosher diet a violation 
under the First and 
Fourteenth Amend. and 
RLUIPA?  NO 
•Offender had 
alternative means for 
religious expression; no 
rabbi was available for 
days requested by 
offender for service. 
•Dietary 
accommodations not 
required if they would 
cause undue costs and 
admin. burden on State 
and no kosher meals 
were least restrictive 
means of obtaining 
legitimate gov't interest. 
•Overall policy on 
religious services did 
not substantially burden 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Lovelace v. Lee  
472 F.3d 174 (2006) Fourth Circuit 
Offender was removed 
from list of offenders 
allowed to observe 
Ramadan and attend 
services.  An officer 
“erroneously” identified 
the offender as breaking 
the fast by accepting a 
lunch tray.  The officer 
admitted he made a 
mistake.   
Was the Ramadan 
policy the least 
restrictive means of 
achieving a legitimate 
gov’t interest?  NO 
The state did not show 
that the policy was the 
least restrictive means.  
The offender’s free 
exercise was 
substantially burdened. 
“A reasonable factfinder 
would conclude the 
officer acted 
intentionally in 
misidentifying…”   
Madison v. Virginia 
474 F.3d 118 (2006) Fourth Circuit 
Offender brought suit 
over denial of kosher 
meals and state argued 
that RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional. 
Is RLUIPA an 
overreach of Congress's 
powers and a violation 
of the Spending and 
Commerce Clause?  NO 
RLUIPA does not, 
however require 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Williams v. Bitner 
455 F.3d 186 (2006) Third Circuit 
Offender was fired for 
refusing to handle pork 
and given a job where 
he made less money. 
Is firing an offender 
from his kitchen job for 
refusing to serve pork 
unconstitutional?  YES 
The U.S. Courts of 
Appeal from the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuits had previously 
held that prison officials 
were required to 
accommodate a Muslim 
inmate's religious 
beliefs regarding the 
handling of pork, and 
the Third Circuit Court 
itself along with the 
U.S. Supreme Court 
supported the principles 
underlying the inmate's 
asserted right. Thus, the 
state of the law at the 
time of violation gave 
the prison officials fair 
warning that their 
treatment of the inmate 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Benning v. GA 
391 F.3d 1299 (2004) Eleventh Circuit 
Jewish offender brought 
suit that he was not 
allowed to constantly 
wear a yarmulke, eat 
only kosher foods, and 
observe holy days and 
rituals. 
Does RLUIPA violate 
the Establishment 
Clause or the Tenth 
Amendment?  NO 
Congress did not 
overstep its powers by 
predicating receipt of 
federal funds on 
adherence to RLUIPA. 
DeHart v. Horn 
390 F.3d 262 (2004) Third Circuit 
Buddhist offender 
requested a special diet.  
The state claimed it 
would require 
individualized 
preparation and denied 
it. 
Does RLUIPA replace 
RFRA for the states?  
YES 
The court held that the 
religious practice did 
not have to be usual or 
mandatory 
Goff v. Graves 
362 F.3d 543 (2004) Eighth Circuit 
Offenders sued over 
denial of prison officials 
to allow banquet food 
trays to offender 
members in segregation.  
CONS had been ruled a 
religion in the 8th 
Circuit, but deemed a 
"masquerade" in Texas. 
Was denial of food trays 
for CONS offenders a 
violation of their First 
Amendment rights?  
NO 
The ban on food tray 
deliveries was rooted in 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Searles v. Dechant 
393 F.3d 1126 (2004) Tenth Circuit 
Jewish offender did not 
work in non-kosher 
kitchen job assignment 
and received 
disciplinary cases, 
losing his privileges to 
own some property 
items.  The rabbi told 
him that it was not 
against his religion to 
work in a non-kosher 
kitchen. 
Does working in a non-
kosher kitchen violate 
an offender's expression 
of religious freedom?  
NO 
Working in the kitchen 
was not a violation of 
the offender's religious 
expression of freedom, 
as evaluated by the 
Turner test.  
Shakur v. Selsky 
391 F.3d 106 (2004) Second Circuit 
The district court held 
that denial of a single 
religious festival meal 
was not a substantial 
burden on the 
offender’s religious 
exercise.  The claim 
was dismissed. 
Is the denial to attend 
the Muslim holiday Eid 
Ul Fitr a legitimate 
claim under an 
offender’s First Amend. 
and RLUIPA rights?  
YES 
The court remanded the 
case to the district court 
for further proceedings 
in regards to the 
offender’s First Amend. 
and RLUIPA 
allegations.  Claims 
regarding due process 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Ford v. McGinnis 
352 F.3d 582 (2003) Second Circuit 
Muslim offender 
claimed he was denied 
the opportunity to 
celebrate the end of 
Ramadan, with Eid ul 
Fitr feast. 
Were the offender's 
religious beliefs 
substantially burdened 
by the policy?  YES 
Vacated and remanded 
to ascertain whether the 
prison officials' policies 
were reasonably related 
to legitimate 
penological purposes. 
Lindell v. McCallum 
352 F.3d 1107 (2003) Seventh Circuit 
The offender alleged 
that his Wotanist dietary 
restrictions were 
ignored. 
Does refusal to allow 
dietary restrictions 
because of failure to 
recognize a religion 
violate Constitutional 
rights?  YES 
Remanded to district 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Madison v. Riter  




offender sued over 
prison officials’ refusal 
to provide a kosher 
meal, citing availability 
of regular, vegetarian, 
and no pork daily 
meals. 
Is denial of kosher 
meals due to doubt of 
the offender’s sincere 
beliefs a violation of 
RLUIPA?  YES   
Is RLUIPA a violation 
of the Establishment 
Clause?  NO 
If mandated by the 
offender's religion, 
denial of a kosher diet 
places a substantial 
burden on offender's 
religious freedom.  The 
State did not prove a 
rational or compelling 
reason for denial of the 
meal.  The district court 
held that RLUIPA was a 
violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  
Upon appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit determined it 
was not. 
Resnick v. Adams 
348 F.3d 763 (2003) Ninth Circuit 
Offender was an 
Orthodox Jew who 
required a kosher diet.  
Offenders were required 
to submit a "'written 
statement articulating 
the religious motivation 
for participation'" in the 
diet (p. 765). 
Is the requirement to fill 
out a form so as to 
receive kosher food a 
violation of the First 
Amendment? NO 
Unless the offenders 
"'participated, or 
attempted to participate, 
in the [diet program], he 
could not be injured by, 
and would have no 
standing to challenge,'" 





Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Williams v. Morton 
343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 
2003) 
Third Circuit 
Offender’s request for 
kosher meals was 
denied because: 
*the offender “already 
had adequate alternative 
from the regular, 
vegetarian, and no pork 
daily menus”; 
*the prison “doubted 
the sincerity of [the 
offender’s] religious 
beliefs”; 
*of the offender’s 
disciplinary history. 
Is the failure to provide 
halal meat for the 
practice of offenders’ 
Islamic beliefs 
unconstitutional?  NO 
The court held the 
regulation furthered the 
legitimate penological 
interests of simplified 
food service, security, 
and costs. 
Kind v. Frank 
329 F.3d 979 (2003) Eighth Circuit 
The Muslim offender 
requested a vegetarian 
diet.  The state offered 
him a pork-free diet in 
convention with Islamic 
practices. 
Is denial of vegetarian 
diet a violation of the 
offender's sincerely held 
religious beliefs?  NO 
The court affirmed the 






Title of Dietary Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Resnick v. Adams 
317 F.3d 1056 (2003) Ninth Circuit 
Offender was an 
Orthodox Jew who 
required a kosher diet.     
Offenders were required 
to submit a "'written 
statement articulating 
the religious motivation 
for participation'" in the 
diet (p. 1059).           
Is the requirement to fill 
out a form so as to 
receive kosher food a 
violation of RFRA? NO 
The offender had not 
shown sufficient cause 
to constitute a RFRA 
violation and the court 
affirmed summary 







U.S. Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious grooming accommodations since passage of RLUIPA (2000) 
Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Ware v. Louisiana 
Dep’t of Corrections 
866 F.3d 263 (2017) 
Fifth Circuit 
Rastafarian offender 
sued under RLUIPA 
against policy that 
prohibited his 
dreadlocks. 
Is a policy prohibiting 
the wearing of 
dreadlocks for religious 
purposes 
unconstitutional?  YES 
The state did not show 
that the policy was the 
least restrictive means 
of meeting a compelling 
gov't interest. 
Smith v. Owens 
848 F.3d 975 (2017) Eleventh Circuit 
Islamic offender 
claimed that policy 
required he shave his 
beard in violation of his 
religious beliefs. 
Is requiring an offender 
to shave a violation of 
his free exercise?  YES 
The district court's 
ruling was vacated and 
remanded in light of the 
decision in Holt v. 
Hobbs. 
Davis v. Davis 
826 F.3d 258 (2016) Fifth Circuit 
Offender alleged 
prohibition against 
growing a kouplock was 
a violation of his 
RLUIPA and First 
Amendment rights 
because female 
offenders were allowed 
to grow their hair long. 
Does the policy against 
growing a kouplock 
violate RLUIPA and the 
First Amendment?  
MAYBE 
Summary judgment was 
vacated because of Holt 
v. Hobbs (2015) and 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Ali v. Stephens 
822 F.3d 776 (2016) Fifth Circuit 
Muslim offender 
claimed his free 
exercise was burdened 
by prohibition against 
wearing kufi and 4" 
beard. 
Does the policy 
prohibiting a 4" beard 
and wearing a kufi at all 
times violate RLUIPA?  
YES 
The prison did not show 
that the policies were in 
the government's 
compelling interest or 
that they were the least 
restrictive means. 
Knight v. Thompson 
797 F.3d 934 (2013) 
723 F.3d 275 (2013) 
796 F.3d 1289 (2015) 
Eleventh Circuit 
Policy requiring short 
hair was challenged as a 
violation of practicing 
their Native American 
religious freedom. 
Is the DOC’s policy 
requiring short hair the 
least restrictive means 
of furthering a 
compelling 
governmental interest?  
YES 
The case was different 
from Holt due to the 
“detailed record 
developed” showing the 
policy was necessary to 
mitigate “actual 
security, discipline, 
hygiene, and safety 
risks” (Knight v. 
Thompson, 2015, p. 
1293). 
Garner v. Kennedy 
713 F.3d 237 (2013) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed policy 
prohibiting facial hair 
violated his exercise of 
religious freedom. 
Is the DOC’s policy 
requiring short hair the 
least restrictive means 
of furthering a 
compelling 
governmental interest?  
NO 
TDCJ did not show the 
actual cost of changing 
the policy.  The 
argument of offender 
identification was 
negated because 
shaving their heads 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Lewis v. Sternes  
712 F.3d 1083 (2013) Seventh Circuit 
Nazirite vow required 
offender to commit to 
not cutting his hair.  The 
DOC’s policy allowed 
long hair if it did not 
create a security risk.  
Offender was not 
allowed to have visitors 
until he consented to 
have his hair cut.  His 
hair was in dreadlocks. 
Prior to court hearing, 
offender was given 
choice of cutting hair or 
segregation.  He cut his 
hair. 
Does the ad hoc policy 
of removing dreadlocks 
in some cases violated 
RLUIPA?  NO 
The Illinois prison had a 
different policy from 
another similar Illinois 
prison.  However, their 
visitation policies were 
different.  The 
offender’s dreadlocks 
were too difficult to 
search.  The offender’s 





Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Stewart v. Beach  
701 F.3d 1322 (2012) Tenth Circuit 
Rastafarian offender 
was required to cut his 
dreadlocks or forfeit a 
transfer to be closer to 
his ill mother.  Officers 
were warned policy 
may violate First 
Amend. 
Does warning of 
potential First Amend. 
violation negate 
officer’s qualified 
immunity?  NO 
Does RLUIPA allow 
individual-capacity 
claims?  NO 
Warden was properly 
granted summary 
judgment as denying a 
grievance appeal did not 
create personal violation 
of rights.  Plaintiff did 
not clearly establish that 
enforcement of policy 
violated his rights.  
RLUIPA only allowed 
cause of action against 
government, not 
individuals. 
Couch v. Jabe  
679 F.3d 197 (2012) Fourth Circuit 
Sunni Muslim offender 
denied permit to grow 
1/8” beard.   
Does failure to consider 
offender’s proposed 
alternative negate the 
state’s claim of least 
restrictive means?  YES 
Offender showed his 
free exercise was 
substantially burdened.  
State did not show 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Grayson v. Schuler 
666 F.3d 450 (2012) Seventh Circuit 
African Hebrew 
Israelites of Jerusalem 
offender claimed ban of 
his dreadlocks was a 
violation of his First 
Amendment rights.  
Prison officials claimed 
they were a security 
risk, but allowed 
Rastafarians to have 
them.   
Is it constitutional to 
allow one religious 
group to have an 
accommodation that is 
not allowed to another 
group?  NO 
Despite the chaplain's 
opinion that the African 
Hebrew Israelites of 
Jerusalem did not 
require dreadlocks, the 
policy was 
discriminatory. 
Kuperman v. Wrenn 
645 F.3d 69 (2011) First Circuit 
New Hampshire DOC 
allowed a religious 
waiver to inmates, 
allowing a ¼” beard.  
Offender sued to allow 
a full, untrimmed beard 
in accordance with his 
faith. 
Is a beard length 
restriction reasonably 
related to a legitimate 




judgment as offender 
did not show evidence 
repudiating prison’s 
claim that policy was 
reasonable related to 
security. 
DeMoss v. Crain  
636 F.3d 145 (2011) Fifth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
the policy requiring 
offenders to be clean-
shaven was a violation 
of RLUIPA. 
Is the clean-shaven 
grooming policy the 
least restrictive means 
of serving compelling 
gov’t interests?  YES 
The policy aids in 
identification of 
offenders, searching for 
contraband, and saves 







Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Kimbrough v. 
California 
609 F.3d 1027 (2010) 
Ninth Circuit 
Offender sued over hair 
length.  Before reaching 
the appeals court, he 
had been released and 
the DOC had changed 
the hair policy. 
If the case becomes 
moot, and no actual 
violation of the 
offender's rights is thus 
found, should attorney's 
fees be awarded?  NO 
The district court never 
actually ruled on the 
offender's claims. 
Holley v. Cal. Dep't of 
Corr.  
599 F.3d 1108 (2010) 
Ninth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
the grooming policy 
imposed a substantial 
burden on his free 
exercise.  He sought 
monetary damages. 
Does acceptance of 
federal funds require the 
state to waive sovereign 
immunity regarding 
RLUIPA?  NO 
The policy was changed 
during the course of the 
lawsuit, and the 
offender was allowed to 
have long hair.  
RLUIPA does not 
require the state to 
waive sovereign 
immunity. 
Smith v. Ozmint  
578 F.3d 246 (2009) Fourth Circuit 
The offender’s head 
was forcibly shaved in 
accordance with the 
maximum security unit 
use policy.  The 
offender claimed it 
violated his rights under 
RLUIPA. 
Is forcibly shaving an 
offender’s head the least 
restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling 
gov’t interest?  NO 
The state did not prove 
that the policy furthered 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Fowler v. Crawford 
534 F.3d 931 (2008) Eighth Circuit 
The offender brought 
suit over refusal to 
allow access to a sweat 
lodge.  The state refused 
on the basis that the 
ceremony would 
include access to 
property such as rocks, 
willow poles, shovels, 
deer antlers, and split 
wood, which could be 
used as weapons. 
Does an offender have a 
right under RLUIPA to 
exercise his Native 
American religious 
beliefs through sweat 
lodge ceremonies with 
other offenders at the 
maximum security 
prison?  NO 
Prohibition of sweat 
lodge met a compelling 
governmental interest 
and was the least 
restrictive means to 
obtain safety and 
security. 
Rasul v. Myers  
512 F.3d 644 (2008) 
555 U.S. 1083 (2008) 
563 F.3d 527 (2009) 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
British nationals 
detained at Guantanamo 
Bay alleged “forced 
shaving of their beards, 
banning or interrupting 
their prayers, denying 
them copies of the 
Koran and prayer mats 
and throwing a copy of 
the Koran in a toilet 
bucket” (512 F.3d 644, 
p. 650). 
Are non-citizen 
detainees protected by 
RFRA?  NO 
SCOTUS vacated and 
remanded in light to 
decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008).  D.C. Circuit 
held that non-citizen 
detainees were not 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Fegans v. Norris  
537 F.3d 897 (2008) Eighth Circuit 
Offender claimed 
grooming policy was a 
violation of his free 
exercise.  He claimed 
the policy violated 
equal protection rights 
as women offenders had 
a different policy.  He 
also noted the medical 
exemption policy. 
Is the policy requiring 
clean-shaven offenders 
and short hair a 
violation of RLUIPA?  
NO 
Female offenders are 
historically less violent 
than male offenders and 
different policies do not 
violate the offender’s 
Equal Protection rights.  
The offender did not 
argue that he wanted the 
same length as those 
granted in medical 
exemptions.  The policy 
was reasonably related 
to the gov’t interests in 
safety and security. 
Longoria v. Dretke  
507 F.3d 898 (2007) Fifth Circuit 
Native-American 
offender claimed denial 
of his request to grow 
his hair violated his free 
exercise rights. 
Does the policy 
regarding hair length 
violate the offender’s 
free exercise rights?  
NO 
The offender, in his pro 
se complaint, did not 
name RLUIPA.  The 
court had decided the 
same issue under RFRA 
and ruled that the test 
was “sufficiently the 





Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff  
422 F.3d 366 (2005) Sixth Circuit 
The offender brought 
suit over policy 
requiring he cut his hair 
in violation of his 
Native American 
beliefs.  An injunction 
allowed him to keep a 
“kouplock.” The 
offender had a long 
history of institutional 
misconduct regarding 
contraband. 
Is the district court 
required to give 
deference to the 
expertise of prison 
officials?  YES 
RLUIPA and RFRA 
required that suitable 
deference be given to 
prison officials in 
creating policy.  The 
injunction allowing the 
kouplock should not 
have been given. 
Warsoldier v. Woodford  
418 F.3d 989 (2005) Ninth Circuit 
Native American 
offender appealed hair 
length policy for male 
offenders.  He was 
housed at a minimum 
security prison, and the 
policy for female 
prisoners was different. 
Is a higher standard of 
proof required to show 
compelling gov’t 
interests over legitimate 
penological interests?  
YES 
The state did not show 
that the security level of 
the offender was 
considered, or that they 
had considered less 
restrictive means, or 
show why the females’ 





Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Adkins v. Kaspar 
393 F.3d 559 (2004) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
Yahweh Evangelical 
Assembly free exercise 
was hindered because 
officials would not let 
followers observe holy 
days or allow assembly 
without a trained 
volunteer. 
Does prohibition of 
assembly without a 
trained volunteer 
substantially burden the 
offenders’ religious 
exercise?  NO 
The state allowed 
sufficient alternative 
means for the followers 
to practice their 
religious beliefs. 
Henderson v. Terhune  
379 F.3d 709 (2004) Ninth Circuit 
Offender stated the 
CDOC’s policy 
regarding hair length 
violated his free 
exercise. 
Does the policy meet 
the Turner test?  YES 
Can an offender obtain 
recourse under AIRFA?  
NO 
The policy is in keeping 
with prison goals, and 
would unduly burden 
administrators if 
removed.  AIRFA did 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Wyatt v. Terhune 
305 F.3d 1033 (2002) 
280 F.3d 1238 (2002) 
315 F.3d 1108 (2003) 
Ninth Circuit 
Rastafarian offender 
brought suit against 
policy that required him 
to cut his dreadlocks in 
violation of his religious 
beliefs 
Is CDOC policy 
unconstitutional?  NO 
Offender filed using 
RFRA, which was 
declared 
unconstitutional.  The 
court reversed.  The 
equal protection claim 
was dismissed because 
the offender’s 
administrative remedies 
had not been exhausted. 
A rehearing was denied 
at 305 F.3d 1033 (2003) 






Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Taylor v. Johnson  
257 F.3d 470 (2001) Fifth Circuit 
Muslim offender sued 
over policy which did 
not allow beards, 
claiming it violated his 
First Amendment rights. 
Is a policy prohibiting 
the wearing of facial 
hair unconstitutional?  
NO 
*In a previous case, the 
court had found the 
policy reasonably 
related to legitimate 
penological practices. 
*The Equal Protection 
claim was vacated and 
remanded.  In Taylor v. 
Groom, 74 Fed. Appx. 
369 (2003), claim of 
disparate treatment was 
vacated as offender had 
been released from 
prison. 
Jackson v. District of 
Columbia  
254 F.3d 262 (2001) 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
Rastafarian and Muslim 
offenders filed suit 
citing RFRA against 
prison policy requiring 
short hair and 
prohibiting beards.  
District court ruled they 
had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies. 
Does the PLRA apply to 
RFRA actions?  YES 
Was the “irreparable 
injury” argument 
sufficient to find PLRA 
did not apply in this 
case (p. 267)?  NO 
Remanded with order to 
dismiss without 
prejudice so that 
administrative remedies 





Title of Grooming Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Ruling 
Flagner v. Wilkinson  
241 F.3d 475 (2001) Ninth Circuit 
Orthodox Hasidic 
Jewish offender 
requested damages after 
prison officials forcibly 
cut his beard and 
sidelocks. 
Did defendants’ actions 
violate a clear 
constitutional right?  
NO 
Was policy 
constitutional?  NOT 
DECIDED 
Reversed denial of 
summary judgment and 
remanded to consider 
constitutionality of 
policy. 
Green v. Polunsky  
229 F.3d 486 (2000) 
Fifth Circuit 
Muslim offender filed 
suit regarding policy 
that required him to be 
clean shaven.  He 
claimed it violated the 
First Amendment Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Does grooming policy 
violate Free Exercise 
Clause?  NO 
Policy is “reasonably 
related to legitimate 
penological interests” 
and “did not deprive 
plaintiff of all means of 
expressing his religious 







U.S. Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious accommodations for pat and strip searches since passage of RLUIPA (2000) 
Title of Searches Case U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin 
553 F.3d 669 (2008) D.C. Circuit 
Offender claimed 
extracting DNA from 
any type sample from 
his body was a violation 
of his religious free 
exercise. 
Does the DNA Analysis 
Backlog Elimination 
Act of 2000 violate free 
exercise?  NO 
Offender did not show 
any specific free 
exercise that was 
substantially burdened.  
He did not argue the 
collecting of the sample 
was problematic; only 
the extraction of DNA 






U.S. Courts of Appeals cases regarding religious accommodations for general exercise of religious freedom since passage of 
RLUIPA (2000) 
 
Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Mack v. Warden Loretto 
FCI 
839 F.3d 286 (2016) 
Third Circuit 
Offender brought suit 
under RFRA for 
harassment due to his 
Muslim faith, and its 
effects on his ability to 
pray at work. 
Does RFRA prohibit 
individual conduct that 
substantially burdens 
religious exercise?  
YES 
The offender's failure 
"to challenge a prison 
policy or regulation 
does not defeat his 





Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Walker v. Beard 
789 F.3d 1125 (2015) Ninth Circuit 
Odinist offender 
claimed that housing 
policy would interfere 
with his religious 
beliefs by potential 
housing him with a non-
white cellmate.  He also 
claimed he could not 
perform an Odinist 
ritual in front of any 
non-white person -- 
therefore, he would be 
precluded from 
performing the ritual 
due to the housing 
policy. 
"Is the housing policy a 
substantial burden on 
the offender's Free 
Exercise rights?  YES 
Odinist offender 
claimed that housing 
policy would interfere 
with his religious 
beliefs by potential 
housing him with a non-
white cellmate.  He also 
claimed he could not 
perform an Odinist 
ritual in front of any 
non-white person -- 
therefore, he would be 
precluded from 
performing the ritual 
due to the housing 
policy. 
Padilla v. Yoo  
678 F.3d 748 (2012) Ninth Circuit 
Plaintiff was arrested 
and detained after 9/11, 
and designated as an 
enemy combatant.  He 
alleged, among other 
issues, that he was not 
freely able to exercise 
his religion – in 
violation of RFRA. 
Was it clearly 
established at the time 
in question that RFRA 
was applicable to 
enemy combatants in 
military detention?  NO 
The defendant was 
entitled to qualified 
immunity as it was not 
clearly established that 






Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
DeMoss v. Crain  
636 F.3d 145 (2011) Fifth Circuit 
The offender claimed 
the policy requiring 
offenders to sit in the 
dayroom so that officers 
could have an 
unobstructed view was 
a violation of RLUIPA 
because he had to leave 
the dayroom to pray. 
Is the dayroom policy a 
substantial burden on 
the offender’s religious 
freedom?  NO 
The offender’s religious 
exercise is not 
substantially burdened 
as he is allowed to 
decide whether to stay 
in dayroom or go to his 
cell to pray. 
Maddox v. Love 
655 F.3d 709 (2011) Seventh Circuit 
During grievance 
process about loss of 
religious services, 
offender was "never 
informed that grievance 
was incomplete or 
procedurally deficient" 
(p. 712). 
Was the cancellation of 
services due to budget 
cuts a violation of the 
offender's religious 
rights?  YES 
The failure to "provide 
reasonable access to 
religious materials" was 
not administratively 
exhausted, so the court 
affirmed (p. 712).  The 
two counts regarding 
budget allocations were 
reversed due to 
preliminary dismissal 
during the grievance 
screening.  The claim 






Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Rasul v. Myers  
563 F.3d 527 (2009) 
512 F.3d 644 (2008) 
555 U.S. 1083 (2008) 
 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
British nationals 
detained at Guantanamo 
Bay alleged “forced 
shaving of their beards, 
banning or interrupting 
their prayers, denying 
them copies of the 
Koran and prayer mats 
and throwing a copy of 
the Koran in a toilet 
bucket” (512 F.3d 644, 
p. 650). 
Are non-citizen 
detainees protected by 
RFRA?  NO 
SCOTUS vacated and 
remanded in light to 
decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008).  D.C. Circuit 
held that non-citizen 
detainees were not 
subject to protections of 
RFRA. 
Jova v. Smith 
582 F.3d 410 (2009) Second Circuit 
Offenders claimed they 
must fight and spar as 
part of their religious 
practice. 
Does the prohibition of 
potentially violent 
physical activities 
provide the least 
restrictive means of 
fulfilling a compelling 
government interest?  
YES 
The prohibition against 






Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Johnson v. Rowley 
569 F.3d 40 (2009) Second Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
termination from prison 
job was due to 
supervisor's prejudice 
towards the Islamic 
faith, in violation of 
RFRA. 
Does the failure to 
submit RFRA allegation 




remedies?  NO 
The BOP policy did not 
allow offenders to 
amend their grievances 
with other issues not 
raised in lower levels of 
the grievance process. 
Fowler v. Crawford  
534 F.3d 931 (2008) Eighth Circuit 
The offender brought 
suit over refusal to 
allow access to a sweat 
lodge.  The state refused 
on the basis that the 
ceremony would 
include access to 
property such as rocks, 
willow poles, shovels, 
deer antlers, and split 
wood, which could be 
used as weapons. 
Does an offender have a 
right under RLUIPA to 
exercise his Native 
American religious 
beliefs through sweat 
lodge ceremonies with 
other offenders at the 
maximum security 
prison?  NO 
Prohibition of sweat 
lodge met a compelling 
governmental interest 
and was the least 
restrictive means to 
obtain safety and 
security. 
Alvarez v. Hill 
518 F.3d 1152 (2008) Ninth Circuit 
Native American 
offender sued for the 
right to practice religion 
without discrimination 
or harassment. 
Does the failure of the 
inmate to invoke 
RLUIPA vanquish its 
use in this suit? 
No.  The facts of the 
case establish "a 
plausible entitlement to 
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Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Iqbal v. Hasty 
490 F.3d 143 (2008) 
556 U.S. 662 (2009) 
Second Circuit 
Detained immediately 
post 9/11, plaintiff 
alleged he was not 
allowed to pray in 
prison because he was a 
Muslim. 
Were defendants 
entitled to qualified 
immunity due to failure 
to state a claim and 
because defendants 
claimed no personal 
involvement?  NO 
The Second Circuit held 
that the defendants were 
not entitled to qualified 
immunity,  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that 
conclusory allegations 
that government 
officials knew of 
actions taken by 
subordinates could not 
be a basis for unlawful 
discrimination claim. 
Second Circuit noted, 
“Hasty’s arguments that 
the repeated banging on 
Iqbal’s cell while he 
prayed shows that he 
was at least allowed to 





Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Spratt v. Wall  
482 F.3d 33 (2007) First Circuit 
For seven years, 
Universal Life Church 
offender was allowed to 
preach in the chapel.  
New warden prohibited 
him from continuing 
preaching with the 
threat of disciplinary 
action if he continued to 
do so. 
Did the change in policy 
which no longer 
allowed an offender to 
preach violate his rights 
under RLUIPA?  YES 
The State did not show 
the compelling 
government interest in 
prison security was 
furthered by prohibiting 
offenders from 
preaching or even that 
the prohibition would 
have been the least 
restrictive means 
available. 
Madison v. Virginia 
474 F.3d 118 (2006) Fourth Circuit 
Offender brought suit 
over denial of kosher 
meals and state argued 
that RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional. 
Is RLUIPA an 
overreach of Congress's 
powers and a violation 
of the Spending and 
Commerce Clause?  NO 
RLUIPA does not, 
however require 
monetary damages to be 
paid. 
Benning v. GA 
391 F.3d 1299 (2004) Eleventh Circuit 
Jewish offender brought 
suit that he was not 
allowed to constantly 
wear a yarmulke, eat 
only kosher foods, and 
observe holy days and 
rituals. 
Does RLUIPA violate 
the Establishment 
Clause or the Tenth 
Amendment?  NO 
Congress did not 
overstep its powers by 
predicating receipt of 
federal funds on 





Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Adkins v. Kaspar 
393 F.3d 559 (2004) Fifth Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
Yahweh Evangelical 
Assembly free exercise 
was hindered because 
officials would not let 
followers observe holy 
days or allow assembly 
without a trained 
volunteer. 
Does prohibition of 
assembly without a 
trained volunteer 
substantially burden the 
offenders’ religious 
exercise?  NO 
The state allowed 
sufficient alternative 
means for the followers 
to practice their 
religious beliefs. 
Murphy v. MO DOC 
372 F.3d 979 (2004) Eighth Circuit 
Offender claimed his 
Yahweh Evangelical 
Assembly free exercise 
was hindered because 
officials would not let 
followers observe holy 
days or allow assembly 
without a trained 
volunteer. 
Does prohibition of 
assembly without a 
trained volunteer 
substantially burden the 
offenders’ religious 
exercise?  NO 
The state allowed 
sufficient alternative 
means for the followers 
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Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Lindell v. McCallum 
352 F.3d 1107 (2003) Seventh Circuit 
Wotanist offender 
alleged he was 
prevented from free 
exercise of his religion. 
Does failure to 
recognize a religion 
violate RLUIPA?  NO 
The district court denied 
in forma pauperis 
proceeding and deemed 
the suit harassing.  The 
7th Cir. noted the claim 
was appropriate under 
RLUIPA and the State 
did not show a 
compelling interest.  
The case was remanded 
and later dismissed for 
failure to follow Federal 
Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali 
v. District of Columbia  
278 F.3d 1 (2002) 
District of Columbia 
Circuit 
Offender sued over 
transfer to D.C. prison 
and administrators’ 
decision he had to serve 
under his birth name 
rather than his legal 
name (changed for 
religious purposes). 
Is a policy to use an 
offender’s birth name 
rather than legal name 
(for religious reasons) a 
burden to the offender’s 
free exercise in 
violation of RFRA?  
NOT DECIDED 
Administrators may use 
the name under which 








Title of General 
Exercise Case 
U.S. Court of Appeals Facts Issue Holding 
Fraise v. Terhune 
283 F.3d 506 (2002) Third Circuit 
Offenders sued over 
decision to designate 
Five Percent Nation as a 
Security Threat Group. 
Does the policy violate 
the offenders' First 
Amendment rights?  
NO 
The policy was 
constitutional under the 
Turner test. 
Clark v. Long 
255 F.3d 555 (2001) Eighth Circuit 
Moorish Science 
Temple of America 
offender claimed his job 
as a dishwasher caused 
him to come into 
contact with pork 
products, violating his 
religious beliefs.  
Offender had to chose 
between washing pans 
or disciplinary action. 
Was judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of 
the defendant correct?  
YES.   
Offender had sufficient 
notice to correct his 
case weaknesses. 
Kikumura v. Hurley 
242 F.3d 950 (2001) 
Tenth Circuit 
Buddhist offender was 
denied pastoral visits 
from a Methodist 
minister. 
Does RLUIPA require a 
religious belief to be 
mandated by the 
religion?  NO 
The offender did not 
have to implicitly state 
whether his beliefs 
required pastoral visits.  
The court held they 
were a religious 
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